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FOREWORD

Conventional wisdom portrays the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a backward
continental force that will not pose a military challenge to its
neighbors or to the United States well into the 21st century.
PLA writings that demonstrate interest in exploiting the
revolution in military affairs (RMA) are dismissed by a large
segment of the PLA-watching community as wistful fantasies.
Major Mark A. Stokes, assistant air attaché in Beijing
from 1992-1995, offers an alternative perspective. In this
study, funded by the United States Air Force Institute for
National Security Studies, he outlines emerging PLA
operational concepts and a range of research and development
projects that appear to have been heavily influenced by U.S.
and Russian writings on the RMA. Fulfillment of the PLA’s
vision for the 21st century could have significant
repercussions for U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Major Stokes ventures into facets of PLA modernization
that are often ignored. Backed by extensive documentation,
he argues that the revolutionary modernization of the PRC’s
telecommunications infrastructure, a robust space-, air-, and
ground-based sensor network, and prioritization of electronic
attack systems could enable the PLA to gain information
dominance in future armed conflicts around its periphery.
Information dominance would be further boosted by China’s
traditional emphasis on information denial and deception.
In discussing the most likely scenario for PLA military
action, Major Stokes postulates that information
dominance—supported by a new generation of increasingly
accurate and lethal theater missiles—could give the PLA a
decisive edge in a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Highly
accurate conventional theater missiles would play an
especially critical role in rapid establishment of air
superiority by suppressing airbases and neutralizing air
defenses. Furthermore, the author argues that the PLA is
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striving to develop the capacity to complicate U.S.
intervention in a Taiwan crisis.
In his appendices, the author provides an initial glimpse
into PLA military space and directed energy weapons
development. With extensive foreign technical assistance,
China is investing in largely dual-use space-based systems
that could provide the PLA with a valued-added boost to its
overall military capabilities. In addition, China’s development of “new concept” directed energy weapons— including
high powered microwave and high powered lasers—may
become a reality in the not-too-distant future.
Stokes argues that, while the PLA faces obstacles in
fulfilling its modernization objectives, underestimating
China’s ability to make revolutionary breakthroughs in key
areas could have significant ramifications for U.S. national
security interests.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the last decade, the Chinese
defense-industrial complex has initiated a focused strategic
modernization program to meet the requirements of 21st
century warfare. Chinese leaders, faced with numerous
perceived national security challenges, have called for a
readjustment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine
requiring the modernization of its space, information,
long-range precision strike, and other strategic dimensions of
warfare.
This study offers an alternative analytical approach to
understanding PLA modernization. Ground force analysts,
who tend to dominate the PLA studies field, naturally view
the PLA mostly in terms of field equipment such as tanks,
artillery, basic soldier skills, maneuver, and firepower. Air
force analysts usually focus on aircraft, aircraft production,
and pilot skills. Navy analysts think of the PLA in terms of
destroyers, frigates, and other sea-based platforms. From
these perspectives, the PLA is viewed as hopelessly backward,
with little prospect, at least within the next 15-20 years, of
becoming a challenge to any power in the region. These
analysts are not necessarily wrong in their conclusions.
Conventional PLA ground, air, and naval forces are woefully
inadequate, and it is difficult to believe that they will be able
to overcome shortcomings in the short to mid-term.
These traditional approaches, however, often gloss over
strategic aspects of PLA modernization. There is an
influential segment within China’s defense-industrial
complex which is concentrating on the development of
doctrine and systems designed to enable targeting of
adversarial strategic and operational centers of gravity, and
defend its own, in order to pursue limited political objectives
with an asymmetrical economy of force. In other words, the
PLA, as part of its long-range regional security strategy, is
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attempting to develop an ability to target an enemy’s
forward-based command, control, communications,
4
computers, and intelligence (C I) nodes, airbases, aircraft
2
carriers and sea-based C platforms, as well as critical nodes
in space. Knowing the importance of protecting centers of
gravity, Beijing is also prioritizing the fielding of systems to
defend its own.
China’s strategic modernization, if successful, will enable
the PLA to conduct operations intended to directly achieve
strategic effects by striking the enemy centers of gravity.
These operations are meant to achieve their objectives
without having to necessarily engage the adversary’s fielded
military forces in extended operations. Strategic attack
objectives often include producing effects to demoralize the
enemy’s leadership, military forces, and population, thus
affecting an adversary’s capability to continue the conflict.
One of the key target systems of strategic attack is an
adversary’s command and control system. As Chinese and
Western analysts have pointed out, disrupting the ability to
communicate can be a critical step toward achieving strategic
paralysis and disunity by cutting off the enemy’s leadership
from the civilian populace and fielded military forces.
Conversely, protecting centers of gravity and the ability to
command and control friendly forces are key objectives of
strategic defense modernization.
There is no question the PLA is modernizing its air, naval,
and ground forces across the board. However, since the
mid-1980s, the PLA has placed special focus on certain
enabling technologies which, short of resorting to weapons of
mass destruction, would allow it to give play to its own
strengths and exploit adversarial “Achilles heels.” The
timeframe for these capabilities varies. China’s capabilities in
ballistic missiles, ground-based radars, and information
denial are already among the best in the world. Development
of other competencies are much further down the road and are
part of China’s long-range plan beyond 2010.
This research project has numerous objectives, including
the following:
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•

Determining the drivers behind China’s strategic
military modernization program;

•

Identifing key research academies, institutes, and
factories involved in strategic modernization;

•

Tracing developments and programs related to
ballistic and cruise missiles, directed energy weapons,
military space program, and information warfare;

•

Appraising the level of technology transfer into China
which has contributed to its strategic modernization
goals;

•

Examining potential organizational and doctrinal
changes within the PLA to related to new strategic
systems;

•

Assessing obstacles which may inhibit development
and deployment of future strategic weapons systems;
and,

•

Analyzing ramifications of China’s strategic
modernization program on regional and U.S. national
security.

To meet these objectives, this monograph is divided into
four chapters following this introductory chapter. Chapter 2
contains an examination of the foundation for China’s
military modernization, to include drivers and defense
research and development (R&D) strategy. Chapter 3
addresses one of the most critical, and often ignored, aspects of
PLA modernization—its aspiration for information
dominance. The monograph then turns, in Chapter 4, to an
examination of systems which could enable the PLA to carry
out paralyzing strikes against an adversary’s critical nodes,
drawing attention to R&D into increasingly lethal ballistic
and cruise missiles. Chapter 5 addresses China’s efforts to
develop a comprehensive air and space defense network which
brings into play many of the developmental efforts discussed
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previously. Chapter 6 discusses various obstacles to China’s
strategic modernization objectives and implications for the
United States.

4

CHAPTER 2
FOUNDATIONS OF STRATEGIC
MODERNIZATION

This chapter begins with an introduction of the key players
within China’s defense industrial complex, driving forces
behind the strategic modernization program, and an overview
of China’s defense R&D strategy. An analysis of emerging
PLA capabilities must begin with the technological base found
within the defense industries. The defense industries operate
through a mixture of bottom-up initiative from individual
research institutes, and top-down direction from the Central
Military Commission (CMC) and State Council. Emerging
PLA doctrine, various threat perceptions, and bureaucratic
competition are major driving forces for R&D of new weapon
systems. Understanding approaches to R&D strategy, to
include various developmental phases, provides a useful
analytical approach to estimating timelines.

The Defense Industrial Complex.
The foundation of China’s strategic modernization is its
defense industrial complex. China has one of the largest and
most cumbersome defense industrial establishments in the
world. However, only certain segments are key players in
China’s strategic modernization. Overall responsibility lies
with the CMC, which is roughly the counterpart of the U.S.
National Command Authority. The CMC works closely with
the State Council which conducts national economic planning,
and provides policy guidance for general R&D and production.
High-level policy related to priority functional R&D areas
1
stems from various state leading groups.
Central Special Committee. One other long-standing
organization for policy decisions related to China’s strategic
modernization is the Politburo’s Central Special Commission
(CSC). The CSC was initially created to oversee China’s
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strategic missile program in 1962. As of 1992, the CSC was
directed by Li Peng, with Liu Huaqing as a deputy, and had as
many as 20 members to coordinate, oversee, and make policy
decisions at the highest level. Members include most vice
premiers and leadership of the military industrial complex.
Through the years, this organization has been sometimes
referred to with different names, including National Defense
Industry Special Commission, Sophisticated Weapons
Production Commission, and Central Science and Technology
2
Special Commission.
State Science and Technology Commission, COSTIND,
and the Defense Industries. The State Council’s State Science
and Technology Commission (SSTC) and the PLA’s
Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (COSTIND) oversee China’s defense
3
industries. Directed by Song Jian, the SSTC is responsible for
China’s overall science and technology (S&T) development
and manages the S&T budget, which has tripled over the last
4
2 years. Key industries involved in strategic modernization
include China Aerospace Corporation (CASC), China
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), and Ministry of
Electronics Industry (MEI). The general manager of each of
these state conglomerates, in theory, reports to Song Jian for
administration and civilian production, and to LTG Cao
Gangchuan of COSTIND for military contracts.
China Aerospace Corporation. Among the defense
industries, the CASC is the most important in China’s
5
strategic modernization effort. CASC oversees the
development of ballistic and cruise missiles, air defense
systems, and the entire range of space launch vehicles and
satellites. CASC is divided into five primary research
academies (yanjiuyuan) which focus on launch vehicles and
ballistic missiles (First Academy); air and missile defense
systems, and developmental research into anti-satellite
technology (Second Academy), anti-ship and land attack
cruise missiles (Third Academy); solid propellant technology
(Fourth Academy); and satellites (Fifth Academy). Another
academy in Shanghai (Eighth Academy) augments and
occasionally competes against the five basic academies in
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launch vehicles and air defense systems. A system of bases
(jidi), numbered 061 through 068, located around the country
have a wide range of manufacturing and R&D responsibilities. Originally established to provide Third Line
manufacturing services subordinate to the individual
academies, the bases have become independent R&D and
6
manufacturing centers.

Drivers of Strategic Modernization.
What drives Chinese strategic modernization? Is their
modernization planning based on a rational top-down model
which assesses fundamental values, interests, and national
security requirements? Do they conduct scenario-based or
threat-based planning? Are requirements subjected to
bureaucratic influences between service arms and influence
by industrial magnates? The answers to these questions are
all probably yes. The mechanics of Chinese defense
modernization planning are complex and opaque, probably
not too different from the Pentagon. A number of factors,
including emerging doctrine, threat perceptions, and
bureaucratic politics, influence Chinese strategic planning,
indigenous research and development, and acquisition.
Doctrine. The most important element driving China’s
military modernization is an emerging doctrine which
emphasizes strategic attack against the most critical enemy
targets. A major focus of China’s military modernization is on
gaining the ability to strike strategic targets, thus presenting
the prospect of ending a conflict quickly by destroying an
enemy’s ability to wage war, or by convincing him to desist
without first having to fight and defeat his military forces.
Ultimately, the objective is to cause enough damage that the
enemy will decide to heed Beijing’s will or make it impossible
to fight.
Strategic attacks, which are inherently offensive, often
comprise the most direct means available to force an enemy to
cease fighting or to make political decisions in line with
Chinese objectives. They are executed to achieve maximum
destruction of an adversary’s ability to wage war. Such an
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approach to warfighting seeks to strike directly at the will and
war-making capacity of the enemy unencumbered by surface
military operations. As Major General Shen Xuezai, head of
the Academy of Military Sciences’ (AMS) Military Systems
Department, states, “Only by controlling the entire
battlespace and striking at key points so as to paralyze the
enemy’s entire operational system and immobilize its forces,
7
will it be possible to win a war.” Strategic attacks rely on
forcing the enemy into the reactive and defensive mode, allow
retention of the initiative, and reduce threats to friendly
units. Strategic campaigns, of course, are only part of an
overall war effort and only one means available to those in
power who wield national military instruments. Widespread
destruction of enemy infrastructure and fielded forces is not
necessary.
Drawing doctrinal lessons from U.S. conduct of the Gulf
War, many Chinese strategists view the most critical targets
as the national command and control apparatus, to include
4
leadership, operational command centers, and the C I
infrastructure. Other classes of targets include key
manufacturing, petroleum storage, and power generation
facilities; transportation infrastructure; population centers;
and fielded military forces. Attacking fielded military forces,
especially reconnaissance and strike assets, may be necessary
as more of a defensive measure to protect friendly centers of
gravity.
This strategic attack doctrine, one aspect of the PLA’s
“limited war under high tech conditions” (jubu zhanzheng zai
gaojishu tiaojian xia), has a number of characteristics. First,
the PLA’s emerging doctrine continues to adhere to the
traditional strategy of “pitting the inferior against the
superior” (yilie shengyou), which recognizes technological
inferiority for an indefinite period of time. Relative
superiority in selected areas, however, can be applied against
an enemy’s weaknesses. The emerging doctrine is offensive in
nature. Chinese doctrinal literature indicates that, if war
against a technologically superior power breaks out, an
enemy will likely deploy forces rapidly and then launch a
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massive air campaign. While an enemy is amassing forces, a
8
window of opportunity exists for a preemptive strike.
From the Chinese perspective, this asymmetrical
approach, “gaining the initiative by striking first” (xianfa
zhiren), is an effective means to offset technological and
logistical advantages which a more advanced military power
brings to the fight. This approach to warfare marks a
significant change from the previous principle of “gaining
mastery only after the enemy has struck” (houfa zhiren). The
emerging doctrine requires a high degree of secrecy, mobility,
a highly accurate concentration of firepower, and surprise.
These principles make possible a quick resolution of conflict.
This does not require annihilation of the enemy or occupation
of his territory, only a paralyzing “mortal blow” (zhiming
9
daji), “winning victory with one strike” (yizhan, ersheng).
Other important aspects of PLA’s doctrinal shift is
recognition of a multidimensional, greatly expanded
battlespace, encompassing the electromagnetic spectrum,
land, air, sea, and space. Only a small proportion of the PLA’s
total troop strength is necessary to achieve their military
objectives. This principle, “winning victory through elite
troops” (jingbing zhisheng), requires only a small number of
highly educated troops in order to achieve a quick victory. The
concept of a swift victory is another principle, “fighting a quick
battle to force a quick resolution” (suzhan sujue). Another
principle is priority on the “in-depth strike” (zongshen daji) to
hit distant, strategic targets in order to avoid forward troops
4
and hit vital centers of gravity, such as ports, critical C I
nodes, airbases, and supply centers. Cruise and ballistic
missiles, and other long-range precision strike assets, are
10
crucial in conducting these in-depth strikes.
PLA writings strongly indicate the foundation of the
emerging doctrine is the concept of information dominance
(zhixinxiquan). Information dominance is generally achieved
through command and control warfare, using combinations of
airpower, special forces, and strategic missile units to strike
4
an adversary’s C I infrastructure. Interfering with an
enemy’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, and use
11
information can paralyze his entire operational system.
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Although dissenting opinions probably exist, there are
clear indications that emerging PLA doctrine is pushing the
development of long-range precision strike and information
operations. Because of this, the CMC, through COSTIND, has
granted priority to offensive and defensive information
systems and to long-range precision strike assets, primarily in
the form of ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same time,
China is emphasizing development of defensive systems
intended to counter enemy information operations and
long-range precision strikes against Chinese territory.
U.S. and Russian Missile Defense Programs. Since the late
1970s, another key driver for China’s strategic modernization
has been U.S. and Russian efforts to develop missile defense
systems. Preliminary work on the U.S. strategic missile
defense program began in the late 1970s and emerged as the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983. Since then,
offshoots of SDI have included Global Protection Against
Limited Strike (GPALS), and various National and Theater
Missile Defense programs. Current and future national
missile defense concepts, including theater high-altitude area
defense systems (THAADS) and the experimental SpaceBased Laser could be deployed as early as the turn of the
century.
Since the late 1970s, the CMC, COSTIND, the Second
Artillery, and the space and missile industry have been
extremely concerned about the deployment of U.S. and
Russian missile defense systems. COSTIND and the space
and missile industry have been especially active in keeping
appraised of technological and political developments
concerning missile defense and have been developing
technologies which will assure China a second strike
capability. Maintenance of a viable nuclear deterrent has
been the highest priority for Chinese defense planners since
the mid-to-late 1950s. This is still true today.
This fear of losing their retaliatory capability began
shortly after the announcement of SDI in 1983, when Chinese
analysts began evaluating potential responses. The first
important paper on SDI and its potential implications for
China was prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
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for Premier Zhao Ziyang in 1984. In late 1984 or early 1985,
the central leadership tasked several ministries and research
institutes to thoroughly examine the SDI issue and its
implications for China. During 1985, the defense industrial
complex hosted several conferences on SDI. A primary
conclusion was that Soviet and U.S. development of ballistic
missile defense (BMD) systems had significant implications
for China’s nuclear deterrent. By 1986, Chinese experts
generally agreed there were three potential responses:
expansion of offensive forces; development of countermeasures, such as shielding and spinning of ballistic missiles
to penetrate BMD systems; and deployment of anti-satellite
12
(ASAT) weapons to destroy space-based BMD systems.
COSTIND played a key role in developing the Chinese
response to the “global technical revolution” sparked by SDI.
As the MFA was developing its SDI response, COSTIND held
a March 1984 meeting on “How to Meet the Global Technical
Revolution Challenge.” In September 1984, COSTIND
delivered a proposal to the CMC suggesting relevant PLA
branches develop defense S&T gameplans out to the year
2000. Working in conjunction with the State Council,
COSTIND formulated a defense S&T strategy which focused
attention on certain key technologies and presented it at a
November 1985 meeting with CMC leadership. Afterwards, in
February 1986, COSTIND, with CMC support, sanctioned the
overall long-term development effort and further directed the
formation of 18 study groups to focus on designated critical
13
technologies.
However, some within the defense S&T community
believed COSTIND’s plan was not sufficient to meet the
technical challenges posed by SDI. In March 1986, four of
China’s most prominent defense engineers presented a
petition to the Central Committee on establishing a “High
Technology Research and Development Plan Outline.” All of
the engineers pushing the new initiative were involved in
strategic programs—Wang Daheng, a preeminent optics
expert who played a role in China’s space tracking network;
Wang Ganchang, one of the founding fathers of China’s
nuclear program; Yang Jiachi, a satellite attitude control
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expert; and Chen Fangyun, an electronics engineer and leader
of the program to develop China’s space tracking network.
The plan, referred to as the 863 Program, was implemented in
parallel to COSTIND’s Long Range Plan to Year 2000 and was
jointly managed by COSTIND and the SSTC. The 863
Program, still a guide and funding source for numerous
preliminary R&D projects, focuses on some of the same
technologies included in the SDI and Europe’s answer to SDI,
the Eureka Program, including space systems, high powered
14
lasers, microelectronics, and automated control systems.
China’s Gulf War Syndrome. Yet another driver for
China’s strategic modernization is U.S. performance in the
Gulf War. The 1991 Gulf War was a rude awakening for the
CMC and the military-industrial complex. The awesome
display of military power showed the Chinese leadership just
how vulnerable their homeland is to attack from a potential
enemy. A second important conclusion which the CMC drew
from the Gulf War was the preeminence of air power and
long-range precision strike, augmented by information-based
warfare, in a greatly expanded battlespace. According to one
source, in a December 1995 meeting the CMC concluded
“ground fighting can only enhance the results of battle.” Key
targets in warfare are the enemy’s “nervous system and
brain,” rather than its ground targets and fighting units.
Another important conclusion was the primacy of offensive
15
operations as an essential element of defense.
China’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Lessons
drawn from the U.S. experience in the Gulf War are being
augmented by subsequent literature on the potential RMA.
The increased doctrinal emphasis on air power, long-range
precision strike, information warfare, and paralyzing strikes
on centers of gravity has been further reinforced by calls to
grasp concepts associated with the RMA. A number of
influential strategists and high ranking members of the
defense industrial complex have acknowledged the RMA and
called on the PLA leadership to meet its challenges of 21st
century warfare. Among the most influential are Zhu
Guangya, COSTIND S&T Committee Chairman, and Qian
Xuesen, Senior COSTIND Advisor. They advocate placing
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priority on understanding the nature of future warfare,
investing in key enabling technologies such as
microelectronics and information systems, raising the level of
PLA officer technical understanding, and adopting innovative
16
doctrine and organizational changes.
Chinese
commentators view the RMA as driving four spheres of
warfighting, including information warfare, precision strike,
17
strategic maneuver, and space combat.
Quest for Great Power Status. Yet another driver is the
quest for status and procurement of weapon systems which
earmark a country as a great power. From the Chinese
perspective, there are certain technologies and weapons
systems which a great power is simply expected to possess.
The mindset is “whatever the West can do, we can do as well.”
The resulting technologies or systems, however, may not
necessarily be optimal for China’s defense needs. For
example, China’s development of an aircraft carrier could be
useful against an regional adversary, but would be of little
direct consequence to United States. Its real effect is to show
that China is a great power.
Territorial Defense. China does take a logical and rational
approach to meeting its defense requirements, to include
enforcement of sovereignty claims. Assessments are made as
to what the threats are that China will face in the near,
medium, and long term, and how China can assure the
capability to defend against those threats. PLA strategists
believe China may be faced with surprise attacks from the
East and South China Seas early in the next century. In order
to guarantee territorial defense, Chinese policymakers have
outlined a defense in-depth approach to national security and
have adopted a strategy to ensure dominance within the seas
area bounded by the first island chain (diyi daolian), bounded
by Japanese home islands, the Ryuku Islands, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Borneo. The PLA has also begun to examine
a territorial defense strategy that extends out to the second
island chain (dier daolian), including the Marianas, Guam,
18
and the Carolines. The PLA Navy, Air Force, and Second
Artillery figure largely in this defense strategy.
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Territorial defense also includes sovereignty claims to
Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Diaoyu Islands in the
East China Sea. Developing an ability to militarily subdue
Taiwan is an especially important driver in China’s strategic
modernization. PLA planners, however, fully understand the
United States maintains the option to intervene if China
takes military action against Taiwan. From the PLA’s
perspective, American intervention in what Beijing believes
to be an internal problem serves as the most likely scenario for
a collision between China and the United States. Therefore,
gaining the ability to defeat a superior power, like the United
States, in a clash over Taiwan is a critical factor in China’s
force planning.
Support for the National Economy. Strategic modernization requirements must compete, or at least support,
China’s overall economic development. China’s overarching
objective is economic development, and fostering of an
environment conducive to their economic security. The PLA
plays two roles in supporting the national economy. First,
development of systems may be emphasized due to their
dual-use nature. COSTIND may be inclined to select and
design systems which can produce some economic benefit.
Information systems, satellites, and cruise missiles, for
example, are systems which can either support the national
economy or be sold abroad for profit. Projects which can be
plausibly wrapped in a civilian facade make it much easier to
import high technology items from countries which ban the
sale of military items. Strategic modernization will become
increasingly important to ensure China’s lines of communication are open to the free flow of oil from the Middle East and
other sources.
Organizational and Bureaucratic Politics within the
Defense-Industrial Complex. The drive for organizational
influence and power are as prevalent in China as they are in
other countries. There is no doubt various PLA branches and
services compete for finite budgets and resources, probably
with the Second Artillery, Navy, and Air Force coming out on
top. As China’s missile defense program takes shape
(discussed in more detail later), for example, the PLA Air
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Force, Second Artillery, and the ground forces will likely
compete for these crucial defense assets. Within the defense
industries, competition for contracts, prestige, and profits
between and within the space, electronics, aviation, and
nuclear industries heavily influence program priorities and
investment. The space industry, for example, lobbies for
advancement of ground-based air defense systems over the
aviation industry’s fighter component. Competition between
the aviation industry’s Nanchang Aircraft Factory and
CASC’s Third Academy in development of cruise missiles is
well-known. Personal connections between industrial leaders
and the military and civilian leadership are also important.
Examples include electronics industry cliques involving Jiang
Zemin, Zou Jiahua, and Hu Qili; and space and missile
industry cliques involving Bo Yibo, Liu Huaqing, Zhang
Aiping, Ding Henggao, Qian Xuesen, and Liu Jiyuan.
Technological Advances. A final driver for strategic
modernization is the seemingly endless stream of critical
technologies flowing into China. Strategic programs put on
hold in the 1970s and 1980s due to technical difficulties have
been resurrected due to increased access to foreign technology
and expertise. Since 1991, a massive flood of technology has
significantly opened the realm of possibilities, and has
influenced program decisions which are based on feasibility.
First, the breakup of the former Soviet Union in 1991 and dire
economic state of former Soviet defense industries have
resulted in a shopping spree for China’s research institutes.
Russian and Ukrainian guest lecturers and annual technical
exchanges assist Chinese engineers in solving difficult
technical problems. The 1994 demise of COCOM and the lack
of an effective successor regime have loosened up the flow of
manufacturing, electronics, and materials technology.

A Guiding Light: Defense R&D Strategy.
There is little evidence to suggest that an overarching
strategic planning document reflects these disparate
influences and drivers and serves as the bible for long-range
R&D and acquisition. There are, however, a handful of
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interrelated defense S&T plans which guide the efforts of
China’s defense industry.
The 863 Program. Much of China’s strategic
modernization effort is framed within a large scale plan
designed to establish a technological foundation for the 21st
century. High-level discussions on this strategic modernization plan, eventually called the 863 Program, were initiated
shortly after the announcement of the SDI in March 1983 and
the initiation of Europe’s Eureka Project in 1985. The 863
Program is roughly comparable to the Eureka Program, which
20
combined civilian and strategic defense programs. The 863
Program, managed by COSTIND and the State Science and
Technology Commission, was established as a mechanism to
concentrate China’s S&T establishment onto seven key areas
21
for long-term development. These areas include space,
lasers, automation, biotechnology, information systems,
energy, and new materials. Within these seven areas, 17
major projects were designated. Projects under the 863
Program are budgeted independently from the PLA,
COSTIND, and SSTC budgets. COSTIND oversees 863 laser
and space programs, while the SSTC manages the other five
22
areas.
China’s defense R&D strategy has its roots in a directive
laid out by Nie Rongzhen in the 1960s. The strategy, called
“Three Moves in a Chess Game” (sanbuqi), calls for three
models in the R&D cycle at any one time. Generally, this is
defined as having a model in trial manufacturing and testing;
a follow-on model under design; and preliminary research on
basic technologies associated with a generation-after-next
23
model. The R&D cycle consists of the three broad phases of
preliminary research, model R&D, and production.
Preliminary Research (yuxian yanjiu, or yuyan). Chinese
defense industries stress on advance research serves as the
foundation for follow-on stages of development. A solid
foundation can significantly shorten design time—for
example, one medium-range ballistic missile system took only
21 months to design, quite a feat compared to other systems
which have taken up to a decade to design. Short R&D time is
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due to mastering of mature technologies through preliminary
research. Preliminary research has two categories:

•

Generic technologies applicable to multiple systems,
i.e., telemetry, aerodynamics, GPS exploitation,
hypersonics, artificial intelligence, etc;

•

Technology applicable to a specific system, for
instance, a movable spot beam antenna for a
COMSAT or a new propulsion system for a missile.

Preliminary research, an integral part of a long-range
plan, is carried out on a contract basis and strives to achieve
technological breakthroughs. China has focused on key
technologies in long-range plans, best exemplified by the 863
Plan. At the end of the allocated time for the project,
approximately 45 percent of advance research projects move
on to the following stage, model R&D, while another 40
percent are used as a foundation for follow-on advance
research projects. Only 14 percent of preliminary research
24
projects are civilian in nature.
Model R&D (xinghao yanzhi). After completion of an
preliminary research project, COSTIND may contract with a
PLA service branch for further research and development,
weaponization, and eventual deployment. This phase, model
R&D, is lengthy, costly, and is closely monitored by
COSTIND. Each model R&D program which emerges from
the preliminary research phase requires a new COSTIND
25
managed contract. The model R&D phase is divided into
four sub-phases:

•

General systems design. Chief designer appointed who
monitors various subsystem design efforts.
Assessments of various design options are selected
based on modeling and simulation.

•

Prototype. Design is revised after a series of ground
tests to ensure the model meets technical specifications.
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•

Flight model. After ground testing, flight tests are
carried out beginning with simple ones, and
traversing through a series of increasingly complex
tests.

•

Commission. After successfully completing flight
testing, the system will go through a design
certification board, and if approved, will enter small
batch production.26

Chief Designer System and Dual Command. A chief
designer is appointed at the initiation of the systems design
phase to oversee subordinate subsystems design. Subordinate
designers are often not within his research organization chain
of command. The chief designer coordinates efforts among
various research institutes, academies, academic centers, and
industries. This chief designer organization is paralleled by
an administrative chain of command, represented by
industry, academy, and research institute leadership, which
ensures requirements and timeliness standards of the PLA
are being met. Administrative leadership oversees several
programs at once along with their day-to-day management
responsibilities. The administrative and technical sides work
closely together to ensure an economy of effort, timeliness
standards, manpower, materials, funding, and other
considerations are attended to. The office of the chief designer
is usually located within the systems design department of
CASC or the individual academy, with the parallel administration oversight normally residing in the office of one of the
deputy directors of CASC or academy. For especially complex
projects which significantly draw from resources of various
industries, COSTIND plays a leading administrative, and
possibly even technical role.
Systems Engineering Design Departments. The systems
engineering design departments of COSTIND, CASC, and the
various academies and bases have a critical role in the
development of future weapons systems and projects. Chief
engineers work out of these organizations which have a
variety of functions. First, with input from subordinate
27
information institutes and other entities, they offer systems
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development recommendations to industry leadership,
COSTIND, State Council, and CMC, and on systems
development issues. They analyze technical options and, as
industry planners, provide influential recommendations on
national level mid- to long-range plans and developmental
objectives. The departments also support individual chief
designer offices within the department. In addition, systems
design departments are responsible for program evaluations
and reviews and for overall quality control. The following list
exemplifies organizations responsible for systems engineer28
ing:

•

Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering
(COSTIND);

•

China Academy of Electronics and Information
Technology, Systems Engineering Department
(MEI-level);

•

China Institute of Astronautical Systems
Engineering (CASC-level);

•

First Planning Department (CASC’s First Academy);

•

Beijing Institute of Electronic Systems Engineering
(CASC’s Second Academy);

•

Beijing Institute of Electromechnical Systems
Engineering (CASC’s Third Academy);

•

41st Research Institute (CASC’s Fourth Academy);

•

501st Research Institute (CASC’s Fifth Academy);

•

Shanghai Institute of Systems Engineering (CASC’s
Shanghai Academy of Space Technology).
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CHAPTER 3
CHINA’S QUEST FOR INFORMATION
DOMINANCE

Beijing’s highest priority for strategic modernization is in
the realm of information. Competition for information is not a
new concept in China. A review of Sun Tzu’s Art of War reflects
the Middle Kingdom’s traditional emphasis on information
dominance. For centuries, Chinese leaders have been masters
at collecting, controlling, and manipulating information.
Building upon this traditional core competency, Beijing is
aggressively absorbing technologies associated with the
on-going information revolution. In fact, the international
business community views the China market as the largest in
world and is devoting considerable attention to meeting the
Chinese demand for technology. China’s unparalleled
revolution in information technology will provide the
foundation for its overall strategic military modernization. In
fact, China’s information revolution is changing the
fundamental character of the PLA, perhaps much more
rapidly than most observers appreciate.
Since the conclusion of the Gulf War, a growing chorus of
PLA officials have strongly advocated the aggressive pursuit
of information-based warfare doctrine and systems. Analysts
claim the PLA first addressed information warfare earlier
than the United States or Russia, when, in 1985, a PLA field
officer named Shen Weiguang wrote a book entitled
Information Warfare, excerpts of which were published in the
PLA’s leading newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, in 1987. Since that
time, numerous PLA think-tanks and COSTIND organizations have published articles and held symposiums on
information warfare. Some of China’s most influential figures,
including Qian Xuesen and Zhu Guangya, have called for
full-scale adoption of information-based warfare as the
foundation for China’s revolution in military affairs. U.S.
conduct of the Gulf War impressed a growing number of
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information warfare advocates, such as Qian Xuesen, who, in
the Third Annual COSTIND S&T Committee meeting in
March 1994, called for establishment of a national informa1
tion network and associated technologies.
COSTIND sponsored a symposium, “Analysis of the
National Defense System and the Military Technological
Revolution” in December 1994 and followed up with another
conference, “The Issue of Military Revolution,” in October
1995. A number of entities have combined to form an
informational warfare research institute, and there are
indications China will form an information warfare
2
simulation center.
Enthusiasm reached a crescendo when China’s leading
authorities on strategy and warfare convened in Shijiazhuang
for a “Forum for Experts on Meeting the Challenges of the
World Military Revolution” in December 1995. The consensus
of the group was to meet the challenges of the informationdriven revolution in military affairs. The more than 30
high-ranking experts attending the conference called for the
development of weapons which can “throw the financial
systems and army command systems of the hegemonists into
chaos.” These types of weapons are useful for underdeveloped
countries to use against a nation which is “extremely fragile
and vulnerable when it fulfills the process of networking and
then relies entirely on electronic computers.” China must
abandon the strategy of “catching up” with more advanced
powers and “proceed from the brand new information warfare
and develop our unique technologies and skills, rather than
inlay the old framework with new technologies.” Some
observers believe by adopting information-based approaches
to warfare, China can effectively leapfrog into the 21st
3
century as a preeminent military power.
PLA emphasis on information dominance was further
reinforced when, at a December 1995 COSTIND National
Directors meeting, Vice Chairman of the Central Military
Commission General Liu Huaqing allegedly stated:
Information warfare and electronic warfare are of key
importance, while fighting on the ground can only serve to
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exploit the victory. Hence, China is more convinced (than ever)
that as far as the PLA is concerned, a military revolution with
information warfare as the core has reached the stage where
efforts must be made to catch up with and overtake rivals.
(emphasis added)4

There is a growing chorus of opinion propelling China
toward establishing a national strategy for developing a
comprehensive information warfare capability. Components
of this strategy include educating China’s domestic audience
and the PLA on the role of information in warfare through
frequent articles in the PLA’s newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, and
in academic journals, such as the AMS’ Zhongguo Junshi
Kexue (China Military Science). There is also a push toward
establishment of a high-level leading group on national
defense information modernization which can study and draft
information warfare theory applicable to China’s unique
defense requirements, and formulate plans and programs for
China’s defense information infrastructure. Chinese
observers stress the need to develop “perfect weapons” which
serve as “trump cards” (shashoujian) to exploit an adversary’s
5
reliance on sophisticated microelectronics. Other aspects of
developmental strategy include focusing efforts to achieve
technical breakthroughs in information technology and
stepping up the education and training of PLA soldiers,
6
airmen, and sailors on information warfare-related skills.
This discussion on China’s quest for information
dominance first examines the most critical aspect of China’s
information revolution—development of its microelectronics
capability. The next section addresses Beijing’s increasing
capability to field sophisticated ground, air and space-based
sensors. Subsequent sections examine China’s development
of its national information infrastructure, Beijing’s
information control programs, and China’s evolving
information attack capabilities.

Information Warfare Concepts and Doctrine.
The PLA strategic community is working furiously to
develop information warfare doctrine and concepts. Over the
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last few years, the AMS and the National Defense University
(NDU), two of the PLA’s leading think-tanks, and COSTIND
have flooded China’s strategy community with writings on
information warfare. Chinese commentators define
information warfare in broad terms. For example, COSTIND
defines information warfare as follows:
All types of warfighting activities that involve the exploitation,
alteration, and paralysis of the enemy’s information and
information systems, as well as those activities which involve
protecting one’s own information and information systems from
exploitation, alteration, and paralysis by the enemy.7

There are several common principles included in
discussions of China’s approach to information warfare. First
and foremost is the concept of information dominance
(zhixinxiquan), described as the ability to defend ones own
information while exploiting and assaulting an opponent’s
information structure. As some advocates have pointed out,
The key to gaining the upper hand on the battlefield is no longer
mainly dependent on who has the stronger firepower, but
instead depends on which side discovers its enemy first,
responds faster than the latter, and strikes more precisely than
the latter.8

Information dominance is generally achieved through
command and control warfare, using combinations of
airpower, special forces, and strategic missile units to strike
4
an adversary’s C I infrastructure. Interfering with an
enemy’s ability to obtain, process, transmit, and use
information can paralyze his entire operational system.
Crucial to achieving the paralysis effect is increased analysis
9
of the enemy military infrastructure as a system. The
multiplying effect of intelligence and information leads to an
almost limitless expansion of combat effectiveness. According
to some Chinese observers, warfare in the information era is a
test of strength between intelligence capabilities of combat
forces. Information superiority, say Chinese commentators, is
not necessarily determined by technological superiority, but
by new tactics and independent creativity of commanders in
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the field. In fact, Chinese operational units have begun to
10
integrate information warfare concepts into their training.
Another concept is integration (yitihua) and seamless
operations (feixianxing zuozhan), defined as tying together
the five dimensions of warfare—air, land, sea, space, and the
electromagnetic spectrum, integrating sensors with mobile
missiles, air, and sea-based forces. Chinese information
warfare analysts view the battlespace as having been greatly
expanded with no clear battlelines. Operational emphasis is
on deep strike (zongshen zuozhan) against enemy command
hubs, information processing centers, and supply systems.
Sudden and quick (turanxing yu kuaisuxing) strikes at the
“vital point” (dianxue) of the enemy’s information and support
systems can paralyze the enemy and destroy his morale.
Operational objectives are not the seizing of territory nor
the killing of enemy military personnel, but rather the
destruction of the other side’s willingness or capability to
resist. Over-the-horizon warfare (yuanzhan) has replaced
close-in fighting, and from the Chinese perspective, will
become the main strike force of the future. Chinese
information warfare specialists advocate exploiting enemy
reliance on complex computers. By destroying an enemy’s
computer systems, high-tech weaponry can no longer operate.
Information warfare specialists also highlight cognitive
aspects of information warfare. One concept outlines a
five-part approach to offensive information warfare,
emphasizing targeting adversarial cognitive systems,
11
jamming, and information manipulation.

The Foundation of Its Information Revolution:
China’s Development of Microelectronics.
There is an intimate relationship between information
dominance and microelectronics. Recognizing this, since 1991
China has named the development of indigenous
microelectronics as a top national security priority. Dual-use
microelectronics and telecommunications equipment support
both economic development and military modernization.
China’s unparalleled revolution in information technology—

29

to include enabling technologies such as microelectronics,
computer systems and software, and artificial
intelligence—will provide the foundation for its overall
strategic military modernization. Over the past decade,
information technology has been the fastest growing segment
12
of China’s economy, rising at an annual rate of 30 percent.
Among these enabling technologies, the Chinese defense
industrial complex most recognizes the central role of
microelectronics. Priority investments in their integrated
circuit R&D and production capability could translate into
significant payoffs in the next few years. For example, in 1993
China’s space and missile industry formed a research
academy—equal in stature to those academies which develop
cruise missiles and satellites—dedicated toward the
development of space-qualified microelectronics. Since the
lifting of international export controls on microelectronics in
the last few years, the use of foreign integrated circuit (IC)
production technology, to include U.S., Japanese, and Korean,
is becoming more widespread.
A solid foundation in microelectronics is essential for
Beijing’s strategic modernization goals. At the heart of
China’s indigenously developed information systems and
guidance platforms is the IC. The Chinese defense
establishment recognizes IC chips as the most basic
component for their long-term economic health and national
strength. In 1993, China depended on foreign sources for up to
80 percent of its ICs. However, by the end of the 8th Five-Year
plan in 1995, China was able to meet half of its total IC
demand with domestically produced ICs. Over the last few
years, China’s production of integrated circuits has increased
at a rate greater than 20 percent per year. As a highlighted
area under the 863 Program, microelectronics has become a
strategic industry. The primary focus is on reducing the cost
and weight of microelectronics while increasing reliability
13
and survivability. Increasing emphasis is being placed on
development of very large scale integrated circuits (VLSIC)
which have applications in advanced phased array radars and
14
space systems.
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The leading organization for microelectronics is the MEI.
Formerly known as the 10th Ministry of Machine Building
Industry, MEI carries out R&D on microelectronics,
telecommunications, radars, electronic warfare systems,
computers, and systems integration software. Directed by
political heavyweight Hu Qili, MEI has entered into a number
of joint ventures as a means to raise its technical compe16
tence. Joint venture arrangements often include the
transfer of IC production lines. Shougang-NEC Electronic
Company produces 5000 chips a month and is expected to
average 8000 chips in 1997. The production line is not yet up
to mass producing sub-micron ICs, but is moving in that
17
direction. One Sino-Japanese joint venture producing
sub-micron (0.35 micron) integrated circuits is located in the
18
Shangdi Information Industry Base in northwest Beijing.
Moving beyond sub-micron integrated circuits, the
Chinese defense industrial complex is placing more emphasis
on microelectromechanical system (MEMS) technology.
MEMS is vital for miniaturizing components to reduce weight
and volume of military systems, to include satellites, robotic
reconnaissance systems, and nano-technological weapon
systems. MEMS applications also include miniature inertial
measurement units for brilliant munitions; merging
information processing with sensors; and for miniature, low
cost deformable mirrors to compensate for atmospheric
distortions when using high-powered lasers. There is a
movement, driven in part by COSTIND, to form a MEMS
state-leading group which will focus fiscal and manpower
19
resources to achieve technical breakthroughs.

Information Acquisition.
China’s defense industrial complex is developing a wide
range of space- and ground-based sensors to cue long-range
precision strike assets and provide advanced warning of
impending attacks on its territory. China is slowly
progressing toward a redundant, layered, and integrated
reconnaissance network. There is a large body of NDU, AMS,
and defense industrial writings which strongly advocate that
China develop a complete reconnaissance network. A broad
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survey of PLA and defense industry literature indicates
20
consistent support for the following systems:

•

electronic reconnaissance satellites;

•

electro-optical reconnaissance satellites;

•

synthetic aperture radar satellites;

•

missile early warning satellites;

•

navigational satellites;

•

weather satellites;

•

strategic and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs);

•

airborne early warning;

•

space surveillance;

•

counterstealth radars;

•

SIGINT sites;

•

tactical reconnaissance vehicles and ships; and,

•

special forces (infiltrated into enemy territory).

Of most significance is that the above list is not just
wishful thinking—China has already deployed, or is actively
developing every one of these information sources. The
defense industries, primarily the electronics and space
industry, are developing a broad array of ground-based,
airborne, and space-based sensors which Beijing hopes will
guarantee battlespace information dominance in any future
conflicts around China’s periphery.
An overview of the PLA’s vast intelligence community is
useful to fully comprehend the important role information
21
plays in China’s strategy. The focal point for strategic and
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tactical military intelligence, and counterpart to the U.S.
Defense Intelligence Agency, is the GSD’s Second Department
(zongcan erbu). The Second Department oversees military
human intelligence (HUMINT) collection, widely exploits
open source materials, fuses HUMINT, signals intelligence
(SIGINT), and imagery intelligence data, and disseminates
finished intelligence products to the CMC and other
consumers. Preliminary fusion is carried out by the Second
Department’s Analysis Bureau which mans the National
Watch Center, the focal point for national-level indications
and warning. In-depth analysis is carried out by regional
22
bureaus.
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). Closely linked to the
Second Department is the GSD Third Department and the
GSD Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and Radar
Department (dianzi duikang yu leida bu), China’s answer to
the U.S. National Security Agency. China maintains the most
extensive SIGINT network of all the countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. SIGINT systems include several dozen
ground stations, half a dozen ships, truck-mounted systems,
and airborne systems. Third Department headquarters is
located in the vicinity of the GSD First Department
(Operations Department), AMS, and NDU complex in the
hills northwest of the Summer Palace. The Third Department
(zongcan sanbu) is allegedly manned by approximately 20,000
personnel, with most of their linguists trained at the Luoyang
23
Institute of Foreign Languages.
SIGINT sites for the collection of radio and SATCOM are
spread throughout China with the net control station situated
in Beijing. Beijing also has several other SIGINT stations as
well. At one time, a site in Lanzhou was responsible for
monitoring Russian signal traffic and for providing strategic
early warning of a Russian missile attack. The Shenyang
station covers signals from Russia, Japan, and Korea. The
Chengdu SIGINT site controls the Third Department’s
operations against India, Pakistan, and Southeast Asia. The
Nanjing site monitors Taiwan signal traffic, and the
Guangzhou site covers Southeast Asia and the South China
Sea. Other sites are located near the Sino-Russian and
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Sino-Mongolian border at Jilemutu, Erlian, and Hami.
Several sites are in Northwest China. There are at least two
SIGINT stations in Shanghai.
Outside China, a SIGINT station has been established on
Rocky Island (Shidao), near Woody Island in the Paracels.
There have been persistent press reports of Chinese electronic
surveillance sites in Burma, an ideal location for monitoring
naval traffic in the Indian Ocean. China has also established
multiple SIGINT sites in Burma and Laos. The Third
Department and the Navy cooperate on shipborne intelligence
collection platforms. Air Force SIGINT collection is managed
by the PLAAF Sixth Research Institute (kongliusuo) in
24
Beijing.
The GSD ECM and Radar Department (GSD Fourth
Department) has the electronic intelligence (ELINT) portfolio
within the PLA’s SIGINT apparatus. This department is
responsible for electronic countermeasures, requiring them to
25
collect and maintain data bases on electronic signals.
ELINT receivers are the responsibility of the Southwest
Institute of Electronic Equipment (SWIEE). Among the wide
range of SWIEE ELINT products is a new KZ900 airborne
ELINT pod. The GSD 54th Research Institute supports the
ECM Department in development of digital ELINT signal
26
processors to analyze parameters of radar pulses.
To augment its ground-based collection, China may be
resurrecting an ELINT satellite program which has been
dormant for over 20 years. The PLA experimented with
ELINT satellites, euphemistically called “technical
experimental satellites” (jishu shiyan weixing), in the
mid-1970s under the Shanghai Bureau of Astronautics’ 701
Program. The first Chinese ELINT satellite was launched
from Jiuquan in July 1975 on the FB-1 launch vehicle which
was specifically designed to meet the weight and orbital
accuracy requirements of ELINT platforms. The FB-1
launched two more experimental ELINT satellites in
December 1975 and August 1976. For unknown reasons, the
program was discontinued. Technical writings, however,
provide strong indications that the Shanghai Academy of
Spaceflight Technology (SAST), the successor of the Shanghai
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Bureau of Astronautics, has resurrected the program and
intends to field a satellite-borne electronic reconnaissance
system. The SWIEE may be developing the ELINT receivers.
At least one SAST design under evaluation is a constellation
of small electronic reconnaissance satellites which can ensure
27
precise location data and survivability.
Photoreconnaissance. Another source of intelligence
information which is increasing in importance is space-based
photoreconnaissance, euphemistically referred to as remote
sensing (yaogan). China is receiving regular satellite
intelligence data, building up their digital imagery databases,
and gaining experience in the management and
interpretation of satellite imagery data. Imagery for use in
China’s intelligence community comes from two sources:
indigenously developed space photoreconnaissance platforms
and imagery acquired from foreign sources.
China has been slow to develop a space-based reconnaissance capability. Its first experimental imagery system
was launched in November 1975, and was followed by two
more tests. The system reached IOC in September 1987 when
the FSW-1 (fanhuishi weixing, or recoverable satellite) was
launched from Jiuquan Space Launch Center, and returned to
earth with its film in Sichuan. The FSW-1 provided for wide
area imaging and orbits for 8 days. Four FSW-1 were
successfully launched between 1987 and 1992. In 1993, a
problem in its attitude control system resulted in a failed
28
FSW-1 mission.
The follow-on FSW-2 satellite carries 2000 meters of film
and has a resolution capability of at least 10 meters. The first
FSW-2, also known as the Jianbing-1B, was launched in
August 1992, with subsequent launches in 1994 and 1996.
One of the more significant aspects of the FSW-2 is its
demonstrated maneuvering capability. The FSW-2 orbits for
15 or 16 days before returning to earth with its imagery
29
package. On October 20, 1996, using the LM-2D from
Jiuquan, China launched another “scientific survey” (kexue
shence) satellite which orbited 15 days before returning to
30
earth. The 1996 FSW-2 launch was expected to be the last in
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this series as China moves to a more advanced imaging
31
system.
China’s remote sensing community is working feverishly
to deploy at least three different electro-optical remote
sensing platforms. First, China’s third generation of imaging
satellite, the FSW-3, is expected to be a recoverable system
with a one meter resolution. China’s Academy of Space
Technology (CAST) engineers have also conducted design
work on a tactical imagery system and associated mobile
ground receiving stations. The system is based on small
satellite technology, uses a charged coupled device (CCD)
array, and, when operating in a 700-kilometer sun
synchronous orbit, is designed to have a five meter
32
resolution. Another series of reconnaissance satellites,
jointly developed with Brazil, is known as Ziyuan-1, or ZY-1.
The ZY-1 will have a 2-year lifespan and will incorporate a
data transmission system to beam images back to earth. The
ZY-1, operating at an altitude of 778 kilometers, is expected to
have only a 20 meter resolution, but will add to China’s
33
experience base in electro-optical imaging systems.
The National Remote Sensing Center, directed by Zheng
Lizhong, oversees China’s remote sensing community,
coordinates requirements, and manages the procurement of
imagery from foreign sources. The GSD Second Department’s
Technology Bureau serves as a PLA representative within
34
China’s remote sensing community. The Center’s Remote
Sensing Ground Station is currently China’s sole imagery
downlink site, serving over 500 organizations throughout the
country. The ground station provides 24-hour a day,
year-round service and has a reception footprint encompassing 85 percent of China, all of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.
The National Remote Sensing Center and its ground
station have taken advantage of the relaxation of controls on
marketing of high resolution imagery and have contracted
with numerous foreign entities to receive remote sensing
data. China has received data from U.S. LANDSAT and
35
Russian remote sensing platforms for several years. The
ground center has contracted with France’s National Center
for Space Studies (CNES) to receive SPOT imagery up to a
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resolution of about 2.5 meters and wide image field of 100
36
kilometers. China is negotiating with or has contracted to
receive data from Canada’s RADARSAT, the U.S. LANDSAT
37
7, and Israel’s EROS-A one meter resolution system. The
station will also receive downlinked images from the first
China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), slated for
launch in 1998. Recent reporting also indicates China may be
negotiating with Russia to upgrade its remote sensing
relationship to include transmission of real-time high
38
resolution imagery for military purposes.
The ground station, working in conjunction with
COSTIND, is rapidly progressing in its capacity and technical
capabilities. During the Spring of 1992, Italy’s Telespazio
signed an agreement with China’s National Remote Sensing
Center worth $8 million to provide Olivetti image processing
computers and software. In March 1992, Telespazio assigned
technicians to train Chinese photo interpreters for up to 3
39
years. In the coming years, the station will be working on
ultra-high-speed data processing, storage, and transmission
systems, as well as computer, data compression, and
networking technology to be able to handle real-time, high
resolution imagery from multiple satellites. COSTIND is
installing a real-time image storage system as well as an
imagery dissemination system, linked to China’s national
integrated telecommunications network, that will allow
40
subscribers to search and rapidly download images. In 1996,
COSTIND installed a digitized high resolution imagery
41
processing system, the BGC-161.
The Institute of Remote Sensing Application (IRSA) is the
primary R&D arm of the National Remote Sensing Center.
The decision to establish the IRSA was made at the 1978
National S&T Conference, and doors were opened in 1980.
IRSA employs almost 300 people and has five basic research
departments, three technology research departments, and
two applications departments. IRSA manages the Center for
Airborne Remote Sensing and the Computer Applications
Center. A wide range of recent upgrades to China’s remote
sensing capabilities are under Project 724. Under the 863
Program, IRSA also has worked to establish parameters for
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China’s first indigenous SAR satellite. Testing on subsystems
42
has already been completed.
China is moving toward augmenting its electro-optical
sensors with synthetic aperture radar satellite systems for all
weather, day and night coverage of ground and maritime
targets. The PLA and other parts of the state apparatus view
radar satellite imagery as critical in China’s ability to achieve
information dominance. Unlike electro-optical systems, radar
satellites, according to GSD Second Department advocates,
can see through clouds, rain, and fog in order to detect targets
on the ground or underground, and in or under the ocean. In
addition, SAR satellites are extremely useful in tracking
moving targets, and can be useful in satisfying military
43
mapping requirements. Chinese engineers have been
examining SAR satellites as a means to track enemy
44
submarines in shallow waters. China has already fielded a
real-time airborne synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system,
and is working toward deployment of an indigenous space
45
based SAR satellite (hecheng kongjing leida weixing).
Until an indigenous system can be launched, however,
China has arranged to receive downlinked radar satellite
imagery to help establish a foundation for radar satellite
imagery exploitation. China’s Remote Sensing Ground
Station director Fan Xizhe has contracted with RADARSAT
International and the Canadian Space Agency to receive
RADARSAT imagery. The Canadian Space Agency has been
working with China on various RADARSAT and SAR
programs since 1993, under the GlobeSAR project.
Furthermore, COSTIND and CASC are negotiating with
Canada’s Spar Aerospace to construct two RADARSATs.
According to the July 1996 draft contract, the first will be
launched within the next 3 years and the second by 2004. The
satellites will incorporate synthetic aperture radars which
can provide all weather, day and night ocean surveillance
46
imagery data.
Canadian RADARSATs have provided up to a 7-10 meter
resolution in all weather conditions, operating at an altitude
of 800 kilometers. In the northern latitudes, the satellite can
image targets every 3 days. Although its primary use is likely
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civilian in nature, the RADARSAT could allow China to locate
ships at sea or large battle groups operating in the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, detect military construction, and key other
47
assets for a closer look at militarily significant targets.
China’s procurement of a synthetic aperture radar
satellite, to include the processing of its images, will lay the
foundation for development of an indigenous space based SAR
system. Preliminary R&D (yuxian yanjiu) on a space-based
SAR satellite was initiated in the late 1980s, and model R&D
(xinghao yanzhi) began in 1991. In May 1995, SSTC and
COSTIND approved the finalized design and work on
associated high speed data transmission is well underway. In
accordance with the national defense S&T strategy, while the
first generation SAR satellite is in the prototype development
phase, preliminary research has already begun on the second
generation SAR satellite system. Key institutes involved in
the indigenous development of synthetic aperture radar
satellites include CAS’ Institute of Electronics, CAST’s 501st
and 504th Research Institutes (Xian Institute of Space Radio
Technology), Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering, and
MEI’s 14th Research Institute and the Southwest Institute of
48
Electronic Equipment (SWIEE).
To gain a real or near real-time indigenous photoreconnaissance capability, China will need to take one of two
potential routes. The primary difficulty is that remote sensing
satellites must be within line of sight to download imagery
data. Essential for the efficient processing of downlinked
imagery is data compression technology, which CAST is
49
attempting to master. The first route which China is
working toward is the development of data relay satellites
(shuju zhongji weixing). Included in China’s long-range plan
for space development, data relay satellites will allow China’s
space sensing platforms to pass data to a ground station
50
without being within line of sight of a ground station. The
second option is establish ground stations abroad. China
signed agreements with France (1993) and Chile (1994) for
51
joint use of their ground stations. Seeking to transmit
imagery directly to theater and field commanders, China’s
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remote sensing community has also begun to explore
52
development of mobile remote sensing ground stations.
Space Surveillance. China has an extensive space and
missile tracking network. The construction of the network,
known as the 154 Project, took place in the 1960s and
supported China’s missile testing. Subsequent upgrades,
undertaken to support the launch and control of the first
Dongfanghong (DFH) communications satellite, were done
under the 157 Project. Leading figures in this effort included
Chen Fangyun, Shen Rongjun, and Wang Daheng. The
network has optical, radar, telemetry, and communications
components. Software development and systems integration
work is done at COSTIND’s Luoyang Institute of Tracking,
Telemetry, and Telecommunications (LITTT).
COSTIND operates the national space and missile
tracking command center in Beijing. The satellite tracking
and control network is managed from the Xian Satellite
Control Center in the eastern edge of the city. The national
satellite control center was formerly located in Weinan,
Shaanxi province, but moved to Xian in December 1987.
Tracking stations supporting the national network are
located at Weinan (GEO/LEO), Xiamen (GEO/LEO), Nanning
(LEO); Kashgar (LEO); Changchun (LEO); and Minxi
(GEO/LEO). China’s Academy of Sciences Nanjing
Observatory does orbital predictions and modeling. China
also operates shipborne missile tracking platforms
(Yuanwang), which are capable of operating throughout the
Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. In addition, China is
working to link up with foreign tracking and control networks,
and has signed agreements for space tracking cooperation
with Chile, Kiribati, and France. Chinese engineers are also
working to establish a space-based component to their TTC
53
network. The current network is primarily to support its
own satellites and has only limited capabilities against
non-cooperative spacecraft. However, it serves as the
foundation for future efforts to develop a more robust space
tracking system which can accurately track foreign systems
as well. Beijing may have already received technical
assistance in laser radars used to track image satellites and
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may be seeking an advanced radar system with the ability to
54
track satellites in low earth orbit.
Over-the-Horizon (OTH) Sensors. China began development of HF ground wave OTH sensors in November 1967. A
group led by Deputy Director of the Space and Missile
Industry Qian Xuesen was assigned the responsibility of
developing a ground wave OTH sensor able to detect targets at
250 kilometers. The radar was to provide targeting data for
their embryonic anti-ship cruise missile program. In the
1970s, an experimental ground wave OTH radar, with an
antenna length of 2300 meters, was deployed. Foreign export
restrictions, however, prevented China from obtaining
technology which was needed for further improvements.
Since 1985, developments in computing, microelectronics,
and digital signal processing have permitted further advances
in China’s OTH technology. Chinese institutes, such as the
Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT), have most recently
concentrated on improving the OTH sensor’s ECCM
capabilities and digitizing the radar system. There is also
some interest in developing a mobile version of the OTH
radar. China has also developed an experimental sky-wave
OTH radar which tracks aircraft targets at a range of 1,000
kilometers. Chinese systems engineers believe the OTH
system can contribute to an integrated air defense system. In
1995, HIT tested a new HF radar system capable of detecting
low altitude and sea-skimming targets as well as naval
55
targets.
Phased Array Radars. Chinese engineers see increased
opportunities for indigenous development of solid state
phased array radars due to advances in integrated circuit
technology. The MEI’s 14th Institute, located in Nanjing, is
China’s leading organization for phased array radar
development. An integral part of China’s space tracking
network includes large phased array radars (LPAR). Work on
LPARs began in 1970. They were intended to catalogue space
targets and provide for early warning of missile attacks. At
least one radar, positioned on a mountain slope at 1,600 meter
elevation near Xuanhua, is believed to be manned by Second
56
Artillery forces. The 7010 radar was developed by MEI’S
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14th Research Institute. The antenna array was completed in
1976 and has gained prominence for its tracking of several
satellites. The 7010 radar hands off targets to other tracking
sensors, such as the 110 radar. The 110 radar is a large
monopulse precision tracking surveillance radar which began
R&D in 1966. The radar system, enclosed in a 44 meter-indiameter radome, was commissioned into service in 1977.
Like the 7010 radar, the 110 radar was developed by the 14th
57
Research Institute in Nanjing.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s). Chinese military
officials have also given priority to the development of UAV’s
(wuren jiashi feiji). UAV R&D is centered in BUAA’s Institute
of Unmanned Flight Vehicle Design Institute and NUAA’s
Institute of Unmanned Aircraft. One of China’s newly
deployed UAV’s is the ASN-206, developed by the Xian ASN
Technology Group. This UAV has a coverage range of 150
kilometers, can operate both day and night, and can carry a
variety of sensors, including optical and infrared. Real-time
intelligence can be transmitted to a ground control station for
targeting purposes. Maximum altitude of the system is
58
5,000-6,000 meters, and its flying time is 4-8 hours. NUAA is
designing a GPS-based navigation system to assist in route
planning and course navigation and a new UAV which
59
incorporates a low radar cross-section design. Beijing may
also have concluded an agreement with a foreign supplier to
acquire a high altitude, long endurance UAV, together with a
ground control station, and either production or co-production
rights. This UAV would give China the ability to conduct
extended imagery reconnaissance and surveillance, ELINT
60
collection, as well as electronic warfare missions.

Development of China’s National
Telecommunications Infrastructure.
The vast amount of data collected by China’s intelligence
system requires a highly advanced national telecommunications infrastructure. The Chinese leadership clearly
4
recognizes that a modern, survivable C I network is an
essential element in modern and future warfare. A high
capacity communications network, capable of handling
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multiple gigabits per second, is vital in linking targeting data
with strike assets. Over the last 5 years, China has opened its
market to the leading telecommunications firms around the
world in what is truly an information revolution. As AT&T
official Bill Warwick stated, “China has the opportunity to
61
leapfrog almost overnight into the information age.” The
emphasis is on high capacity fiber optics; switching systems,
to include highly survivable common channel signaling No. 7
software; satellite communication systems; and systems
integration and data fusion.
China has taken initial steps toward forming a national
4
4
integrated C I system. Before 1991, China’s C I system was
disjointed and void of interconnectivity. After the Gulf War,
the State Council and CMC directed the establishment of a
national information system which will bring together
various communications networks. The Eighth Five-Year
Plan (1991-95) marked a dramatic change in China’s attitude
toward telecommunications, which has become the fastest
growing sector of China’s dynamic economy. The State
Council directed the formation of an Information Technology
Leading Group which develops policy and coordinates
information technology development. By the end of 1995,
China had constructed ten of the largest networks in the
world. Based on Beijing’s long range telecommunications plan
to 2050, this rapid modernization is expected to continue. This
full court press toward informationalization has prompted
some to assert that China has the potential to become the
62
world’s most advanced telecommunications infrastructure.
Foreign providers have been key to China’s initial
successes in telecommunications development. Leading
companies include Alcatel, Ericsson, Siemens, Nokia,
Northern Telecom, AT&T, Sprint, and Motorola. Providers of
communications satellites and associated technology include
Hughes (primarily very small aperture terminals, or VSATs),
Lockheed-Martin, and Loral.
The military implications of China’s revolutionary leap in
information capabilities are significant. Recognizing the need
for a real-time sensor-to-shooter capability, the PLA is
working closely with the Ministry of Post and Telecom-
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munications (MPT), the electronics industry, and the space
industry to help establish an integrated high capacity
national information infrastructure. Since promulgation of
the 863 Program, China’s telecommunications community
has embarked upon a long-term, dual-use program valued at
63
$200 billion U.S.
China’s telecommunications sector encompasses civilian
and military organizations. As is the case in the United
States, a national telecommunications network is inherently
dual-use, meaning civilian and military sectors can benefit
from its use. The MPT, under the leadership of the State
Council, is the preeminent player in China’s telecommunications sector. MPT held a monopoly over
telecommunication services until 1994, when the State
Council authorized the formation of a competing network,
United Telecommunications Corporation (Liantong).
Liantong came into existence through the merging of the
electronics, railways, and power industries, and at least a
portion of the PLA General Staff Department communication
64
networks. MEI’s China Academy of Electronic Information
Technology also plays a role in developing a national informa65
tion infrastructure.
Development of dedicated PLA communications networks
is a top national priority. Since 1992, the capacity of PLA
communication networks has increased 10-fold. According to
one estimate, the central government allocates approximately
20 percent of the total telecommunications budget toward
66
dedicated PLA communications systems. There are
currently at least four military networks—a military
telephone network, a secure telephone network, an
automated command system, and an integrated field
communication network. The automated command system
links ground force units with PLA Air Force and Navy units.
Construction began in 1987 and, when completed, will be able
to transmit data, imagery, and other types of militarily useful
67
information. PLA and civilian networks are currently
separate. There are efforts underway, however, to integrate
PLA telecommunications networks into the public
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communications network, making extensive use of civilian
68
services possible.
The PLA is developing its communications infrastructure
in accordance with the “six transformations.” These include
moving from analog to digital technology; electrical cable to
optical cable; electromechanical switches to programcontrolled switches; single function terminals to multifunction terminals; single service networks to networks
offering integrated services; and administration based on
human labor to control based on automation and the
69
application of intelligent technology.
Two of the leading PLA organizations responsible for
development of China’s defense information infrastructure
include the GSD’s Telecommunications Department and
COSTIND’s Beijing Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE).
Entities under the Telecommunications Department include
the GSD Information Engineering Academy and a
communications-related business endeavor, the China
Electronics Systems Engineering Company (CESEC), which
operates what is commonly known as China’s third
70
communications network. BISE works closely with the GSD
Telecommunications Department and civilian entities in
71
integrating various networks into an national system. PLA
communication troops also work with national and provincial
MPT authorities, often being tasked to install commu72
nications links.
China’s investment into a modern
information infrastructure is nothing short of revolutionary.
Purchasing some of the world’s most advanced telecommunications technology, China is installing a dizzying array of
terrestrial and satellite networks.
China’s telecommunications development will provide a
significant boost in the PLA leadership’s ability to command
and control its forces. The central headquarters of the PLA
4
GSD C I apparatus is located in the Xishan area in the
western suburbs of Beijing. It functions as a communications,
intelligence, and combat control center. In short, the Xishan
command complex is the operational nerve center of the PLA
ground units, air forces, navies, and strategic missile forces,
similar in nature to the Pentagon’s National Military
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Command Center. The Command and Control Headquarters
includes the GSD First Department (known as zongcan
zuozhan bu, or operations department), key Second
Department offices, and the Third Department. The First
Department, under direct control of the GSD director, mans
the Command and Control Headquarters 24 hours a day.
All operational orders to PLA units originate from the
Command and Control Headquarters. Mobilization orders
usually result from high level meetings held in the Xishan
complex, attended by the CMC Standing Committee, other
high ranking military officials, and selected civilian leaders.
Orders can be transmitted through a number of means,
including secure telephone or landline. The military
command network is a closed network. Orders from the
national command authority can go to the military region or
73
directly to an individual division. There is an effort
underway to develop a strategic SATCOM network which
uses very small aperture terminal (VSAT) mobile ground
stations with an antenna smaller than three meters in
diameter. Eventually, all units at the group army-level and
74
above will be equipped with this capability.
The Ground Segment. The mainstay of China’s
communications development is installation of a backbone
fiber-optic network, linking all provincial capitals except
Lhasa. With work well underway to connect cities at the
prefecture level, installation of fiber-optics has achieved an
annual growth rate of 92 percent. The fiber optic network
augments previously existing microwave and high frequency
75
(HF) networks.
To ensure various networks can
accommodate vast amount of data, MPT, ostensibly backed by
the PLA, is investing heavily into synchronized digital
hierarchy (SDH), asynchronous transfer mode (ATM),
synchronous optical networking (SONET), wavelength
division multiplexing (WDM), and other technologies which
76
significantly increase survivability and useable bandwidth.
China’s national fiber-optic network is an essential aspect
of China’s quest for information dominance. Fiber-optics deny
an adversary the ability to intercept communications since
there is no transmission of signals through the air. The only
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viable means of tapping into fiber-optic links is to physically
penetrate the cable, which can be detected by system
administrators. Fiber-optic networks also complicate the
ability of overhead photo reconnaissance platforms to detect
command and control nodes, which usually have a noticeable
signature. These types of technologies associated with
fiber-optics are capable of “all optical” operations in that there
are no optical-to-electronic transitions which may cause
bottlenecks or limit versatility. These networks are also
rapidly reconfigurable in the case of a sudden surge in
77
communications requirements.
The Space Segment. COSTIND, MPT, and China’s space
community are making progress in integrating a space
segment into its overall telecommunications infrastructure.
All four of their first operational generation satellites, the
DFH-2 series launched in the 1980s, have ceased to function.
After a long delay, CASC and COSTIND have succeeded in
placing the first of their second generation domestic
communications satellite, the DFH-3, in orbit. The first
DFH-3, launched in November 1994, failed to reach its proper
orbit. However, the second attempt to place a DFH-3 into orbit
78
in May 1997 was successful.
CASC’s satellite R&D and manufacturing arm, CAST, has
commenced work on the next generation communication
satellite, the DFH-4, a direct broadcasting system which can
transmit data to users without the need for ground station
79
rebroadcasting. The fielding of a direct broadcast satellite
offers a capability for distributing information to the lowest
echelon in a battlefield. The term “sensor-to-shooter” can
become a reality if this technology were adapted to military
applications, potentially transmitting data (maps, pictures,
and enemy deployments) on demand to small units, each
using an 18-inch (or smaller) capability to receive orders and
situational information. The DFH-4 could feasibly permit the
transmission of tailored data to hundreds of units
simultaneously. CAST is also researching measures to ensure
survivability of their satellite communications, to include
80
spread spectrum and frequency hopping technology.
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While developing an indigenous ability to build
communications satellites, COSTIND and MPT have
contracted to purchase several foreign satellite systems. To
fill the gap in coverage after the DFH-2 satellites approached
the end of their service life, MPT purchased an in-orbit
satellite, CHINASAT-5, in 1993. MPT, COSTIND, and CASC
also joined in a partnership arrangement with Thai and Hong
Kong companies to form Asia-Pacific Telecommunications
Company (APT). Their first satellite, APSTAR-1, was
launched in July 1994 and is expected to have a lifetime of 10
years. APSTAR-2 exploded shortly after launch in January
81
1995. A replacement satellite was launched in April 1997.
Other satellite procurements included CHINASAT-7
which was launched in August 1996, but failed to reach its
proper orbit. China has contracted for a replacement satellite
with 52 transponders (36 C-Band/16 Ku-Band), the
CHINASAT-8 (Zhongwei-8), which will be launched by the
82
end of 1998. In August 1995, China Orient Telecommunications Satellite Company signed a contract for a U.S.
manufactured satellite, designated as the CHINASTAR-1
(Zhongxing-1), which will be launched on an LM-3B during
1998. This modern, high capacity system of 38 transponders
will provide voice, data, and other services, and will have a
lifespan of 15 years. China Orient’s TT&C ground station will
be located within a complex of existing ground stations in
83
Dongbeiwang, northwest of the Beijing’s Summer Palace.
COSTIND, CASC, and MPT are also working closely with
Germany in the joint development of another generation of
communication satellite, SINOSAT-1 (Xinnuo Weixing-1), the
first of which is due for launch in 1998. The German firm
Teledix is serving as a subcontractor for the SINOSAT-1, the
DFH-3, and other programs, supplying attitude control
84
systems to orient and stabilize the spacecraft body.
China is also participating in international consortiums
which will provide global mobile telephone services. First,
CASC is a shareholder in the Iridium consortium, which will
provide global cellular services via a 66 satellite constellation.
COSTIND will launch 22 of the satellites. An Iridium gateway
in China will interconnect with the public switched network
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which will make communications possible between Iridium
85
lines and any other telephone in the world. COSTIND has
also given serious consideration to developing its own global
network, the Global Mobile Satellite Information System
(GMSIS). GMSIS, utilizing a small number of satellites in
medium earth orbit, will provide mobile communications
services to a large number of domestic and regional
86
customers.
Finally, COSTIND, CASC, Liantong, and MPT have
signed an agreement with Singapore and Thailand for joint
procurement and management of a communications satellite
which will offer mobile hand-held phone service. The
consortium, called Asia-Pacific Mobile Telecommunications
(APMT) will buy a U.S. satellite for U.S. $640 million. Launch
of an LM-3B from Xichang is scheduled for mid-1998. The
initial concept for the system called for a Hughes 601 platform
in geostationary orbit off the west coast of Sumatra. The
system, which will operate in the L and Ku bands, is designed
to handle 4,000 calls simultaneously. Chinese requirements
include multiple beam technology (specifically 32) for
87
increased security. China’s space and ground communications segments are being integrated into a national
88
information infrastructure.
Systems Integration. Combining the various networks and
equipment into a survivable, integrated network is a national
priority. Concerned about potential effects of an enemy strike
against a communications node, China’s telecommunications
community is investing heavily into common channel
signaling number seven switching technology (SS7). SS7
software allows for automatic rerouting of traffic should a key
C3 node be disabled. Beijing hopes to complete a national SS7
“intelligent network,” within the current 5-year plan
(1996-2000). MPT and the PLA Telecommunications
Department’s Institute of Information Engineering jointly
developed China’s first domestically produced SS7 intelligent
network, the CIN-01, and in March 1997, the PLA GSD
89
installed an intelligent SS7 network in the Beijing area. As a
side note, much the PLA’s software development for systems
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integration is concentrated within COSTIND’s Beijing
90
Institute of Systems Engineering.
On the military side, one concept called for establishing
and connecting five military networks—command and control
systems, intelligence and reconnaissance, early warning and
detection, communications, and electronic warfare. In theory,
the formation of a defense information infrastructure will
allow operational integration and combined command of
China’s ground, naval, air, and Second Artillery forces.
Sources indicate the PLA currently does not have a
4
comprehensive C I network, but appears to be adopting a
91
step-by-step approach toward forming one.
Computing. Dominating the information environment
requires the computer processing of vast amounts of data.
High speed computers are also essential for simulations and
modeling, and operation of a wide range of new weapons
systems. Recognizing the importance of computing, the State
Council formed a state leading group on computerization in
May 1996. The leading group is headed by Zou Jiahua and
consists of representatives from MEI, MPT, State Planning
Commission, People’s Bank of China, and 12 other
departments. The group will formulate national policies,
strategies, and mid- to long-range plans for national
92
computerization.
COSTIND and other state R&D organizations have
prioritized development of supercomputing technologies
under the 863 Program. The SHUGUANG 1000 parallel
computer system, an 863 funded program, achieved 2.5 billion
operations per second in 1985. Projects underway include a
CAS effort to develop a parallel supercomputer system, the
DAWN series, capable of speeds up to 300 billion calculations
93
per second. China’s defense industry is also working to
reduce the size of its microcomputers for missile, launch
vehicle, and satellite use. For example, CASC’s first
microcomputer for launch vehicles weighed 50 kilograms. The
size was reduced to 30 kilograms, and reduced again to 10
94
kilograms.
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China is increasing emphasis on computer simulation.
Useful systems include a new series of Chinese
supercomputers, the Yinhe (Galaxy), developed by
COSTIND’s National University of Defense Technology
(NUDT) in Changsha, Hunan province. Most recently, NUDT
developed an advanced real-time simulation system which
has been used by CASC and the aviation industry in the
development of a new generation of missile control systems
95
and UAVs. CASC’s primary simulation facility, the Beijing
Simulation Center, is the largest in Asia. As a side note, in
April 1997, the Russian Defense Minister initiated
cooperative efforts with the Beijing Simulation Center in
96
computer simulation technology.
China is also investing heavily in the development of
artificial intelligence and intelligent computer systems. The
SSTC and COSTIND designated intelligent computing as a
key area of development under the 863 Program. National
level coordination of artificial intelligence R&D is done
through the Expert Group for Intelligent Computing (code
named 863-306), chaired by Wang Chengwei. Establishment
of the National Research Center for Intelligent Computing
Systems further reflects growing emphasis on artificial
97
intelligence. Artificial intelligence systems, such as neural
networks, have a wide variety of applications, to include
weapon system design and manufacturing, simulation,
automatic target recognition (ATR), and decisionmaking.
China is poised to become a world leader in advanced
computer networking technology. According to AT&T
Chairman Louis Gerstner, “China has the opportunity to
move more quickly than other countries because its has
invested less in traditional systems and practices.” China’s
across-the-board introduction of state-of-the-art systems
avoids pitfalls other countries are facing, such as investing in
making incompatible computer systems talk with each
98
other.
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Information Attack.
A final aspect of China’s quest for information dominance
is information attack. PLA strategists see precision targeting
of critical command and control nodes, computer warfare, and
a counterspace capability as means to offset adversarial
strengths. The development of an effective electronics
countermeasures capability is a top priority within the PLA
General Staff Department, specifically the Electronic
Countermeasures and Radar Department (dianzi duikang yu
leida bu), and within the R&D community. Information
warfare advocates are pressing for more sophisticated means
to engage in command and control warfare, including better
jammers and high powered microwave technology.
First, PLA strategists are increasing emphasis on
computer warfare as one means to offset adversarial
strengths. Chinese observers point out the effectiveness of
U.S. use of viruses against Iraqi computer systems during the
Gulf War and note the utility of using computer viruses as a
weapon. Engineers have conducted feasibility studies on
introducing viruses (bingdu) into adversary’s computer
systems from long distances via wireless means. Besides
serving as a means to attack computer networks, these
studies have been useful in developing countermeasures to
99
enemy attempts to inject viruses into Chinese computers.
China’s defense industrial complex is placing a great deal
of emphasis on electronic countermeasures (ECM)
development. The GSD Electronic Countermeasure and
Radar Department (also known as GSD Fourth Department),
established in 1990, has overall responsibility for electronic
warfare, including electronic intelligence collection and
maintenance of threat libraries and electronic orders of battle.
Besides coordinating the PLA electronic warfare doctrine and
strategy, GSD Fourth Department units provide electronic
warfare defense of strategic targets, such as the PLA
100
command bunkers in the Western Hills (Xishan) of Beijing.
The GSD Fourth Department leadership is currently tackling
problems associated with command and control of ECM
operations. Because of the close coordination required, an
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ECM command operations cell will serve as an integral part of
101
a theater command post.
Electronic warfare units have
conducted major joint exercises as recently as March 1996 in
102
the South China Sea.
The research institute most responsible for ELINT
development and radar jammers is the electronic industry’s
SWIEE (the 29th Research Institute) in Chengdu, Sichuan
province. Research and development on communications
jammers is the responsibility of the 36th Research Institute in
Hefei, Anhui province. SWIEE is also conducting operational
feasibility studies on using UAVs as electronic warfare
103
platforms.
The PLA’s primary academic and training
institute on electronic warfare appears to be the PLA
Academy of Electronic Engineering, located in Hefei, Anhui
104
province.
Chinese planners have begun to develop electronic
warfare concepts to counter adversarial air and space systems
as well. For example, there are indications the PLA is
105
preparing to test or deploy a SATCOM jammer.
SWIEE
engineers have carried out feasibility studies for jamming
106
synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance satellites.
Chinese research institutes are also conducting feasibility
studies on jamming the U.S. NAVSTAR Global Positioning
107
System.
Finally, Chinese engineers are examining
methodologies to enable the PLAAF to jam airborne early
warning platforms and sophisticated networks, such as the
108
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS).
One of the most significant foreign sources of electronic
warfare technology is Israel. In the late 1980s/early 1990s,
Israel export firms and China’s Ministry of Electronics
Industry signed a memorandum of understanding on
technological transfer of electronic warfare hardware and
software. Israeli companies such as Elbit, Elisra, Tadiran,
Elop, and Elta entered into cooperative development ventures
with Chinese entities such as SWIEE, the Hebei-based
Communications, Telemetry, and Telecontrol Research
Institute (MEI 54th Research Institute), and the Anhui-based
East China Research Institute of Electronic Engineering
(ECRIEE, or the MEI 36th Research Institute). Projects
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include airborne radar warning receivers, ELINT systems,
109
and radar jammers.
Under COSTIND guidance, China’s R&D community is
also dabbling in even more advanced information attack
technology related to high powered microwave (HPM)
weapons. China’s most respected advocates of information
warfare have strongly supported HPM development.
COSTIND subordinated research institutes have already
mastered certain power sources commonly associated with
microwave weapons, including flux compression generators
(baoci yasuo fashengqi) and vircators (xuyin jizhen dangqi).
Chinese writings have outlined three attack applications for
HPM devices: as a directional microwave air defense system
to damage the electronic systems of attacking aircraft and
antiradiation missiles (known to Chinese engineers as an
electromagnetic missile); an ASAT weapon to degrade
sensitive satellite electronic systems; and a warhead to use in
4
an opening salvo to shut down adversarial radars and C I
110
systems.
In addition to “soft kill” approaches to information
dominance, China’s R&D establishment is developing a
variety of “hard kill” means to neutralize segments of an
4
enemy’s C I infrastructure. Employment of ballistic, cruise,
2
and antiradiation missiles against C centers and
ground-based early warning sites is one approach. Targeting
of airborne early warning platforms is another. The Chinese
defense industrial complex is examining a range of designs for
a long-range air-to-air missile to counter high value assets
such as airborne early warning platforms, airborne warning
and control systems (AWACS), and airborne jammers.
Development appears to be in the theoretical evaluation
(lunzheng) phase where various institutes evaluate system
feasibility and performance requirements. Key organizations
in this effort include the Shanghai Academy of Space
Technology’s primary missile design institute (Shanghai
Institute of Electromechanical Engineering) and the PLAAF
Eighth Research Institute (Weapon System Evaluation). A
solid propulsion system and combined passive microwave and
111
infrared imaging seekers are under consideration.
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The most common concept for a long-range anti-airborne
early warning (AEW) or anti-AWACs system is to use a
missile with a jet engine, plus a rocket booster for final
approach to the airborne platform. A missile, preferably with
a low radar cross section, could approach the AEW platform at
an extremely low altitude using passive radar, homing in on
the aircraft’s radar signal. Once under the AEW platform, it
would ignite its rocket and home in on the AEW using active
radar or infrared. Such a missile could be quite difficult to
avoid, as it might be 20-30 seconds before such a fast moving
112
missile from below connected.
CASC is already marketing a surface-to-air anti-radiation
missile system. The FT-2000, intended to neutralize airborne
jammers and early warning sensors, operates in the 2-18GHZ
range and can reach targets out to an advertised range of 100
113
kilometers.
A final, less high tech approach to information attack is
the growing PLA emphasis on special operations forces.
Chinese writings indicate one of the most important of special
operations missions is to carry out strikes against an
114
adversary’s leadership and command centers.
After
clandestine entry into enemy territory, special operations
troops could strike critical early warning installations, cut
communications landlines running out of command centers,
or designate targets for air strikes.

Information Protection.
One of the most important pillars in China’s quest for
information dominance is denying an adversary information
on PLA plans, force deployments, and vulnerabilities, and
protecting the PLA’s ability to command and control its forces.
Secrecy has been a traditional aspect of Chinese strategy, and
as an authoritarian society, information security is pervasive.
However, China’s entry into the information age presents a
new set of problems. The 1992 failure of 12 railroad computer
systems due to viruses was a rude awakening for China’s
leadership. The rise of information warfare has driven fears
that its growing information infrastructure is vulnerable to
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attack or sabatoge. To help counter its growing vulnerability,
Beijing established a National Key Laboratory of Information
Security under China’s University of Science and Technology.
As a further measure, in 1996, China’s State Secrets
Bureau and the State Council’s Development Research
Center published a strategy for information security. The
most significant conclusion was a call for the State Council’s
Leading Group on Information Technology to develop
information security strategy and technology in parallel with
China national information infrastructure development. The
report also points out that China’s computer systems, now
largely unprotected, need to enhance their security measures.
Other sources indicate China has taken steps to protect the
leakage of electronic emissions from computer systems which
can be intercepted and exploited by adversaries. In 1996,
China Academy of Science established the Information
Security Technology Engineering Research Center while the
115
State Council began formulation of TEMPEST standards.
Chinese leadership and strategic analysts are becoming
increasingly concerned about foreign attempts to insert
viruses into their information systems. Acutely aware of the
havoc which computer viruses can cause to a command and
control system, PLA analysts have advocated measures to
protect internal computer networks. These measures include
decreasing dependence on foreign sources of integrated
circuits, increasing investment into R&D on computer
warfare, strengthening information systems’ ability to resist
116
EMP, and improving computer security management.
At
least one PLA institute dedicated to INFOSEC and computer
security is the PLA Academy of Electronic Technology in
117
Zhengzhou, Henan province.
In May 1996, Jiefangjun Bao (PLA Daily), published an
article calling for greater attention to emission security. The
article was sparked by the April 1996 death of a Chechen
separatist leader who was killed when the Russian Air Force
plotted his precise location after he used a cellular phone. The
PLA has also studied the success of U.S. SIGINT in
monitoring and cataloguing Iraqi electronic transmissions
before and during the Gulf War. The PLA has issued
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directives to strictly control any communications and radar
emissions and implement an effective frequency management
118
system.
Beijing is examining a wide range of technologies to reduce
vulnerabilities of its communications to interception or
jamming. For example, widespread introduction of fiber optics
communications significantly increases its communications
security. Engineers are studying the application of spread
spectrum and frequency hopping technology for Beijing’s
satellite tracking and control network, as well as more secure
119
satellite communications methodologies.
China is also
stepping up integration of more complex encryption
(mimaxue) algorithims. At least one organization involved in
cryptography is the Sichuan Institute of Information Science,
which produces one of China’s leading publications on the
subject, entitled “Leading Edge Research in Cryptography.” A
major conference, CHINACRYPT ‘96, was recently held to
120
discuss the latest advances in encryption.
To augment other information security measures,
Chinese engineers and military operators stress concealment,
camouflage, and deception (CCD) concepts which are
ingrained into traditional Chinese strategic constructs.
Writings of industry and military officials indicate
widespread attempts to deny foreign satellite platforms
information related to disposition of missile forces and other
strategic assets. Chinese strategists differentiate camouflage
and concealment by the degree of technology involved.
Camouflage includes decoys, netting, radar angle reflectors,
and other means to prevent an adversary from detecting
forces and weapon systems.
Technology, however, has reduced the effectiveness of
traditional camouflage measures and has forced China to
move toward concealment. Concealment is the employment of
technology to decrease detection by adversary satellite
systems. Concealment measures, integrated into the weapons
R&D process, include electromagnetic, radar, noise, and
infrared signature reduction. China emphasizes use of
camouflage to avoid detection by foreign optical, infrared, and
radar satellites. For example, they camouflage their missile
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silos and construct dummy silos. Analysts acknowledge
that camouflage has become more difficult since the advent of
radar and infrared satellites. However, Chinese strategists
are certain that emerging concealment materials and
technology can effectively counter foreign surveillance
systems. One example is infrared suppression, which will
121
counter heat-seeking precision guidance systems.
PLA
engineers have also published technical papers on methods to
122
reduce infrared signature of underground facilities.
China’s efforts to develop counterstealth systems have
contributed to the development of low observable technology
for aircraft, UAV’s, and cruise missiles. China clearly
recognizes the advantages of low observable technology and
has stepped up investment into stealth (yinshen) research,
achieving what some engineers believe to be technological
123
breakthroughs.
Psychological operations, manipulation, and strategic
deception aspects of information warfare are deeply ingrained
in Chinese military doctrine. Traditional Chinese military
history, to include the strategic writings of Sun Tzu, is full of
examples of strategic and tactical surprise, and deception.
Initial Chinese entry into the Korean War can be
characterized as a strategic surprise.
In summary, Chinese military planners appear to be
striving for a comparative advantage in the ability to control,
collect, process, act upon, and disseminate information, giving
the PLA a future edge in conflicts around its periphery. The
PLA is increasingly viewing information as a strategic
weapon. Just as possession of nuclear weapons marked a
major power in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, information
technology is characteristic of a major power of the 21st
century. Crucial in this effort is the development of critical
communications and information processing technologies,
such as space-based surveillance, direct broadcast satellites,
and high speed computers. China’s information technology
community is making necessary investments into correcting
shortcomings in Beijing’s ability to integrate complex
information systems. At the same time, the PLA is investing
4
in systems which can disrupt an adversary’s C I infra-
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structure as a means to blind and disrupt the leadership’s
ability to control forces under his command.
China’s rate of improvement is likely to improve
dramatically in the next decade. China’s information
revolution is driven by technologies available worldwide.
Digitization, computer processing, precise global positioning,
and systems integration—the technological basis on which a
range of new capabilities depends—are available to any
country with the money and will to use them systematically to
improve military capabilities. Based on its large investment
into sensors, telecommunications, electronic warfare, and
information protection technologies, China clearly views
exploitation of the information revolution as key to its
strategic modernization.
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CHAPTER 4
DAWN OF A NEW AGE:
CHINA’S LONG-RANGE PRECISION STRIKE
CAPABILITIES

With a solid base of information, PLA planners hope
someday to be able to mate sensors and strike assets into a
real-time strategic reconnaissance/strike complex. The PLA
hopes to develop a range of strike assets with which to exploit
adversarial vulnerabilities on the ground, on the ocean, in
space, and within the electromagnetic spectrum. Chinese
strategists and planners have priority programs to develop a
new generation of lethal, highly accurate, and survivable
ballistic and cruise missiles, able to penetrate any theater or
national missile defense system. Since 1991, the PLA and the
space and missile industry have made conventionally armed
surface-to-surface missiles and extended range cruise
missiles key projects in their 15-year developmental plans.
Shortly after the Gulf War, the PLA expanded the role of
its strategic rocket forces, known as the Second Artillery, as a
conventional striking force. The new mission is the direct
result of a dramatic increase in the accuracy of its ballistic
missile force. Missiles are rapidly becoming the sole credible
long-range firepower projection asset which the PLA has in its
inventory, and this will remain likely true for the foreseeable
1
future. This chapter examines selected long-range strike
assets which could allow the Chinese to achieve their limited
objectives. An examination of China’s cruise missile program
is first explored, followed by an outline of its ballistic missile
research and development, and concluded with an overview of
China’s strategic missile force, the Second Artillery.

Cruise Missiles.
Since the Gulf War and the increasing availability of
technology, the Chinese defense industrial complex has
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decided to upgrade its aerodynamic missiles. Building upon a
well-established foundation of air launched, ground launched,
and submarine launched anti-ship missile technology, China
is creating a new generation of cruise missiles able to
penetrate defenses and strike critical targets with precision
and increased firepower. Fielding of land attack cruise
missiles will prompt expansion of missions of the PLA’s
Second Artillery and Navy.
The heart of China’s aerodynamic missile development
lies within CASC’s Third Academy (di san yanjiuyuan, or
sanyuan for short), headquartered in Yungang, southwest of
Beijing. Over 14,500 technicians and workers ply their trade
in ten research institutes and two major factories. Each of the
ten research institutes focuses on specific subcomponents of a
cruise missile, such as propulsion, inertial navigation, control
systems, terminal guidance, and launching equipment. The
Third Academy’s Third Design Department, consisting of over
1,000 technicians, has systems engineering and design
2
responsibilities.
The Third Academy’s cruise missile R&D effort began in
the late 1950s. Intended as an anti-ship coastal defense
system, Qian Xuesen led the industrial campaign. Based on
an agreement signed in 1959, the Soviet Union provided
prototypes and technical information. R&D and production
facilities were established under the space and missile
industry at Yungang near Beijing, in Hubei province (066
Base) and in Sichuan (062 Base). The aviation industry
established an augmenting, and sometimes competing, center
for anti-ship missile production at the Nanchang Aircraft
Factory. With Soviet assistance, an anti-ship missile testing
complex was established off the coast of Liaoxi, Liaoning
province. Since 1959, over 10 variants of anti-ship missiles
3
have been produced.
The Gulf War provided a new impetus for cruise missile
development. The PLA and the defense industries were awed
by the performance of U.S. and allied land attack cruise
missiles, especially the Tomahawk. Since then, the Third
Academy has flooded the civilian and military leadership with
feasibility studies on air, ground, and sea launched
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aerodynamic missiles. The PLA and the Third Academy have
moved beyond the concept of utilizing cruise missiles for
tactical coastal defense, to a more ambitious goal of fielding
missiles which are able to strike strategic land- and sea-based
targets.
The defense industrial complex strongly advocates
increasing investment into cruise missiles. In an offensedefense cost comparison, some believe that developing an
arsenal of cruise missiles can have a 9:1 ratio between
developing, deploying, and maintaining cruise missiles over
the cost of defending against them. As the president of the
Third Academy has pointed out, the cost of producing cruise
missiles is 20-30 percent less in China than it is in other
4
countries. A national program aimed developing cruise
missiles will further foster technological spin-offs from work
in inertial guidance, terrain matching, scene matching
terminal guidance, turbojet and turbofan engines,
supercritical bomb wings, electronic warfare, and
concealment and counterconcealment technology. Third
Academy representatives also assert that highly capable
cruise missiles can be profitable by marketing their products
5
overseas.
Third Academy director Wang Jianmin has outlined what
he considers to be priorities for future cruise missile
development. First and foremost is a completely new
generation of mid- to long-range cruise missiles included in
the 2010 long-range plan. He outlined specific technologies,
such as low smoke solid fueled motors, composite ramjet
engines, IR imaging guidance, active/passive microwave/IR
imaging guidance, and IR/laser imaging composite guidance,
and new forms of ECCM and on board jammers, as top
6
priorities in R&D efforts.
Chinese analysts see three applications of cruise missiles.
First, they clearly envision using cruise missiles in an
offensive counterair role. Highly accurate missiles can offset
an adversary’s superiority in air forces by striking its air
assets while they are concentrated on the ground or on a
carrier. Other potential targets include runways, air
operations centers, POL facilities, and quarters housing
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pilots. Such a targeting capability requires near real-time
sources of information, a high degree of accuracy, and effective
7
munitions. The Third Academy has conducted in-depth
targeting assessments of U.S. aircraft carriers, including fleet
defense assets, characteristics of radar and infrared
8
emissions, and electronic combat capabilities.
Chinese strategists also discuss cruise missiles as a
critical element in their quest for information dominance.
Cruise missiles are necessary to take out an adversary’s eyes
and ears. This includes antiradiation missile (ARM) strikes
against radars, land attack cruise missile attacks against
high value reconnaissance assets on the ground, and strikes
4
against C I nodes in order to paralyze command and control.
China’s defense industrial complex, specifically the Third
Academy with support from the Harbin Institute of
Technology, is aggressively pursuing deployment of a
9
long-range antiradiation missile. An ARM capability would
be a significant leap in the PLA’s ability to hit important
targets protected by air defense assets. A final utility of cruise
missiles is nuclear deterrence. There are clear indications
that China will likely have a nuclear warhead sized for one of
their cruise missiles and are seriously considering adding
10
another leg to their nuclear force.
Hoping to field a viable aerodynamic missile which is able
to hit critical targets at sea and on land, the defense industrial
complex is focusing resources on a few key areas potentially
11
applicable to all variants under development. First, the
Third Academy is striving to reduce the radar cross section
(leida jiemian) of its missiles, potentially requiring a new
class of cruise missile. Specific methodologies include shaping
of the airframe and application of the radar absorbing
12
materials. Reduced cross section is needed to minimize an
adversary’s ability to detect an incoming missile or at least
reduce reaction time.
Engineers are also working on better propulsion systems
which can increase the lethal range or speed of the cruise
missile. Faster cruise missiles reduce an adversary’s reaction
time. In one of China’s most significant aerospace programs,
COSTIND and the Third Academy are designing a supersonic
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combustion ramjet engine (scramjet, or chaoran chongya
fadongji) which can propel a missile at hypersonic speeds of
13
between Mach 4-10. Engineers are also working toward
more efficient turbojet and turbofan engines and motors in
order to significantly extend the range of its cruise missiles.
The current range of China’s antiship missiles is limited to
around 200 kilometers. To be able to hit targets in Japan using
a ground launched system, for instance, the Third Academy
would have to produce a missile with an approximately
14
1,250-1,500 kilometer range (750 kilometers for Okinawa).
The Third Academy is also capitalizing on many available
technologies in order to improve the accuracy of its missile
force. At least one of the Third Academy’s requirements
driving the next generation of cruise missiles is the ability to
strike airfield runways with conventional munitions, a feat
which requires tremendous accuracy. China’s rapid rise in
computing capabilities and growing availability of
commercial satellite imagery provides increased opportunity
to integrate terrain command guidance (TERCOM) and
digital scene matching area correlator (DSMAC) into their
navigation and guidance systems. The Third Academy has
been conducting preliminary research into TERCOM (dixing
pipei zhidao) since at least 1988, and, in 1991, published a
thorough internal analysis of the Tomahawk’s performance in
15
the Gulf War.
TERCOM capability is based on preprogramming the
missile with digital maps. During flight, the missile’s radar
system matches the terrain surveyed to the computerized
maps to ensure its course. This requires highly sophisticated
digital mapping systems and powerful computers which will
allow very accurate targeting. DSMAC uses a digitized
satellite image of the target stored in the missile’s computer
system. In flight, the missile matches the stored image with
images detected in flight. In general, the better resolution of
the stored image, the more accurate the missile. China has
already made great strides in development of digital mapping.
To correct for en route navigation errors, Third Academy
engineers are attempting to integrate GPS receivers with
their inertial navigation units and TERCOM systems. Third
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Academy engineers believe DSMAC can guarantee a CEP of
less than 16 meters. Mid-course corrections through a
combined GPS/INS system can further reduce the accuracy of
16
cruise missiles to 10 meters. There is some indication China
is examining integrating combined GPS/GLONASS receivers
17
on board their missiles as well.
Other terminal sensor technologies under development
2
include passive imaging infrared, CO laser radar, millimeter
wave, and synthetic aperture radar terminal sensors, as well
as various composite systems. R&D into passive imaging
infrared sensors is focused on matching a stored computerized
18
image with a real infrared image detected by the missile.
Third Academy engineers have already laid the technical
2
foundation for a CO laser guidance system, to include the
19
target recognition components.
Chinese aerospace
engineers believe synthetic aperture radar, millimeter wave
radar, infrared imaging, and laser radar guidance can result
20
in an accuracy of one to three meters.
There are other technologies the Chinese are researching
to mask launch sites and enhance the ability of their missiles
to penetrate defenses. Engineers are attempting to reduce the
signature on cruise missile propellants, and conceal location
21
of mobile land based strategic and tactical cruise missiles.
To further increase the penetration capability, the Third
Academy is examining the technical prospects of integrating
electronic and optical countermeasures onto cruise missiles in
order to complicate adversarial detection, tracking, and
22
discrimination systems. The PLA Navy has conducted
modeling of various anti-ship cruise missiles to evaluate
23
performance against the SM-2 air defense missile system.
The Third Academy is working with other defense
industries to develop warheads which can effectively disable
strategically important targets. Most significant is work on
mastering submunition (zidantou) and guided dispensor
(zhidao busanqi) technology. Submunitions can knock out
aircraft in the open, crater runways to temporarily prevent
aircraft from taking off and landing, or lay mines to make
runway repair more difficult. They are also furthering R&D
on more lethal unitary warheads for precision strikes against
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24

key facilities. There are persistent signs that the Chinese
intend to arm at least a portion of their cruise missile
inventory with nuclear warheads. Engineers are also
laudatory of cruise missiles equipped with high powered
microwave (dagonglu weibo) warheads. If they are able to
move beyond preliminary R&D on high powered microwave
technology, such a directed energy warhead would be
especially lethal against shipborne or airbased electronic
25
systems.
The Third Academy has upgraded its ability to design and
manufacture highly complex cruise missiles. They are
integrating the use of virtual reality (xuni xianshi) in cruise
missile development, and are using increasingly sophisticated
supercomputers to design the missiles. Third Academy
manufacturing centers have imported some of the world’s
most advanced engineering workstations, and three, four, and
26
five-axis computer numerically controlled machine tools.
CASC’s world-class simulation facility in western Beijing also
aids cruise missile development by theoretically reducing
testing requirements by 40-60 percent and shortening overall
27
development time by 30-40 percent.
A new generation of low observable, extended range,
faster, and more lethal missiles will probably be adapted for
multiple platforms. Cruise missiles launched from airborne
(H-6 or H-7) or naval platforms will result in significantly
extended range. Perhaps more dangerous would be an ability
to launch from a submerged submarine, which the Third
28
Academy is closely examining. It is believed that the first
naval platform capable of submerged launching of cruise
missiles will be the Song-class submarine, produced at the
29
Wuhan shipyard.
Extension of the range and target set of its cruise missiles
will likely require a shift in organizational responsibilities.
Conventional and nuclear air-launched land attack cruise
missiles will most likely be subordinated to the PLA Air Force.
Tactical and strategic attacks against sea platforms will
continue to be a PLA Navy mission. The PLA Navy will
expand its mission to include conventional and nuclear cruise
30
missile strikes against land-based targets. The greatest
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change in responsibilities may well be an expansion of the
Second Artillery’s mission to include strategic groundlaunched land attack with cruise missiles equipped with both
nuclear and conventional warheads. In support of this new
mission, the Second Artillery’s Fourth Research Institute has
been modeling the ability of cruise missiles to penetrate air
31
defense systems.
The Third Academy approach is to develop variations of
existing shorter-range airframes which encompass some
advanced technologies. The Third Academy is believed to have
advanced to model R&D and testing of some of these initial
variants. First, the PLA has allegedly ordered the
acceleration of a ground launched land attack version of the
YJ-8A (C-802). This 135-kilometer range system would be the
first to incorporate GPS-assisted navigation and TERCOM
guidance. Some sources believe GPS aided navigation could
result in cruise missiles like the YJ-8 to achieve accuracies of
up to 10 meters. GPS-aided guidance could be augmented by
32
terrain contour matching.
Until they are able to field their next generation of cruise
missiles, China may enter into an agreement with Russia for
the purchase of antiship missiles. The sale of two Russian
guided missile destroyers was discussed during Li Peng’s visit
to Moscow on December 28, 1996. The destroyers include the
SS-N-22, designed to counter Aegis ships, and allegedly one
cruise missile the U.S. Navy fears most because of its
33
supersonic speed, maneuverability, and large warhead.
Russia’s Raduga Design Bureau has also assisted the Third
Academy in application of stealth technology to an
34
unidentified air launched cruise missile. Russia has also
sent specialists to the Third Academy’s 8359th Institute to
overcome various technical obstacles in the development of
35
new launch platforms.

Ballistic Missile Research and Development.
In addition to cruise missiles, CASC is making rapid
advances in increasing the survivability and lethality of
ballistic missiles. China began its ballistic missile research
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and development program in the mid-1950s. Recently
returned from the United States, Qian Xuesen submitted a
proposal for missile development in 1956. The CMC approved
the proposal but had to turn to the Soviet Union for technical
assistance. Under the 1957 Sino-Soviet technical accord, the
Soviet Union provided rudimentary missiles, associated
launching equipment, and technical assistance. By 1960,
however, the Sino-Soviet relationship deteriorated and all
Soviet technicians returned to Moscow. Despite this setback,
China test launched its first domestically produced missile,
the DF-2A, in 1965. Over the course of the next 20 years, a
series of liquid-fueled missiles were designed and tested to
allow the PLA to strike U.S. bases in Japan (DF-2), the
Philippines (DF-3), Guam (DF-4), and continental United
States (DF-5). In the 1960s, China’s missile industry began
development of a solid-fueled sea launched ballistic missile,
the JL-1. In the late 1970s, work began on a land-based
version of the JL-1, the 1,800 kilometer range DF-21.
Subsequent solid fueled missile development has focused on
shorter range systems equipped with conventional payloads
36
and longer range counterparts to the DF-4 and DF-5 ICBMs.
China’s preeminent organization for ballistic missile
development is the CASC First Academy (diyi yanjiuyuan, or
yiyuan). The First Academy, also known as the China
Academy of Launch Technology (CALT), consists of an overall
design and systems integration department, and 13 research
institutes and seven factories which are responsible for
engines, control technology, inertial systems, warheads,
materials, testing, and launchers. With more than 27,000
personnel, the First Academy is the largest R&D organization
within CASC. Leveraging its expertise in ballistic missiles,
the First Academy, headquartered in the southern Beijing
suburb of Nanyuan, has developed a range of satellite launch
vehicles. In its work on solid systems, the First Academy
depends upon the Fourth Academy in Hohhot, Inner
Mongolia, for its solid motors. CALT is also supported by
institutes and factories subordinated to various bases deep
inside China. One of these bases, the Sanjiang Space Group in
Hubei province, has developed its own complete ballistic
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missile system, the 300-kilometer DF-11 (also known as
37
M-11).
Today, the First Academy’s research and development
resources are devoted toward ensuring its nuclear ballistic
missile force remains a viable deterrent in the face of
emerging missile defenses. Since the initiation of work on the
Strategic Defense Initiative in the late 1970s, Chinese missile
engineers have been busily working to ensure their missile
38
force retains its vitality. In addition, the PLA, drawing
profound lessons from the Gulf War, views conventional
ballistic missiles as a crucial aspect of China’s emerging deep
39
attack (zongshen) capability. To meet these objectives, the
First Academy’s research and development resources have
focused on increasing the range of its solid fueled ballistic
missiles, and increasing the survivability, accuracy, and
lethality of its existing tactical, campaign or theater (zhanyi),
40
and strategic short range missiles.
China’s program to modernize their nuclear
intercontinental ballistic missile forces is well-documented.
To briefly summarize, however, China’s current ICBMs, able
to strike targets throughout the United States, are liquid
fueled. To offset vulnerabilities in their small ICBM force, the
space and missile community is developing a new generation
of mobile, solid fueled ICBMs. These include the DF-31 (8,000
kilometer range) and DF-41 (12,000 kilometer range) ICBMs,
and the sea-based version of the DF-31, the JL-2. The nuclear
tipped DF-31 will probably be deployed in experimental
regiments around the turn of the century, and will have the
ability to strike targets as far away as Guam and Hawaii.
After successfully testing the DF-31, the space and missile
industry will likely move the DF-41 to the next developmental
41
stage.
As CALT proceeds in its DF-31/DF-41 development,
another top R&D priority is ensuring its current and future
products are able to penetrate potential missile defenses and
survive any counterattack. Probably the most well-known
program is the development of multiple warhead technology.
This includes multiple warheads against a single target, and
multiple warheads against multiple targets with the option of
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equipping each with independent guidance sets. As of
January 1996, CALT was in midst of developing multiple
warheads, each with its own guidance system and
42
maneuvering capability.
R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs)
was initiated as early as 1970. Technical difficulties, however,
have stalled the program. The First Academy renewed R&D
in 1983, shortly after the SDI was announced in March 1983.
The DF-5A, able to strike targets in the continental United
States (CONUS), was the designated recipient of the MIRVs,
although there is no evidence that they have been deployed.
Critical to this effort is the miniaturization of warheads, a
possible objective of tests at Lop Nur over the last few years.
According to Chinese missile designers, real and decoy
warheads (jia dantou) can be mixed using multiple warhead
technology. Real warheads can be painted with radar
absorbing materials that will weaken radar returns to
43
maximize similarities between real and decoy warheads.
CALT is developing maneuverable (jidong biangui)
reentry vehicles to complicate missile defense tracking. While
vehicles can maneuver at any time during flight, Chinese
engineers see most utility in programming a reentry vehicle to
maneuver in its terminal phase, 20-30 seconds before striking
its target. A reentry vehicle has the ability to maneuver
within a lateral range of 556-900 kilometers. Another
maneuvering option discussed is to send the warhead up to a
higher altitude after separation from the missile, slowly
descending in a glide for a very long distance, and then finally
diving toward the target. Chinese engineers are also
addressing problems associated with maintaining accuracy
44
after exo-atmospheric maneuvering.
Another option Chinese designers have recently discussed
is a fractional orbiting missile (bufen guidao daodan) in which
a warhead is placed into a low earth orbit. When the time
comes to attack a target, an engine can be fired to bring the
warhead to bear against a target, creating great difficulties for
45
an adversary’s missile defense.
China conducted a
feasibility study on a fractional orbital bombardment system
(FOBS) in 1966. This system launches a missile into very low
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orbit, approximately 95 miles above earth. Before completion
of first orbit, a retro-rocket retards the speed of the warhead,
which hits the target with only a few minutes warning. In
1965, China had learned from an American report that the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was developing a
forward operations base (FOB); this report was never
confirmed. They explored launching a missile over Antarctica
and penetrating the weakest point in the U.S. warning
46
network.
The Chinese have devoted resources toward countering
potential deployment of air- and space-based high powered
laser systems. First, Chinese engineers have carried out R&D
into spinning their ballistic missiles to prevent concentration
47
of a high powered laser on a single spot. Another method
under consideration as an explicit countermeasure to boost
phase intercepters is fast burn booster (suran zhutui)
technology for China’s next generation of solid fueled strategic
ballistic missiles. Chinese engineers, however, caution
designers about potential quality control problems related to
stage separation and accuracy, and suggest this technology
should be divided into three stages based on the pace of foreign
48
missile defense developments.
Missile analysts view depressed trajectories (yadi guidao)
as another option to counter space-based and exoatmospheric
upper-tier missile defense systems. Intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) often reach altitudes of 2,000 kilometers on
a normal trajectory. However, launching a missile at a
depressed trajectory could allow the missile to achieve only a
100 kilometer altitude which complicates some space-based
systems’ ability to penetrate the atmosphere. Testing and
modeling has been done on the DF-3, which normally has a
range of 2,780 kilometers, with a maximum altitude of 550
kilometers. With depressed trajectory, the DF-3 travels 1,550
49
kilometers at 100 kilometers altitude.
Jammers can also increase the ability of missiles to
penetrate missile defenses and strike their targets. Passive
jamming includes the use of chaff (jinshu botiao) to confuse
enemy sensors, and tests have shown that 122 kilograms of
chaff can affect an area 320 kilometers wide and 720
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kilometers long. Other measures under investigation include
electronic and infrared countermeasures on board reentry
vehicles, as well as carrying out hard kills against enemy
theater missile defense (TMD) radars through the use of
50
anti-radiation missiles.
Finally, the Second Artillery and CASC have conducted
modeling exercises and simulations to test China’s ability to
break though the wide range of projected U.S. TMD
deployments. This includes developing a capability to attack
airborne missile defense platforms as well. Modeling has
focused on using combinations of surface-to-surface,
51
air-to-surface, and sea-to-surface missile systems. After
computer simulations and modeling exercises, CALT is
confident that its maneuverable theater ballistic missile
52
re-entry vehicles can defeat opposing PAC-2+ systems.
Protection against attack, or survivability, is another
important aspect of ballistic missile modernization.
Survivability measures include silo hardening, mobility
53
(road/rail); scattered and camouflaged launch sites. Chinese
R&D into camouflage technology is explicitly intended to
54
counter U.S. air and space-based reconnaissance platforms.
CALT officials have evaluated various deployment and
launching modes for their strategic missile survivability, and
many have concluded China’s future interests can best be
served through a mix of silo-based and mobile launchers, with
an emphasis on rail-launched systems. Also emphasized was
integration of decoys and concealment technology in their
55
missile development and deployment.
Another vital aspect of ballistic missile modernization is
accuracy. The First Academy is striving to increase the
precision of their ballistic missiles through a variety of means.
First, the First Academy is developing better gyros and
inertial measurement units. With assistance from Russia,
CALT is working on applying beryllium technology to their
inertial measurement units to decrease the weight of their
56
guidance sets. Reducing the weight of attitude control and
guidance sets is crucial for development of multiple warheads
on a single missile, with each reentry vehicle equipped with its
own guidance system.
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Like the Third Academy, CALT is exploiting the U.S.
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) constellation of
satellites. With a receiver installed onto the missile, these
GPS satellites provide en route updates to the control system
to correct trajectory errors. Some estimates indicate GPS
assistance can help achieve an accuracy of 100 meters or
57
better. At least two tests of an on-board GPS trajectory
58
reference system had been conducted as of 1995. According
to one authoritative estimate, GPS-aiding of ballistic missiles
can improve overall ballistic missile accuracy by 20-25
59
percent. Engineers have also developed an integrated
60
NAVSTAR GPS and GLONASS receiver. If mounted on a
missile, the benefits of such a receiver are great. Should an
adversary jam or turn off GPS, the missile system can still rely
on the GLONASS updates. The First Academy is integrating
GPS onto their mobile launchers to further enhance the initial
61
reference point and increase accuracy. Engineers have also
carried out applied research into applications of differential
GPS (chafen quanqiu dingwei xitong) as another measure to
62
further increase the accuracy of ballistic missiles.
To improve accuracy even further, the space and missile
industry is carrying out preliminary R&D on digital scene
matching terminal guidance (jingxiang quyue xiangguanqi),
which uses on-board computers to correlate stored images
with landmarks. First Academy engineers believe digital
scene matching can result in a 5-12 meter accuracy for their
63
ballistic missiles. The Second Artillery has expressed
support in scene matching terminal guidance, which would
require the manueverable reentry vehicle previously
64
discussed.
The First Academy, in conjunction with COSTIND and the
Second Artillery, is examining a wide range of warheads in
order to make its missiles more lethal and able to exploit
weaknesses in foreign TMD systems now under development.
The First Academy’s warhead design institute (13th Research
Institute, or Beijing Institute of Special Electromechanics) is
carrying design work on runway penetrators to support
65
offensive counterair missions. Indications exist that the
13th Research Institute is working to overcome problems
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associated with submunition dispensing warheads, which can
cause damage over a significantly greater area than a unitary
warhead. Other warheads under development reportedly
include mine-laying payloads, an electromagnetic pulse
4
warhead (i.e., HPM) to take out enemy C I equipment, and
penetration warheads to target fortifications deep underground. Some reporting indicates the 600 kilometer range
66
DF-15 could feasibly achieve an accuracy of 30-45 meters.

Second Artillery.
The PLA’s primary arm for strategic attack is the Second
Artillery (erpao). Its traditional realm has been in nuclear
strategic missiles. However, since the conclusion of the Gulf
War, Chinese planners have seen value in expanding the 2nd
Artillery’s mission to include conventional strikes against
high value strategic targets. The Second Artillery, with an
estimated 90,000 personnel, consists of headquarters
elements, six launch bases, four research institutes, two
67
command academies, and possibly an early warning unit.
The headquarters is located in Qinghe, a suburb to the north
of Beijing. Commanded by LTG Yang Guoliang, the Second
Artillery headquarters complex consists of headquarters,
political, logistics, and equipment technology departments,
each headed by a PLA major general. The headquarters
complex maintains contact with subordinate units through its
own communications regiment. Three deputy commanders
assist Lieutenant General Yang Guoliang in his
responsibilities. The Second Artillery maintains liaison
offices within the China Academy of Engineering Physics,
CASC’s First Academy’s liquid fueled logistic vehicle (LV)
integration factory (211 Factory) and CASC’s 307 Factory
68
(solid fueled system integration).
The Second Artillery headquarters complex oversees six
launch bases which are division-sized elements, each
commanded by a major general. A base headquarters
structure mirrors that of the national headquarters in Qinghe
with Headquarters, Political, Logistics, and Equipment and
Technology Departments (Bu). Base-level equipment and
technology departments (zhuangji bu) oversee launch site
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management (zhendi guanli); warhead stations (dantizhan);
and launch repair facilities.
Each base has two or three subordinate brigades (lu) and
regiment-level special departments (chu) responsible for
chemical defense, communications, training, security, and
weather. Each brigade, commanded by a colonel, has up to
four launch battalions (fashe ying). Missile brigades are
generally structured by type of missiles. In other words, one
brigade only has one type of missile, thus facilitating
maintenance and specialization. There are least 13 brigades
in the Second Artillery. In addition, each base has training
(jiaodaodui) and nuclear warhead (euphemistically referred
to special equipment) maintenance units. Each base is
directly subordinate to the Second Artillery commander in
Qinghe, although they do receive support from the military
regions. The total number of nuclear warheads maintained by
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the Second Artillery is unknown.
80301 Unit. The 80301 Unit is headquartered in
Shenyang, Liaoning province, and consists of three launch
brigades, each with up to three launch battalions. Its DF-21
and DF-3 IRBMs cover the Korean peninsula and Japan, to
include Okinawa. At least one of the brigades, equipped with
1,800 kilometer range DF-21s (CSS-5), is concentrated in the
area of Tonghua, approximately 80 kilometers north of the
North Korean border. R&D on the DF-21 began in 1967 and
had its first successful test in 1985. Shortly thereafter, the
DF-21 was deployed into an experimental regiment. The
DF-21 follow-on, the DF-21A, is expected to have a 1800
70
kilometer range, with a 600 kilogram warhead.
80302 Unit. The 80302 Unit, also known as 52 Base, is
headquartered in the mountain resort town of Huangshan,
Jiangxi province, and is the Second Artillery’s most important
unit for conventional long-range precision strikes against
Taiwan. The Huangshan base has at least two, but probably
three brigades. The 52 Base’s most well-known brigade, the
815th, garrisoned in Leping, Jiangxi province, is equipped
with the newest addition to the Second Artillery’s inventory,
the DF-15. The 600-kilometer range DF-15s gained notoriety
during the March 1996 missile exercises off the coast of
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Taiwan. During a wartime situation, the 815th Brigade’s
missiles scatter to pre-surveyed launch sites (zhendi) in
Fujian province in order to range the entire island of Taiwan.
China’s total DF-15 inventory is estimated as being from one
hundred to several hundred missiles. Rail is the usual way of
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moving missiles from garrison to field deployments.
80303 Unit. The 80303 Unit, headquartered in the eastern
suburbs of Kunming, Yunnan province, has two brigades. One
of the brigades, equipped with DF-21s, is located in Chuxiong,
approximately 100 kilometers west of Kunming, while the
other is located at Jianshui, south of Kunming. These missiles
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are in range of several targets in India and Southeast Asia.
80304 Unit. The 80304 Unit, headquartered in Luoyang,
Henan province, has three brigades. At least one brigade,
located in the area of Luoning, is equipped with the 12,000
kilometer DF-5 ICBM, able to strike targets throughout the
United States and Europe. One other brigade is located near
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Sundian.
80305 Unit. Headquartered in the remote western Hunan
provincial city of Huaihua, the 80305 Unit is the second
command equipped with ICBMs. Its two subordinate brigades
74
are located south of Huaihua, near the town of Tongdao.
80306 Unit. The 80306 Unit, headquartered in Xining,
Qinghai province, has three brigades, including one potential
experimental regiment, concentrated in the Datong,
Delingha, and Da Qaidam areas. Indications exist that the
80306 Unit may upgrade to the DF-21. The 80306 Unit is able
75
to target sites in the former Soviet Union and India.
Institutes and Colleges. The Second Artillery also has one
engineering design academy and four research institutes to
solve problems associated with operations, transporter
erector launchers (TELs), and logistics (First Institute),
command automation, targeting, and mapping (Third
Institute), and missile and warhead engineering design. The
Second Artillery’s Command College in Wuhan prepares
officers for leadership positions within headquarters
elements and launch brigades. The Engineering College in
Xian educates technicians largely associated with equipment
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and technology departments at various headquarters and
field units. The Second Artillery’s Academy of Engineering
Design works closely with CASC in evaluating overall design
76
work.
Doctrine. The 2nd Artillery has separate doctrines for its
nuclear and conventional missile forces. First, ballistic
missiles are the key to providing strategic nuclear deterrence.
In the past, the Second Artillery is thought to have followed a
doctrine which required only a small number of warheads
necessary to cause unacceptable damage on a handful of
enemy cities. This minimal deterrence doctrine, however,
appears to be evolving toward a limited nuclear deterrence
(youxian weishe) approach. Limited nuclear deterrence differs
from minimal deterrence in that the latter relies on simple
countervalue strikes. Very few warheads are necessary.
Limited deterrence doctrine has counterforce and warfighting
elements with intended targets including enemy missile
4
bases, C I centers, and strategic warning assets. Limited
deterrence requires a greater number of smaller, more
accurate, survivable, and penetrable ICBMs and sealaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); a ballistic missile
defense capability to protect its limited deterrent force; and
ASAT assets to hit enemy satellites. According to nuclear
weapon strategists, a space-based early warning capability is
77
needed to speed up reaction time. China’s strategic
modernization R&D support this shift toward a limited
warfighting approach to nuclear warfare.
The Second Artillery’s conventional mission currently
provides China its only reliable means of long-range attack
against an enemy’s high value targets. A growing sector of the
PLA believes ballistic missile strikes against strategic targets
are the best way to even out the playing field when fighting
against a technologically superior force. Increasingly accurate
ballistic missiles, aerospace engineers assert, can be targeted
against enemy air defense nodes and even against aircraft
carriers. Chinese analysts view a large arsenal of ballistic
missiles as a relatively cheap means to saturate an expensive
78
theater missile defense architecture. According to one
estimate, the Second Artillery’s missile supplier, CASC, will
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have the capacity to produce 1,000 new ballistic missiles
79
within the next decade.
Over the horizon missile strikes against critical nodes can
paralyze an enemy’s combat capacity. Strikes against
important targets also drive up the human and material costs
and put psychological pressure on enemy troops and domestic
3
constituency. Targets in a campaign include C I nodes,
weapon control centers, high value air assets on the ground,
logistics bases, and important sea combat platforms. Strikes
against air bases can enhance the PLAAF’s ability to gain air
superiority by temporarily degrading an enemy’s ability to
generate sorties. Other important targets include logistics
80
bases.
Missile strikes would likely be conducted as soon as the
Chinese leadership believes war is inevitable. Absorbing
lessons learned from the Gulf War, the PLA believes an enemy
such as the United States is most vulnerable when it is
deploying forces and logistics to the area of operations. A
preemptive strike during this phase, many PLA strategists
believe, will significantly offset the an enemy’s technological
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advantages.
The Second Artillery clearly understands the implications
of counterstrikes after missile attacks. Chinese engineers are
devising means to reduce the time a missile launcher is
exposed at a pre-surveyed launch site. In one concept,
adjustments are made to the TEL which allows for the missile
erection within one minute and retraction within a minute.
Reductions in TEL weight will increase mobility and allow
82
transport over lower classes of roads and bridges. To
increase accuracy of their missiles, TELs are being equipped
83
with GPS receivers.
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CHAPTER 5
IN DEFENSE OF ITS OWN:
CHINA’S AEROSPACE DEFENSE

China’s quest for information dominance and growing
competency in long-range precision strike is intimately
related to its overall aerospace defense modernization effort.
The PLA has long suffered from an antiquated air defense
intelligence network, command and control, and capable air
defense weapon systems. Specifically, the PLAAF has lacked
decent early warning radars, early warning satellites, and
1
automated intelligence handling and transmission facilities.
However, since the Gulf War, Chinese policymakers have
placed a high priority on upgrading their overall air defense
capability in order to protect strategically critical points. With
China’s space and missile industry leading the way, a
comprehensive air defense network is being designed to
counter air and missile attacks. The network is composed of
numerous segments, including early warning, command and
control, air defense weapons, and offensive counterair and
counterspace weapons systems.
A national air defense reconnaissance network composed
of a variety of sensors is a top priority. Chinese strategic
analysts have consistently outlined the most important
sensors for development. In addition to strategic HUMINT,
missile early warning, photoreconnaissance, and SIGINT
systems, priorities include airborne early warning platforms,
bipolar/multipolar (shuang/duodi) radars, over-the-horizon
sensors, ultrawideband (UWB), impulse ( chongji) ,
microwave, laser, millimeter, inverse synthetic aperture, and
acoustic radars. A common theme throughout the literature is
an outstanding requirement for an ability to counter stealthy
2
aircraft and missiles. China, especially the PLAAF, is clearly
concerned about the effect of stealth weapons, such as the
F-117A, on its air defense systems and is attempting to
3
enhance its existing air defense system. Crucial to its effort to
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form a integrated air defense network is the ability to fuse
data from multiple sensors, introducing widespread data
netting of sensors in order to reduce the value of stealth.
4
Several institutes are engaged in working this problem.
First, China is working to indigenously develop an
airborne radar. In the meantime, however, the Chinese have
contracted with Great Britain’s Racal and Israel’s IAI for the
purchase of AEW radars. Racal will supply six to eight of its
Searchwater surveillance radars to the PLA Navy. IAI,
through Shaul Eisenberg’s UDI office in Beijing, is
negotiating the sale of the Phalcon radar which will be fitted
into the Russian A-50 (IL-76 derivative). The contract is
5
valued at 250 million U.S. dollars. Aerostats are another type
of airborne sensor being closely examined by the PLA Air
Force and Navy. An aerostat (qiqiu) network, helpful for
detection of low flying cruise missiles, would consist of a series
6
of large inflated dirigibles hoisted above China’s coastline.
China’s development of ultrawideband (UWB) radar
technology is focused on counterstealth (fan yinshen).
Proponents claim UWB (chaokuandai) systems can decrease
radar cost, detect small, stealthy targets, defeat enemy
jamming, and minimize the size of radars. UWB radars send
repetitive transmissions of a single powerful pulse of a very
wide bandwidth. Chinese experimental tests have been
conducted against coated targets. UWB radars commonly
have a bandwidth of up to one gigahertz and can track
7
hundreds of targets.
There are numerous other sensor programs underway,
such as bistatic and multistatic radar development. A
well-known counterstealth system, bistatic and multistatic
radars use different sites for transmission and return of radar
8
pulses. Laser radars are another priority area of
development. The Chinese are experimenting with radar-like
devices called lidars, which use the laser light reflected from
targets and received by an optical lens to locate the targets. A
deliberately widened beam is first used to acquire a target and
then reduced to a pencil beam in order to improve target
2
calculations. Chinese researchers have emphasized CO
lasers in particular. The Chinese have also conducted
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research on a higher-power laser radar similar to the U.S.
9
“Firepond,” which has space tracking capabilities. Engineers
are also carrying out R&D into gigawatt-level high powered
10
microwave as a counterstealth measure.
China is also stepping up investment into developing an
ability to counter antiradiation missiles through the use of low
probability of intercept radars (di zaihuo gailu leida), phased
array radars, and radar networking. The low probability of
intercept (LPI) radar technology is concentrating on low peak
power transmission and spread spectrum (guangpin)
technologies. In addition, when radars of the same frequency
form a net, they can cause deviation errors in the ARM
guidance set. Signal adjustments can be made to ensure the
signals operating on the same frequency do not interfere with
each other. Widespread use of decoys and traps (youpian) to
11
deceive ARM sensors is another option under close scrutiny.
These sensors are critical for cueing kinetic and directed
energy weaponry for air defense. Like many developing
nations, China’s air defense architecture is dominated by its
ground based segment. PLAAF fixed wing assets remain the
12
weak link in guarding China’s airspace. With the Second
Academy in the lead, China is aggressively modernizing its
surface-to-air missile capability by upgrading current
systems; fielding new generation SAMs; and procuring
foreign systems. Standard scenarios drawn up by Chinese
analysts include initial launches of foreign tactical ballistic
and cruise missiles against weak points in China’s air defense
structure, destroying air defense assets located along key air
routes. Then an adversary, under an ECM shield, is expected
to launch ARMs and precision air-to-ground munitions using
combinations of aircraft and cruise missiles to attain air
13
superiority.
To counter an enemy air and missile campaign, PLA
strategists and Second Academy analysts believe they must
develop multicapable air defense systems able to engage a
variety of missiles and aircraft at low to high altitudes. SAM
systems must use advanced search, discrimination, tracking,
and guidance technology; advanced mobile equipment, high
quality materials, and powerful propulsion and fire control
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systems, together with multisensor warheads and advanced
software. Chinese analysts stress the importance of an air
defense “firepower network,” comprised of SAMs, AAA,
electromagnetic shells (diancipao), and air defense lasers.
In its SAM development, the Second Academy is striving
for ever faster speeds and more effective guidance systems.
Among other achievements, the Second Academy believes
they have made significant advances in developing a passive
long-wave infrared imaging terminal guidance seeker, which
can be used in all weather conditions and is highly resistant to
14
electronic countermeasures. Engineers are pressing for
completion of preliminary research into millimeter wave and
infrared integrated seeker for hypervelocity missiles, similar
to the U.S. ERINT system. Borrowing from foreign experiences, Chinese engineers are attempting to correct problems
15
they have encountered. In order to ensure the ability of
future SAMs to operate in a the face of heavy jamming, CASC
has designed digital simulators to allow operators to train in a
16
dense electronic combat environment.
China is taking advantage of every opportunity to
incorporate foreign technology in order to hasten
developmental objectives. Chinese clandestine acquisition of
Patriot technology after the Gulf War, and the purchase of
Russian S-300PMU (SA-10B) and S-300/PMU-1 (SA-10C)
SAM systems have made important contributions to the
Second Academy’s ability to develop a highly capable
indigenous SAM. One candidate for incorporating S-300 and
PAC-2 Patriot technology is the HQ-9, which may have
rudimentary missile defense capabilities, including defense
17
against cruise missiles. The Second Academy is probably
most interested in phased array radar and missile guidance
technology used in both the PAC-2/PAC-3 and S-300. China
and Russian negotiators have also recently signed an
18
agreement on the sale of TOR-M1 (SA-15) SAM systems.
The Second Academy is carrying R&D into more advanced
air defense technologies. For example, their systems
engineering department has examined the utility of HPM
weapons as an air defense weapon both to jam or destroy
19
incoming aircraft. Some call HPM weapons a “natural
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enemy” (tiandi) of more technologically advanced militaries
and an “electronic trump card” (dianzi shashou), which can be
20
used as counterstealth as well as an antiradiation weapon.
Possibly related to HPM technology, more exotic air
defense concepts under development include an
electromagnetic missile (dianci daodan). This “missile” is a
burst of radio frequency (RF) energy which can severely
disrupt the electronic systems of an attacking aircraft or
missile. Both the Second Academy and the University of
Electronic Science and Technology of China have active
electromagnetic missile programs which also have useful
properties for counterstealth and long-range commu21
nications.
Another relatively mature technology under development
is the electromagnetic and electrothermal gun. China’s first
experimental railgun (daoguipao), developed by the China
Academy of Engineering Physics, was tested in 1986, when a
0.34 gram object was hurled at 1.68 kilometers a second.
China’s first electrothermal gun (dianrepao) was tested in
1991 and achieved a velocity of 1.86 kilometers a second.
CAS’s Institute of Particle Physics also developed a railgun in
1988 which propelled a 50 gram shell at 3 kilometers a second.
The same institute tested a coilgun (dianquanpao), capable of
projecting a 44 kilogram object 14 meters per second, in 1990.
CAEP developed its own electrothermal gun in 1991 and fired
22
a 20 gram projectile at 1.85 kilometers a second.
Finally, analysts advocate upgrading China’s existing
antiaircraft artillery (AAA) to meet challenges posed by
enemy missiles, especially to counter the cruise missile
threat. Modeling has been conducted against the BGM-109C
Tomahawk, and the results gave 37mm AAA a kill rate of 23.0
percent. The air defense system was able to detect the cruise
missile at a range of 43 kilometers and was able to track it at a
23
range of 9.1 kilometers.
Chinese strategists also stress limiting an adversary’s
information. Advocates urge adopting measures such as
camouflage, deception, dispersal, mobility, and secrecy. Of
great importance is physical destruction of an adversary’s
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24

reconnaissance platforms, employment of low probability of
intercept radars and communications equipment, deployment
of baits and false targets, and reduction the radar cross
section (RCS) of air defense weapon systems. When not
employed in combat, weapon systems must be hidden in
bunkers or covered with camouflage netting, and emissions
must be controlled and frequencies kept secret. Under combat
conditions, air defense operators will theoretically plug into
3
C I systems for targeting data and rapidly change positions,
25
and be on guard against enemy special forces.
Chinese operational concepts, however, indicate that
Beijing believes it must never get to the point where enemy air
assets are crossing into Chinese airspace. In a phased
approach to air defense, first and most important is to destroy
opposing force’s air and missile assets before they leave the
ground. According to aerospace analysts, the top priority in
emerging air defense doctrine are preemptive strikes (xianfa
zhiren) against adversarial air assets on the ground,
especially high value assets such as airborne warning and
control, and electronic reconnaissance platforms. Highly
accurate ballistic and cruise missiles are crucial for
4
preemptive strikes against airfields and supporting C I
assets. Chinese writings have specifically noted the threat of
UAVs and have strongly advocated striking out at nodes
3
26
within the UAV C I system.
After reducing the punch an adversary can deliver,
Chinese analysts believe they must prepare key targets, such
3
as C centers, ports, airfields, missile sites, and UAV bases to
counter enemy attacks. Attacking aircraft and cruise missiles
must be identified as soon as possible. When outside of 100
kilometers, fighter aircraft and long-range SAMs must be
employed. Between 10-100 kilometers, mid- to short-range
SAMs, railguns, and air defense lasers must be activated.
Once inside 10 kilometers, air defenders must rely on
27
short-range and ultrashort-range SAMs and AAA.
Formation of composite air defense units is a key step in
28
seamless air defense operations.
Missile Defense. China’s air defense concepts include
protection against cruise and ballistic missiles as well. The
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Second Academy and the Shanghai Academy of Spaceflight
Technology are leading the way in China’s TMD R&D.
Western open source reporting and Chinese technical
journals provide clear indication that the CMC has approved
funding for a 10-year developmental program for a theater
missile defense system, to include satellites for missile launch
warning. The PLAAF and CASC have advocated a 15-year,
three-phase approach to TMD development, first by fielding a
“Patriot-like” system, such as the HQ-9; initiating model R&D
on an extended range anti-theater ballistic missile modeled on
the U.S. PAC-3 interceptor; and carrying out preliminary
29
research on a THAAD-class system.
Studies indicate the Second Academy has already
initiated programs to develop means to counter tactical as
well as medium-range ballistic missiles, focusing on infrared
seeker development, and on combined infrared and
millimeter-wave seekers. China is modeling and conducting
computer simulation of a theater missile defense system that
can counter missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers. After
successfully developing a missile defense system, initial
concepts indicate they would cover major cities and
operational centers of gravity, to include key ballistic missile
units, and would also be organic assets of certain group
30
armies.
Chinese strategists and engineers recognize that a
space-based early warning capability is essential to a viable
missile defense architecture. China has a well-established
technology base in infrared sensors, which, when placed on
satellites, can detect a missile almost immediately after
launch by detecting the infrared radiation from its engine or
31
motor plume. Technical writings indicate the space industry
is working to master specific technologies associated with
missile early warning satellites. In a potentially related
program, CAST has primary responsibility for providing the
satellite bus for the infrared telescope which, according to
design outlines, will be placed in a geosychronous orbit shortly
32
after the turn of the century.
Command and Control. China understands the problems
of orchestrating an air defense campaign which has
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reconnaissance, offensive counterair, and defense counterair
components. An integrated national air defense system is the
long-term objective. The PLA Air Force has responsibility for
air defense of Chinese territorial air space. Offices of the PLA
Air Force leadership are located in the PLA Air Force
headquarters complex in western Beijing. Similar to its U.S.
counterparts, the headquarters oversees the organization,
training, and equipping of the PLAAF. Headquarters, PLAAF
also manages a command center which uses a semi2
automated C system to monitor airspace inside Chinese
territorial airspace and maintain links with PLAAF units
throughout the country. However, as a GSD service arm,
PLAAF operational orders originate from the GSD
Operations Department complex in the Western Hills.
The next echelon resides at the military region level. The
various Military Region Air Force (MRAF) headquarters
support PLA Military Region commanders by providing air
defense and air support to ground operations. Each MRAF
oversees one or more air corps or command posts which have
operational command over aviation and air defense assets.
Each command post/air corps is responsible for air defense in
33
its particular area of operations.
In a wartime situation, the Sector Operations Center
2
(SOC) is C authority over defense counterair assets within its
area of responsibility. The SOC is being designed to receive
data from over the horizon and missile early warning radars,
and other sensors. It has authority to direct PLAAF and Navy
air defense fighters, SAMs, AAA, and air defense jammers.
The SOC also maintains control over any mobile tactical air
defense systems which control radars, air defense fighters,
SAMs, and AAA. The SOC reports to the regional Air Defense
34
Operations Center.
The key entity responsible for R&D and systems
2
engineering design of China’s automated C systems is the
Ministry of Electronics 28th Research Institute in Nanjing.
The 28th Research Institute was a key player in the
development of China’s area air defense network, which
acquires, processes, and represents the air situation for the
area under its command. Naturally, the 28th Institute is also

116

responsible for development of China’s national air traffic
35
control network.
Counterspace. Another important aspect of China’s
aerospace defense program is found within the rubric of
counterspace. Chinese writings have long given lip service to
the need to gain the upper hand in space as a prerequisite to
battlespace dominance. However, since the Gulf War, a
growing body of literature from the Academy of Military
Sciences (AMS), COSTIND, and China Aerospace
Corporation (CASC) has advocated the development of a
counterspace capability, and indicates ongoing programs to
master enabling technologies.
Counterspace operations are viewed as an inevitable
aspect of future warfare and as part of an overall information
denial doctrine. AMS writings note that the United States
relies on satellite platforms for 70 percent of its
communications (90 percent for navy communications), and
36
90 percent of its intelligence. Chinese strategists and
engineers perceive U.S. reliance on communications,
reconnaissance, and navigation satellites as a potential
“Achilles’ heel.” COSTIND advocates believe China must
develop space combat systems which are a fundamental
aspect of the revolution in military affairs and a new sphere of
37
warfighting.
The PLA and the defense industries have implemented or
are examining a broad range of passive and active
counterspace measures. The PLA currently stresses passive
counterspace measures in an attempt to deny foreign
reconnaissance satellites with information on its disposition
of forces and R&D programs. For example, in 1992 COSTIND
and CASC established camouflage standards for missile
development in order to counter foreign optical, infrared, and
38
radar satellite systems.
Active measures under
consideration include kinetic kill vehicles, ground-based
lasers, and satellite jammers. CASC is among the strongest
advocates for an antisatellite (ASAT) development program,
arguing that an ASAT (fanweixing) capability is needed to
deter potential adversaries from attacking China’s own
satellites. They also believe that an ASAT capability is easier
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to develop than ballistic missile defense systems. In fact,
39
components of the two systems are intimately related.
Preliminary research (yuxian yanjiu) on ASATs has been
carried out since the 1980s, at least partly funded under the
863 Program for High Technology Development. However,
R&D on fundamental technologies applicable to an ASAT
weapons system have been ongoing since the 1960s. Under
the 640 Program, the space and missile industry’s Second
Academy, traditionally responsible for SAM development, set
out to field a viable antimissile system, consisting of a kinetic
kill vehicle, high powered laser, space early warning, and
target discrimination system components. While this
program was abandoned in 1980, engineers associated with
this effort are still active. For example, the 640 Program chief
designer, Song Jian, is chairman of the State Science and
40
Technology Commission.
Chinese strategists recognize the importance of a space
tracking network in counterspace operations. COSTIND is
modernizing and expanding its space tracking network. This
network, operated by COSTIND’s China Launch and
Tracking Control (CLTC), will be necessary for tracking and
control of a projected increase in China’s domestic satellites
and its international satellite launch business. COSTIND is
adding overseas links in Chile and the South Pacific island of
Kiribati, and has contracted with France for access to data
41
from its space tracking network. China Academy of Sciences’
astronomical observatories in Nanjing and Kunming feed into
the CLTC network, providing orbital prediction data for
CLTC. CAS and CLTC are upgrading their network of high
resolution telescopes, augmented by laser tracking devices.
China’s space community claims an ability to detect objects in
42
space down to 10 inches. While the network is designed for
cooperative targets, it does provide the framework for
improvements against non-cooperative targets.
CASC researchers, primarily concentrated within the
Second Academy, are leading China’s preliminary and model
R&D of counterspace systems. Several articles have appeared
in the Second Academy’s journal, Systems Engineering and
Electronics, which indicate they are tackling some specific
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problems in negating adversarial satellites. Almost all deal
with terminal guidance problems with a homing kill vehicle.
Specific systems under evaluation and simulation include
43
infrared, radar, and impulse radar terminal guidance.
Chinese engineers have also conducted studies to counter
44
satellite decoys as well.
Other entities associated with CASC have supported the
overall R&D effort. Harbin Institute of Technology and
Beijing University of Astronautics and Aeronautics, for
example, have carried out modeling and simulation of various
space intercept control and terminal guidance systems. One
control concept involved the use of several small solid motors
45
for orbital control stabilization. CASC analysts within the
Third Academy have conducted assessments of air launched
ASAT missiles and have noted this approach as the most
inexpensive ASAT option. Supporting assessments have
focused on solid fueled motors for the air-launched miniature
46
homing vehicle.
Chinese aerospace analysts view ground-based
high-powered lasers, able to degrade or destroy satellites at
all altitudes, including medium and geosynchronous orbits, as
an alternative to kinetic kill vehicles. Directed energy ASAT
47
weapons are touted as the wave of the future. China has the
basic technologies needed to move to more advanced R&D
stages of a ground-based laser (GBL) ASAT system. One of the
most capable lasers under development is a free electron laser
(FEL). COSTIND’s China Academy of Engineering Physics
(CAEP) began FEL (ziyou dianzi jiguang) development in
1985 and activated their first experimental system, the
Shuguang-1, in May 1993. The experimental Shuguang-1,
developed by CAEP’s Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics,
achieved a power output of 140 megawatts during a test in
1994. CAEP is working to reduce FEL size as a means to
increase mobility. In addition to a FEL system, CAEP and
CAS have made significant achievements in chemical and
48
solid state lasers. PLA-affiliated publications assert that
while the Chinese do not yet possess the capability to destroy
satellites with high-powered lasers, they are capable of
49
damaging optical reconnaissance satellites.
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As an integral part of its high-powered laser program,
China has placed high priority on development of adaptive
optics and deformable mirrors. Adaptive optics, which use
numerous electronic devices to shape a mirror for optimal
beam pattern, are necessary to compensate for atmospheric
absorption, scattering, and thermal blooming. During the
1994 COSTIND S&T Committee Meeting, “flexible mirrors”
(lingjing) were singled out as a critical technology for
increased emphasis. Concentrated effort into adaptive optics
began in 1980 when the CAS formed an adaptive optics
research group and laboratory within its Institute of
Optoelectronics in Beijing. Since then, other CAS institutes,
including Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics
and Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics, have lead
50
China’s adaptive optics R&D. CAEP’s Institute of Applied
Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM) has
supported the effort through modeling work on atmospheric
51
effects on ground based high-powered laser weapons.
One other directed energy concept which the Second
Academy has evaluated, and advocates, is the use of HPM
52
weapons in a counterspace role. AMS and COSTIND
analysts believe HPM weapons will serve a useful purpose in
the 21st century and strongly advocate their development.
CAEP’s Institute of Applied Electronics, University of
Electronic Science and Technology of China, and the
Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology in Xian are three
of the most important organizations engaged in the research,
53
design, and testing of Chinese HPM devices.
There have been other ASAT concepts alleged to be under
consideration as part of an overall aerospace defense system.
References, albeit dubious in nature, outline simple ASAT
measures including an antisatellite satellite in a
counter-orbit which releases 30 gram steel balls in order to
penetrate the satellite shell. This option, called “fairy
spreading flowers” (xiannu san hua), is low cost and effective.
Another option specifically directed against space-based laser
platforms calls for the application of powder, paint, or dust to
cover reflectors in order to prevent laser weapons from
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focusing on targets. This measure is simple, but vulnerable to
54
attack from enemy satellites.
One final counterspace measure under examination is an
electronic countermeasure directed against enemy satellites.
COSTIND and CASC are conducting feasibility studies on
various satellite jammers intended to complicate use of
55
communication satellites and NAVSTAR GPS. Such
measures would deny an adversary use of a satellite, but not
destroy the platform itself, perhaps avoiding escalation of the
conflict.
There are some within China who are more circumspect
about ASAT development and the militarization of space.
Arms control experts, such as Du Xiangwan, have openly
called for a international ban on ASATs and establishment of
an international regime for oversight and control of military
satellites. He is critical of certain missile defense systems,
such as the space based laser, which has the capability to
56
attack satellites as well as missiles. Other Chinese arms
control advocates see the development of ASATs as inevitable
due to the growing importance of satellites for military
operations. Therefore, limitations are required on military
57
satellites as well as on ASAT development.
The development and deployment of an active
counterspace weapon system would require a decision at the
highest level of the PLA leadership. The literature does not
provide any clear indication that the CMC has directed the
defense industrial complex to move toward ASAT testing or
production stages. Technical writings do, however, clearly
point to conceptual assessments on various ASAT systems
and related technologies. AMS writings provide the doctrinal
framework. The literature suggests China’s ASAT program is
beyond preliminary research and has moved into the model
definition stage of R&D. These studies could form the basis of
any joint CMC-State Council decision to proceed to the next
step in the R&D cycle.
Cost would be a major factor in deciding whether or not to
deploy an ASAT system. According to some estimates, basic
space sensors, facilities, and manpower would run a fixed cost
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of approximately $20-30 million. Cost of on-board sensors ($1
million) and the missile ($1 million) would add up to a variable
cost of around $2 million. If a facility launched 10 interceptors,
its fixed and variable costs would be about equal, and the total
cost per launch would be about $4-6 million per interceptor.
Against a high performance satellite valued at $1 billion, such
an interceptor would have a cost effectiveness ratio of about
200:1. In short, development of an ASAT capability could be
58
determined to be an economically sound decision.
There are a number of detractors, however, which may
discourage the PLA from attempting to deploy a ground-based
launcher (GBL) ASAT. First is the technical difficulty of
atmospheric absorption, scattering and thermal blooming of
the high-power laser. Further development of adaptive optics
and choice of laser will help to mitigate this problem.
Deuterium fluoride and free electron lasers can operate at
wavelengths which minimize atmospheric problems. Basing a
GBL on a high mountain, above cloud cover, can also reduce
the amount of atmosphere through which a laser must travel.
Basing a GBL in a relatively arid region, such as Gansu,
Qinghai, or Xinjiang would help reduce weather problems.
Another detractor is the infrequency in which a low earth
orbit reconnaissance satellite would pass within view of the
GBL site. Deployment of a larger number of GBLs would
increase opportunities, but would also drive up the costs. One
other factor is the vulnerability of a GBL. A static GBL tucked
away inside a mountain could be concealed, especially if
potential adversaries were not looking for it. However, after
its use on a satellite, the GBL would become a primary target
for adversarial strikes.
Absent from discussions of active counterspace systems
are clues as to the type of launcher which could be used to
deliver a homing vehicle to its designated target. Chinese
writings indicate that the former Soviet Union utilized the
SS-9, which could counter recon, navigation, and weather
satellites, as well as the space shuttle. They also detail an
unidentified U.S. three-stage ground launched solid direct
ascent ASAT (zhijie shenggao fanweixing) and the
air-launched ASAT missile. Analysts, however, are critical of
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shortcomings of the Russian system in the face of U.S.
satellite maneuverability, radiation and laser hardening, and
advanced warning systems; as well as the 2,000 kilometer
altitude limitations of the Russian coorbital ASAT
(gongguishi fanweixing) system, and amount of time (at least
3 hours) it would take to reach its target. CASC analysts are
also critical of the Russian system, citing the requirement to
be tied to satellite launch centers. On the other hand, a fighter
armed with an ASAT missile is praised for its flexibility and
59
mobility.
China’s defense industrial complex clearly has set its
sights on an integrated national air defense system, together
with a counterspace capability, that would be able to oppose
any would be attacker. The Second Academy’s role in
planning, doctrinal development, and systems R&D is
significant should not be underestimated. The adversary used
for its threat based planning, aquisition, and development is
clearly the United States. The Second Academy, COSTIND,
and other PLA entities carefully studied how the United
States decimated the Iraqi air defense system and are taking
steps to ensure China is capable enough to not suffer a similar
fate.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

China’s military industrial complex—driven by an
evolving doctrine which emphasizes information dominance,
preemptive, long-range precision strikes against critical
nodes, and a highly capable air defense—is conducting
preliminary and applied R&D into a dizzying array of
technologies and weapons systems. China’s success, however,
in achieving technological breakthroughs and fielding the
kind of reconnaissance/strike complex discussed in this
monograph is not assured. Yet even modest breakthroughs
could advance the PLA’s ability to achieve its national
security objectives, including forceful integration of Taiwan
into the PRC, and deny the United States an ability to
intervene.

Obstacles in PLA Strategic Modernization.
There are a number of obstacles which will complicate
China’s ability to modernize the PLA. First, defense R&D and
production must compete with other economic priorities.
Advance research, at least compared to model R&D, testing,
and production, is relatively cheap and can produce useful
spin-offs for the civilian sector. However, the costs of most
programs would likely rise significantly the closer they move
toward production. Therefore, China’s defense industries can
afford to do theoretical evaluation on a variety of systems and
technologies, but will be forced to selectively choose systems
for further development.
There is a widespread perception that the technological
level of the Chinese defense industrial complex, to include
quality control, is just too far behind to ever produce weaponry
which could challenge U.S. supremacy. However, most within
the PLA believe matching the technological level of the United
States is not necessary to complicate U.S. power projection in
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the Asia-Pacific region. The predominant view within China,
and that which was advocated by Deng Xiaoping, is that
selective emphasis into a few “pockets of excellence” is
enough.
Since the demise of the USSR and dissolution of any viable
international export control regime, some of the world’s most
advanced technology has flooded into China. It is commonly
argued that the rate of technology introduction is simply more
than the defense industries can handle. China has had
difficulties translating theory and design success into reliable
weapon systems. Beijing is painfully aware of this
shortcoming, and has taken steps to improve manufacturing
through the widespread introduction of computer aided
manufacturing, highly precise machine tooling equipment,
and added emphasis on integrating research and production.
China’s defense industries have been purchasing a broad
range of foreign high tech equipment without much thought
as to how to integrate various components into a system.
Examples include their air traffic control and national
telecommunications infrastructure modernization. Aware of
their shortcomings, the defense industrial complex is seeking
out international systems integration consultants. Security
considerations and bureaucratic in-fighting, however,
continue to slow progress.

Strategic Modernization
and the Cross-Strait Military Balance.
Despite these obstacles, it is dangerous to underestimate
China’s ability to make significant leaps in capability over the
next decade or two. Mistakes in assessing PLA modernization
could be extremely costly to U.S. regional interests and even
in U.S. lives. Nowhere is this more true than assessing the
balance in the Taiwan Strait and the effect U.S. intervention
could have.
China’s strategic modernization has the potential to
significantly alter the military equation in Taiwan Strait
early in the next century. Emphasis on preemptive,
long-range precision strikes, information dominance,
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command and control warfare, and integrated air defense
could enable the PLA to defang Taiwan’s ability to conduct
military operations. While Beijing has a range of other options
available, such as seizing an off-shore island or conducting
missile exercises similar to those of March 1996, paralysis of
the Taiwan military can allow Beijing to achieve its objectives
with relatively few casualties and without widespread
destruction of the island.
The following discussion provides one scenario which
could bring into play the doctrine and strategy under
discussion as well as systems under development. In 2010, for
example, should the CMC decide to settle the Taiwan question
once and for all, doctrinal writings and systems under
development indicate the PLA’s first objective could be to
conduct parallel operations against Taiwan’s early warning
radar sites, SIGINT facilities, power plants, national-level
command centers, and communications nodes in order to
paralyze Taiwan’s military command and control apparatus.
PLA operations would require coordinated use of electronic
warfare assets, anti-radiation missiles, land attack cruise
missiles, ballistic missiles, special forces, and conventional air
strikes. Preparation and coordination for such a complex
operation would have to go undetected by Taiwan and U.S.
intelligence. This would require strict emission security and
passive counterspace measures, such as transmission of
satellite warning messages, concealment, camouflage, and
deception.
PLA electronic warfare operations would be directed
against Taiwan’s approximately 25 early warning radar sites.
Through the GSD Fourth Department ELINT collection, the
PLA likely has a library of the operating parameters of these
radars, which can be used to program ship and airborne radar
jammers. Without sophisticated ECCM, the performance of
Taiwan’s early warning radar network would likely be
degraded. If radars are still operating, air-launched
antiradiation missile strikes could either destroy the radars
or at least force the operators to turn them off. Low flying PLA
attack helicopters, if fielded by 2010, could be employed as
well. Special operations forces could not only strike selected
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radar sites, but could also cut communications links
connecting the radar sites to air defense command centers.
The PLA would also likely attempt to jam, or if available by
2010, use long-range antiradiation air-to-air missiles to target
Taiwan’s E-2T AEW platforms should they be airborne.
Taiwan’s surface-to-air missile sites, especially Modified
Air Defense System (MADS) and Tien-kung I and II, would be
2
also primary targets. Air defense radars and tactical C links
would be the focus of jamming operations, antiradiation, land
attack cruise, and ballistic missile strikes. Like the early
warning radars, the threat of antiradiation missile strikes
could force operators to shut them down.
PLA doctrinal writings on command and control warfare
strongly indicate they would target strategic command,
control, communications, and intelligence centers as well.
Major SIGINT facilities which would be monitoring some PLA
activities would be targeted with ballistic and cruise missile
strikes. Special forces could target antennas and cut
communications links to command centers. Ministry of
National Defense and Taiwan Air Force (TAF) command
centers would also likely be attacked. Hardened command
centers, however, are not easy to destroy. PLA operations,
therefore, would likely be directed against the
communications links, to include fiber-optic cables,
connecting the command centers to the outside world. At the
same time, PLA information operations would attempt to shut
down Taiwan’s military and civilian power and transportation computer systems through the insertion of viruses.
4

In parallel with strikes against Taiwan’s C I
infrastructure, the PLA Second Artillery may target Taiwan’s
eight primary airfields. Ballistic and cruise missile strikes
against airfields would likely focus on runways, POL
facilities, and barracks housing pilots. Airfields hosting E-2T,
F-16s, and any electronic combat aircraft would likely take
priority. If their missiles are indeed able to achieve an
accuracy of 30-45 meters or better, the PLA would likely
attempt to target specific taxiways as well as entrances to any
underground aircraft storage facilities.
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Should the Taiwan Air Force (TAF) be able to get aircraft
off the ground, PLA air defense modernization and CCD
programs could severely limit successful counterair or
counterforce operations. One option for Taiwan to counter the
ballistic and high performance cruise missile threat is to carry
out offensive missions against the PLA bases, ships, and
submarines which are carrying out the strikes. However, even
if able to generate sorties in between missile or air strikes,
finding and then reaching mobile Second Artillery launchers,
missile garrisons, and command and control facilities in a
dense air defense environment could be a daunting task.
The cumulative effect of simultaneous strikes against
4
critical nodes in Taiwan’s C I infrastructure, SAM sites, and
airfields could be systemic paralysis. A temporary breakdown
of Taiwan’s early warning apparatus, command and control
structure, major SAM sites, and airfields would allow a brief
window of opportunity for the conduct of conventional air
strikes against the same set of targets, as well as a broader
range of targets. Ballistic and cruise missile strikes probably
would not be able to completely shut down an airfield.
However, missile strikes, combined with an information
vacuum caused by heavy jamming and disruption of
communications, could be enough to seriously complicate the
TAF’s ability to generate sorties.
This, in theory, provides a brief window for the PLAAF to
follow up with second wave of strikes, this time using PLAAF
assets with precision guided bombs. Through the use of
ballistic, land attack cruise, and antiradiation missiles, and
force multipliers such as electronic warfare and computer
attacks, the PLAAF can offset any disadvantages it has in
comparision to the TAF. The end result of these first two
waves—the first using a combination of jamming,
antiradiation, cruise, and ballistic missiles, and special
operations forces and the second employing conventional air
strikes—would be enough to effectively suppress Taiwan’s
information infrastructure and air defense system. Some
Beijing-based analysts believe air superiority over Taiwan
1
could be acheived in 45 minutes or less.
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Owning the skies over Taiwan, the PLA would have
numerous options available. Beijing could simply establish a
no-fly-zone in order to pressure Taiwan authorities to assent
to their demands. If further hostilities are necessary, the PLA
could leverage its air superiority to then achieve dominance of
the waters around Taiwan. If occupying the island is
necessary, a final step, after air and naval superiority are
established, would be to transport PLA ground forces across
the Strait. Owning the skies above and the waters around
Taiwan, PLAAF and PLA(N) assets would provide the
necessary firepower to ensure Taiwan ground force resistance
would be minimal. PLA preparation of the battlespace
through long-range precision strikes and information
operations threatens Taiwan’s ability to command and control
its forces, and significantly reduces its costs of achieving air
superiority—even with the PLA’s backward air force. In short,
emphasis on information dominance, missile forces, and air
defense could decisively tip the cross-Strait military balance
in Beijing’s favor.

PLA Strategic Modernization and the United
States.
The PLA’s strategic modernization has implications for
the United States. An increasingly capable PLA does not
necessarily mean China is an emerging threat. Chinese
strategy is based on developing a military that is relatively
cheap, does not require a large infrastructure to maintain, but
that nevertheless could complicate U.S. power projection
ability should interests collide. There are signs that some
within China believe that armed conflict with the United
States is inevitable in the long term, especially over Taiwan.
In the short to mid term, though, China must maintain a
peaceful environment—and good relations with the United
States—in order to develop its economy, S&T base, and
2
military force. While there is modernization underway across
4
the board, only certain areas, such as C I and missiles, have
been granted special attention. Successful fielding of only a
handful of key systems could significantly hamper U.S.
operations in the region.
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The Taiwan scenario discussed above did not include U.S.
involvement. One could, however, be devised. Open source
writings and R&D efforts indicate that PLA planners do
consider the possibility of U.S. intervention. In the scenario
above, the PLA would conduct spasmodic, preemptive strikes
to quickly establish information dominance and air
superiority over the skies of Taiwan. U.S. aircraft carrier
battle groups and USAF assets operating out of Okinawa,
Japan and Guam may attempt to prevent or remove the PLA’s
air superiority.
China is devoting considerable resources toward
preparing for potential conflict with the United States,
especially over Taiwan. Despite its overwhelming victory in
the Gulf War, Chinese analysts have concluded the U.S.
military has vulnerabilities which can be exploited. For
example, the United States continues to rely on a few fixed
bases from which to project power into the region in a
contingency situation. Heavy concentrations of aircraft
flowing into bases will become increasingly easy to identify, as
will aircraft carrier battle groups operating within the first
4
island chain. C I assets, to include critical nodes in space,
would be monitored as well.
The PLA is placing a premium on denying the United
States and other potential adversaries information
dominance. Fiber-optics, communications and operational
security practices, and increasingly sophisticated CCD
measures will make it difficult to correctly identify and target
operational centers of gravity. In the unfortunate event of a
major war, Beijing’s investment into a highly capable air
defense system, with emphasis on counterstealth, could
significantly raise the human and material costs of attacking
targets on the mainland, even if critical nodes can be
identified. U.S. logistical bases and prepo facilities will
become more vulnerable as well.
China’s defense industrial establishment is investing in
the development of components of a sensor network which,
within the the next 15 years, could enable the PLA to detect,
identify, and track ships operating around its periphery.
Successful deployment of electronic reconnaissance and radar
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satellites, in particular, could have significant implications.
ELINT and radar satellites could work well together to detect,
identify, and track U.S. carrier battle groups and other vessels
of interest. The combination is effective because they would be
complementary and redundant. If the ship being tracked goes
silent, the passive electronic reconnaissance satellite will not
be able to pick it up but the SAR satellite will still register its
position. If the ship attempts to jam the radar, the ELINT
platform can easily pick it up. Using the spacecraft in
combination, therefore, makes it extremely difficult for the
enemy ships to hide, especially if linked to PLA ground-based
SIGINT, surface wave over-the-horizon radars, submarines,
and ostensibly civilian sentry vessels operating in the open
ocean.
Chinese publications are already assessing that the
United States could not sustain combat operations in defense
of Taiwan. Analysts are carefully evaluating vulnerabilities
in U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Shortcomings of aircraft
carriers, some have concluded, include their prominent
signature, tendency for bad weather to degrade operations,
reliance on complex logistics, poor ASW and anti-mine
capability, and difficulties in rapidly repairing damaged flight
decks. Ways to counter aircraft carriers include mine laying,
submarine operations, electronic warfare, attacking
carrier-borne AEW assets, employment of large numbers of
UAVs, and night operations. Aircraft carrier battle groups,
say Beijing-based publications, are too reliant on highly
vulnerable logistics ships and disruption of supply lines will
force withdrawal of the carriers.
The PLA does not limit vulnerability assessments to the
U.S. Navy. Assuming Japanese permission is granted, USAF
operations out of Okinawa’s Kadena Airbase, Chinese writers
say, would be hampered by the distance beween Okinawa and
Taiwan. Deploying USAF assets to Taiwan would open them
up to attack by highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles.
Resuppling Taiwan by air or ship would also be vulnerable to
attack. Analysts have also examined employment of ballistic
3
missiles against carriers. In short, China’s force modernization, to a certain degree, appears to be geared toward
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countering U.S. ability to intervene in a cross-Strait conflict.
This anti-access strategy is centered on targeting operational
2
centers of gravity, including C centers, airbases, and aircraft
carrier battle groups located around the periphery of China.

China and the Revolution in Military Affairs.
Chinese open source writings often discuss information
dominance, long-range precision strike, and asymmetrical
warfare within the context of a revolution in military affairs
(RMA) with Chinese characteristics. In fact, Chinese analysts
have pointed out that the RMA could favor a country like
China more than the United States. Ironically, one reason is
the U.S. experience in the Gulf War conflict:
It is the U.S. victory in the Gulf War that can hinder the
further development of the U.S. military . . . the U.S. military
has already become excessively reluctant to part from its
existing military power and concepts—it is very possible
future enemies will use this weakness and in the new RMA put
forth more advanced thinking than the US.4

Another reason is the proliferation of information
technology. Chinese observers believe that U.S. superiority in
technology associated with information warfare is rapidly
fading. To a great extent, some of the world’s most advanced
information technology is widely available on the commercial
market. Strategists point out that the United States
overestimates its ability to gain information superiority in the
face of a determined adversary that has a well-established
5
program to deny U.S. sensors its intelligence objectives.
The RMA’s highly precise weaponry, efficient array of
sensors, and modern, survivable telecommunications
infrastructure may be more conducive to denying the U.S.
power projection than in making power projection the easy
peace action which many military leaders expect. Little RMA
technology gives the United States the capability to insert
decisive force half-way around the world without large bases
and platforms. The RMA shows no signs of reducing U.S.
dependence on a few fixed air bases, ports, and carriers
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located close to the battlefield. Simply put, projecting power
will be far more difficult than being a regional defender.
China, operating from its own territory, is growing in its
ability to disperse assets, set decoys, confuse sensors, and
distribute supplies well in advance. These technical changes
will make offensive military action much more difficult. A
well-prepared regional power like China can hide and
disperse its forces much better than the United States. It is
clear that the RMA, which stems from precise weapons,
powerful sensors, and increased communications capability,
could shift the balance of power to a country like China,
despite clear U.S. superiority and what most analysts would
still call a backward PLA.
Asymmetrical advantages which the PLA may acquire
over time have political implications. As it becomes
increasingly clear that power projection will become more
costly, both in terms of lives and material, the United States
may find that interests it previously judged vital will no longer
warrant intervention. Thus, China may well defeat U.S.
strategy without actual combat, the essence of Sun Tzu. It is
no coincidence that as China develops an ability to complicate
power projection, it is also beginning to use political rhetoric
against the U.S. system of bilateral alliances and the
maintenance of U.S. forward deployed forces in the region.
In the long term, China may hope to challenge
unquestioned U.S. supremacy in space. Cooperation in space
technology with former Soviet states, France, and Germany
increases the chances of Chinese success in this area. China’s
rise in space comes at a time when Russia’s space program is
shriveling up due to a lack of funding. At one time, Russian
leaders considered abandoning their manned space program
and stated that orbiting Russian communication satellites
may cease to exist at any time. The Russian space program
6
has a severe shortage of launch vehicles as well.
There are no easy solutions to potential challenges posed
by PLA modernization. The first problem lies in analytical
approaches to evaluating PLA modernization. Most within
the U.S.-based PLA watching community are skeptical of
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China’s ability to modernize its military. One helpful measure
would be a shift from concentration on the PLA’s many
shortcomings to a careful, sober examination of what the PLA
could do now and in the future. The first step is recognizing
that the PLA intentionally masks its capabilities as a
fundamental approach to deterrence. While the U.S.
purposefully displays its capabilities to effect deterrence,
China hides its strengths and weaknesses as a means to inject
uncertainty into the minds of potential adversaries.
Greater effort must be made to convince China that being a
cooperative and transparent member of the international
community is in China’s interests. We must continue to
expand our network of contacts with the PLA in order to better
understand their long-range objectives and guide them
toward responsible behavior within the region. In our
relationship with the PLA, though, we must be realistic in
anticipating how far the PLA will go in opening their doors to
outside observers. Transparency is anathema to their
doctrinal emphasis on concealment and deception.
Nevertheless, maintaining a wide ranging dialogue will aid in
building confidence and reducing suspicions. In short, a PLA
which is able to complicate U.S. power projection through
asymmetrical means does not automatically mean China is a
threat to the United States if the relationship is wellmanaged.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6
1. For an assessment of Taiwan vulnerabilities and PLA attack
strategies using combination of ballistic and cruise missiles, electronic
warfare, and aircraft, see Yuan Lin, “The Taiwan Strait is No Longer a
Barrier—PLA Strategies for Attacking Taiwan,” Kuang Chiao Ching
(Wide Angle), April 16, 1996, No. 283, pp. 14-19. Wide Angle is a Hong
Kong-based publication with close links to the PLA. For an in-depth
mainland discussion on use of ballistic missiles against airfields, see Li
Xinyi, “On the Air Supremacy and Air Defense of Taiwan and China: Is
Taiwan an ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’?,” Taiwan de Junbei (Taiwan
Military Preparations), July 1, 1996, pp. 11-18, in FBIS-CHI-97-323. Li
is the analyst who asserts the Taiwan Air Force would be brought to its
knees in about 45 minutes.

145

2. See, for example, Li Tzu-ching, “CPC Thinks China and the
United States Will Eventually Go To War,” Cheng Ming, May 1997, pp.
15-16, in FBIS-CHI-97-126.
3. Ying Nan, “Hangmu de Biduan Ji Fanhangmu Zuozhan”
(“Shortcomings of Aircraft Carriers and Anti-Carrier Operations”),
Xiandai Junshi, January 1998, pp. 13-15; Zhu Bao, “Discussion of
Technical Means to Attack Aircraft Carriers With Tactical Ballistic
Missiles,” Hubei Hangtian Keji, 1997 (1), pp. 46-49, in CAMA, 1997, Vol.
4, No. 4. Zhu is from the 066 Base Institute of Precision Machinery.
Employment of ballistic missiles against aircraft carriers could be a
reality if the First Academy is able to master maneuvering re-entry
vehicles and terminal guidance technologies. Also see Chang Lan,
“Analysis of the Defense System of American Aircraft Carriers,” paper
presented during November 1997 conference of National Missile
Designers Network, in CAMA, Vol. 5, No. 3. Chang is from the Beijing
Institute of Space Systems Engineering, CASC’s primary missile
systems design institute. In addition, see “U.S. Military Intervention in
Cross-Strait Conflict Seen As Unlikely,” Taiwan de Junbei, July 1,
1996, pp. 76-79, in FBIS-CHI-97-302; and Su Qi, “Intervention in
Taiwan Question Seen As Harmful to U.S. Interests,” Taiwan de
Junbei, July 1, 1996, pp. 72-75, in FBIS-CHI-97-302.
4. Zhu Xiaoli and Zhao Xiaozhuo, Mei’E Xin Junshi Geming (The
United States and Russia in the New Military Revolution), Beijing: AMS
Press, 1996, pp. 40-45.
5. Ibid.
6. “Russia Official Says Finances Threaten Nation’s Space Aims,”
Boston Globe, December 20, 1996.

146

APPENDIX I
CHINA AEROSPACE CORPORATION
ORGANIZATION

Director: Liu Jiyuan. Russian educated, former vicepresident of CALT.
Vice-Directors:

•

Wang Liheng. Former Third Academy vice-president.

•

Luan Enjie. Navigation and control expert.

•

Bai Bai’er. Educated at Harbin Institute of
Technology.

•

Xia Guohong. PhD from University of California.

Total Number of CASC Employees: 270,000
Direct Reporting Elements:

•

General Office. Manages daily duties of CASC
headquarters.

•

Comprehensive Planning Department. Develops
long-range developmental strategies and policies.

•

Scientific Research and Production Department.
Manages fiscal year planning for commercial space
launches and military and civil production.

•

S&T Department. Oversees basic research projects.

•

International Cooperation Department. Responsible
for international exchanges and negotiations.
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•

Security Department. Safeguards information on
China’s space and missile R&D and production.

•

China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC).
Markets a wide range of items, to include satellite
launch services and a broad range of civil and military
products. China Precision Machinery Import/Export
Corporation (CPMIEC), a subordinate entity under
CGWIC, has dominated the missile sales realm.

701st Research Institute

Beijing Institute of
Aerodynamics. Conducts
windtunnel testing for CASC
systems.

707th Research Institute Institute for Astronautics
Information. Collects, analyzes,
and distributes information for
use throughout the aerospace
community.
708th Research Institute Institute of Space Standardization
710th Research Institute Institute of Computer Systems
307 Factory

Nanjing Chenguang Machine
Factory. Final assembly for solid
fueled missile systems. Employs
7,800 people.

•

Science and Technology Committee.

•

China Resource Satellite Application Center.Directed
by Wu Meirong. Conducts liaison with others in
remote sensing community.

•

Beijing Simulation Center. Asia’s largest simulation
facility.

•

Beijing Space Technology Test Center
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•

Shenyang Xinguang Dynamic Machinery Company

•

Shenyang Xinle Precision Machinery Company

•

Xinyang Company
1st ACADEMY

CHINA ACADEMY OF LAUNCH TECHNOLOGY

Director: Shen Xinshun
Vice-Director: Xu Dazhe
Location: Nanyuan, adjacent to PLAAF Nanyuan Airfield
in southern suburbs of Beijing.
Mission: R&D and production of launch vehicles; liquid
fueled surface-to-surface missiles; and solid-fueled
surface-to-surface and submarine launched missiles.
Employs over 27,000 personnel. Business name of Beijing
Wanyuan Industry Corporation. Organized into 13
research institutes and seven factories.
Important departments, institutes, and factories:
1st Planning Department Beijing Institute of Astronautical
Systems Engineering (Liquid
Systems)
4th Planning Department Beijing Institute of Electromechanical Systems Engineering
(Solid systems engineering)
11th Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Liquid Rocket
Engines. Also known as Beijing
Fengyuan Machinery Company.
Directed by Liu Guoqiu and
employs over 900 people.
Operates 067 Base liaison office
and test site in southwest
suburbs of Beijing.
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12th Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Automatic
Control. Colocated with 2nd
Academy facilities on Yongding
Road in western Beijing. Over
800 personnel assigned.
Established in 1958. Engaged in
R&D of missile related guidance
technology to include GPS
exploitation. Directed by Dong
Ruohuan.

13th Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Control
Devices. R&D of inertial
instrument technology such as
gyros and accelerometers. Over
700 assigned. Ding Henggao
served as deputy director.
Current director is Sun
Zhaorong.

14th Research Institute

Beijing Special
Electromechanical Institute.
Warhead development. Closely
associated with CAEP in effort to
miniaturize warheads. Employs
800 personnel and directed by
Wu Zhaozong.

15th Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Special
Engineering Machinery. Ground
equipment, to include launch
control and missile launcher
survivability. Directed by Bao
Yuanji.

702nd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Structure and
Environmental Engineering.
Directed by Yang Yongxin.
703rd Research Institute Beijing Research Institute of
Materials and Technology.
Directed by Mao Huamin.
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704th Research Institute Beijing Research Institute of
Telemetry (BRIT). Since 1991,
engaged in exploitation of GPS.
Employs over 1000 personnel.
Li Bingchang.
200 Factory

Guanghua Radio Factory.
Control system electronic
components.

210 Factory

Beijing Jianhua Electronic
Instrument Factory. Inertial
components. More than 1200
employees. Close association
with 13th Research Institute.
Located in Nanyuan.

211 Factory

Capital Space Machinery
Corporation. General Assembly
Plant (Liquid systems).
Located in Nanyuan complex.

230 Factory

Beijing Xinghua Machinery
Factory. Located on Yongding
Road.

7107 Factory

Inertial Devices Factory. Located
in Baoji. Associated with 230
Factory.

Beijing Experimental
Factory

Electronic hydrolic servo
systems. Located in Muxidi,
West Beijing.

Beijing Wanyuan Sealing
Factory
2nd ACADEMY
CHANGFENG ELECTROMECHANICAL
TECHNOLOGY DESIGN ACADEMY

Director: Chen Dingchang. Replaced Liu Congjun.
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Location: Yongding Road, western suburbs of Beijing
Mission: R&D and production of air and missile defense,
ASAT, and associated radar systems.
Number of personnel: 12,800
Important departments, institutes, and factories:
2nd Planning Department Beijing Institute of Electronic
Systems Engineering.
Department-level institute
responsible for air/missile
defense and ASAT systems
engineering. Employs over
700 engineers. Directed by Yuan
Qi.
17th Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Control and
Electronic Technology. Located
in Muxidi, West Beijing.

23rd Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Radio
Measurement. R&D of radar
systems. More than 1300 people.
Located on Yongding Road and
directed by Huang Huai.

25th Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Remote
Sensing Equipment. Radar and
optical terminal guidance
systems. Directed by Sun
Zhaoxin.

203rd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Radio
Metrology and Measurement.
More than 250 engineers.
Directed by Miao Fuquan.
204th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Computer
Applications and Simulation
Technology. Computer software
and simulation technology.
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206th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Mechanical
Equipment (Jixie Shebei).
Launchers and other ground
equipment. Employs 570 people.
Directed by Qin Ye.
207th Research Institute Beijing Institute of
Environmental Features. R&D
into target characteristics.
Microwave, optical, and laser
environmental engineering.
Manages microwave
anechoic chamber and laser
laboratory. Space observation.
Directed by Zhao Ji.
208th Research Institute Information Center and
publisher of 2nd Academy’s
journal, Systems Engineering
and Electronics Technology.
210th Research Institute Xian Changfeng
Electromechanical Institute.
Electromechanical systems
engineering. Employs over
1500 personnel. R&D on
telemetry, dynamic strength and
heat/cold testing. Directed by
Huang Wangsheng.
706th Research Institute Computer development
112 Factory

Xinfeng Machinery Factory.
Final assembly plant for SAMs,
etc.

123 Factory

Air Defense Missile Warheads

283 Factory

Ground Control Systems

284 Factory

Control Systems Manufacturing.
Xinjian Power Machinery Plant.
Located on Yongding Road.
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786 Factory

Radar and Guidance Systems
Plant
3rd ACADEMY

HAIYING ACADEMY OF ELECTROMECHANICAL
TECHNOLOGY

Director: Wang Jianmin
Location: Yungang, in southwestern suburbs of Beijing
Number of personnel: 14,500 in 10 research institutes
and two factories.
Mission: R&D and production of anti-ship and land attack
cruise missiles and associated systems. Established in
1961. S&T Commission headed by Yao Shaofu.
3rd Design Department

Beijing Institute of
Electromechanical Engineering.
Responsible for anti-ship/land
attack cruise missile design and
systems engineering. Directed by
Li Huiting. Over 1200 personnel
assigned.

31st Research Institute

Power Machinery Research
Institute. Develops cruise missile
propulsion systems. Employs
more than 1,300 personnel.
Established in 1957, predating
establishment of 3rd Academy.
Directed by Zhang Zhenjia.

33rd Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Automated
Control Equipment. Cruise
missile autopilot and inertial
naval systems. Located in
Yungang.
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35th Research Institute

Huahang Institute of Radio
Measurement. Located in
Hepingli, Beijing.

310th Research Institute Information collection, analysis,
and dissemination. Produces
advocacy papers on cruise missile
systems.
8357th Research Institute Jinhang Institute of Computing
Technology. Control systems and
on-board computer systems.
Located in Tianjin. 470
personnel.
8358th Research Institute Jinhang Institute of Technical
guidance. Located in Tianjin.
Publishes technical journal
Infrared and Laser Engineering.
8359th Research Institute Beijing Special Machinery
(Tezhong Jixie) Institute. Cruise
missile launching equipment
(tube, air, etc). Russian
exchanges.
119 Factory

Autopilot systems

159 Factory

Xinghang Electromechanical
Factory. Located in Yungang.

239 Factory

Beijing Hangxing Machine
Building Factory. Located on
Hepingli Street in Beijing.
General assembly of cruise
missiles. Led by Hu Zongyin,
over 3000 assigned.

558 Factory

Autopilot and altimeter
production.

781 Factory

Terminal Guidance System Plant

786 Factory

Ground Tracking Radar Factory
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5013 Factory

Warhead Plant
4th ACADEMY

Director: Ye Dingyou
Number of personnel: 3500
Mission: R&D and production of solid fueled motors for
ballistic missiles and satellite kick motors. Founded in
1965. Fourth Academy corporate name of Hexi Chemical
Machinery Company.
41st Research Institute

Shaanxi Institute of Power
Machinery. Solid rocket motor
design. Located near Hohhot.
Directed by Wang Desheng.

42nd Research Institute

Red Star Chemical Institute of
Hubei

43th Research Institute
Non-Metallic

Shaanxi Institute of

44th Research Institute

Shaanxi Institute of Electronics

46th Research Institute

Hexi

47th Research Institute

Xiangyang Chemical Machinery
Corporation

7414 Factory

Shaanxi Hongchuan Machinery
Factory

7416 Factory

Shaanxi Changhong Chemical
Plant. Assembly factory.

7422 Factory

Xian Space Lanling Factory

Materials and Technology.
Filament winding machines.

7424 Factory
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Shaanxi Xianfeng Institute of Machinery
Hexi Corporation

•

Synthetic Chemical Engineering Institute

•

Inner Mongolia Hongguang Machinery Plant

•

Inner Mongolia Hongxia Chemical Plant

•

Inner Mongolia Power Machinery Plant
5th ACADEMY
CHINA ACADEMY OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY

Director: Xu Fuxiang (recently replaced Qi Faren after
series of satellite failures)
Vice-Directors: Zhang Guofu, Yuan Jiajun, and Ma
Xingrui
Location: Haidian district of northeastern Beijing, on
Baishiqiao Road.
Mission: R&D and production of communications,
space-based ISR systems, and weather satellites. Laying
groundwork for future navigation satellites; data relay
satellites; space shuttle; and space station. Established
1968. With 10,000 personnel, oversees 14 research
institutes and factories. Current capability to produce 4-6
satellites per year.
501st Research Institute

Beijing Institute of Spacecraft
Systems Engineering
(Department-level entity).
Established in 1968. Responsible
for satellite systems engineering.

502nd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Control
Engineering. R&D of attitude
control systems. Established
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1956 under CAS. Employs over
1400.
503rd Research Institute Beijing Institute of Satellite
Information Engineering. R&D of
satellite applications and
communications technology,
including ground segments of
FY-2 weather satellite and GPS
receivers. Involved in China’s
indigenous effort to develop
satellite nagivation system
(RDSS). Established 1986.
Employs more than 300
personnel.
504th Research Institute Xian Institute of Space Radio
Engineering. R&D of space
communications, remote sensing,
and spacecraft TT&C. Produces
space electronic systems,
including TWTs, CCD camera
and microwave data links,
and antennas. Personnel total
1200.
508th Research Institute Beijing Institute of Space
Machinery and Electronic
Engineering. Located adjacent to
1st Academy facilities
in Nanyuan. R&D of remote
sensing and recoverable vehicle
technology.
510th Research Institute Lanzhou Institute of Physics.
Conducts research into optical
cryogenics, microgravity, and
radiation effects.
511th Research Institute Beijing Institute of
Environmental Test
Engineering.
Facilities in Beijing and Huairou.
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513rd Research Institute Yantai Telemetry Technology
Institute
529 Factory

Beijing Orient Scientific
InstrumentFactory. Final
assembly for satellite systems.
1200 personnel.
8th ACADEMY

SHANGHAI ACADEMY OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY

Director: Zhang Wenzhong
Mission: Created in 1961, employs 30,000 personnel in 17
institutes and 11 factories. SAST supplies the first two
stages of the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 and Fengyun
meteorological satellites.

•

Shanghai Institute of Electromechanical Engineering
(8th Design Department). Directed by Jin
Zhuanglong. Employs 478 personnel.

•

Shanghai Institute of Satellite Engineering (509th
Research Institute). SAST’s key unit for satellite
systems engineering and environmental testing.
Established in 1969 and employs more than 600
people. Directed by Lu Zili. Primary products include
FY-1 and FY-2 satellites. (CAST brochure has this
institute under CAST)

•

Shanghai Precision Machinery Research Institute

•

Shanghai Institute of Power Machinery

•

Shanghai Institute of Radio Equipment (802nd
Institute). SAM guidance and fuzes.

•

Shanghai Institute of Precision Instruments.
Guidance systems. Xinyue Institute.
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•

Shanghai Institute of Electronic Communications
Equipment Engineering

•

Shanghai Institute of Electromechanical Equipment

•

Shanghai Xinfeng Chemical Engineering Institute.
Propellant technology.

•

Shanghai Institute of S&T Information for
Electromechanical Engineering

•

Shanghai Institute of Precision Metrology and Test
Engineering

•

Shanghai Xinwei Electronic Equipment Research
Institute (809th Institute). LV and tactical weapons
computer automation launch control systems design
and satellite control computers. Established 1979.

•

Shanghai Xinli Institute of Power Equipment.
Engines and motors.

•

Shanghai Institute of Space Power Sources

•

Shanghai Spaceflight Automatic Control Equipment
Research Institute

•

Shanghai Institute of Spaceflight Telemetry, Control,
& Telecommunications Engineering

•

Shanghai Institute of Video & Telecommunications
Equipment Engineering

•

Shanghai Spaceflight Architecture Design Institute

•

Shanghai Xinzhonghua Machinery Factory

•

Shanghai Xinjiang Machinery Factory

•

Shanghai Xinxin Machinery Factory
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•

Shanghai Xinhua Radio Factory

•

Shanghai Xinya Radio Factory

•

Shanghai Xinguang Telecommunications Factory

•

Shanghai Xinyu Power Supply Factory

•

Shanghai Xinli Machinery Factory

•

Shanghai Broadcast Equipment Factory

•

Shanghai Instrument Factory

•

Shanghai Wire Communication Factory
9th ACADEMY

CHINA ACADEMY OF SPACE ELECTRONICS
TECHNOLOGY

Director: Tao Jiaqu
Location: Headquartered in Beijing’s Haidian district (8
Fucheng Road), sites in Nanyuan and near Xian.
Established in 1993.
Mission: Development of specialized computers, integrated
circuits, and other microelectronic devices in support of
CASC projects.
Number of employees: More than 10,000 in 9 institutes,
10 manufacturing plants, and 5 technical centers.
Important institutes and factories:
771st Research Institute

Lishan Microelectronics
Institute.
Established 1960s. R&D and
manufacturing of missile
satellite-related computers and

161

integrated circuits. 3800
personnel.
165 Factory
061 BASE
CHINA JIANGNAN SPACE INDUSTRY GROUP

Director: Li Guozhong
Mission: Development of systems associated with
surface-to-air missiles.
Scope: 35 institutes, factories, and companies
Number of personnel: 6400
Location: Zunyi and Kaishan, Guizhou Province

•

302nd Research Institute (General Institute of
Military Products)

•

Jiangnan Electromechanical Design Institute

•

38th Research Institute

•

303rd Research Institute

•

Wujiang Machinery Factory

•

Nanfeng Factory

•

Xinfeng Instrument Manufacturing Corporation.
Tracking and control systems.

•

Qunjian Machinery Factory

•

Chaohui Electromechanical Factory

•

Meiling Factory

•

Honggang Electromechanical Factory
162

•

Guizhou Gaoyuan Machinery Factory. SAM
launchers.
062 BASE
SICHUAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION

Director: Yu Ruihua
Number of Personnel: More than 20,000
Headquarters: Chengdu, Sichuan province
Mission: Development of systems associated with
liquid-fueled ballistic missiles, launch vehicles, and
anti-ship missiles.

•

Chongqing Aerospace Electromechanical Design
Institute (800 personnel)

•

Sichuan Changzheng Mechanical Factory. Located in
Wanyuan, in northern Sichuan (5,000 personnel).

•

Chongqing Bashan Instrument Factory. Telemetry
equipment.

•

Fenghuo Machinery Factory. Servo-mechanical
devices.

•

Liaoyuan Radio Factory. Space flight controls.
Located in Xuanhua, Sichuan province.

•

Tongjiang Machinery Factory. Metals processing.

•

Mingjiang Machinery Factory. Located in Dachuan.

•

Pingjiang Instrument Factory. Control systems.
Located in Dachuan.

•

Chuannan Machinery Factory. Missile system
ignitors.
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O66 BASE
SANJIANG SPACE GROUP

Director: Cao Lijia
Number of personnel: 17,000.
Headquarters: Xiaogan, north of Wuhan. Production
centered in Yuan’an, in western Hubei province. Maintains
office in Wuhan.
Mission: R&D of solid-fueled tactical ballistic missiles and
stealth/counterstealth technology. Base 066 established in
August 1969 as Third Line production base for 3rd
Academy anti-ship missiles. In 1975, began independent
R&D of M-11 missile, designed by Wang Zhenhua, who
completed system R&D in 1984.

•

Sanjiang Space Group Design Institute

•

Hubei Redstar (Hongxing) Chemical Institute, 42nd
Research Institute, located in Xiangfan, Hubei
province.

•

Hubei Hongfeng Machinery Plant. Established 1970.
Electromechanical integration. Located in Yuan’an.

•

Wanshan Special Vehicle Machinery Factory.
Located in Yuan’an.

•

Hubei Jianghe Chemical Factory. Located in
Yuan’an

•

Xianfeng Machinery Factory. Located in Yuan’an.

•

Wanli Radio Factory. Located in Yuan’an.

•

Honglin Machinery Factory. Located in Xiaogan.

•

Hubei Hongyang Machinery Factory. Located in
Yuan’an.
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•

Jiangbei Machinery Factory. Located in Yuan’an.

•

Wanfeng Factory. Located in Yuan’an.
067 BASE

SHAANXI LINGNAN MACHINERY CORPORATION

Director: Hu Hongfu
Mission: R&D base for liquid engines and inertial guidance
systems for launch vehicles. Oversees five research
institutes and four factories.
Number of personnel: More than 1,100

•

Shaanxi Engine Design Institute

•

Beijing Fengyuan Machinery Institute

•

Shaanxi Institute of Power Test Technology

•

Xian Changda Precision Electromachinery Institute

•

Shaanxi Hongguang Machinery Factory

•

Shaanxi Cangsong Machinery Factory

•

16th Research Institute

•

165 Research Institute

•

204 Factory

•

710 Factory

•

7103 Factory (Hongguang)

•

7107 Factory

•

7171 Factory. Inertial devices.
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068 BASE
HUNAN SPACE AGENCY

Director: Hu Zhigang
Mission: Aerospace electromechanical equipment
associated with surface-to-air missiles, and R&D of special
materials. Oversees one research institute and five
factories.
Location: Changsha, Hunan province
Important research institutes and factories:

•

7801 Research Institute. Directed by Yan Hailiang.
Located in Changsha, Hunan province.

•

7803 Factory. Directed by Huang Yaoyue, produces
superhard materials (chaoying cailiao). Hunan
Taishan Machinery Factory.

•

804 Factory

•

861 Factory

•

Hunan Zhujiang Instrument Factory

•

Hunan Electromechanical Instrument Factory
YUNNAN SPACE GROUP

Director: Wang Shirong
Mission: Formerly tied to 3rd Academy. Established 1969.
Formerly a Third Line unit within Yunnan province, moved
to Kunming in 1987. Current responsibilities unclear.
Manages six factories and eight companies.
Number of Personnel: 3,500
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HARBIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Academy of Astronautics
Academy of Material Science and Engineering
Department of Astronautics and Physics
Department of Applied Chemistry
Department of Applied Physics
Department of Communications Engineering
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Department of Control Engineering
Department of Electrical Engineering
Department of Mathematics
Department of Mechanical Engineering
Department of Power Engineering
Department of Precision Instrumentation
Department of Radio Engineering
Department of Space and Opto-Electronic Engineering
Robotics Research Institute
Plating Research Center
Analysis and Measurement Center
Inertial Navigation Test Equipment Center
Simulation Center
Sources: Zhongguo Hangtian (China Space News) (weekly), July
1992-June 1995 and July 1996-January 1997; China Today: Defense
Science and Technology, 1993; John Lewis and Xue Litai, China’s
Strategic Seapower, 1993; brochures from 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and
8th Academies, and various research institutes; China Astronautics
and Missilery Abstracts (selected issues); John Lewis and Hua Di,
China’s Ballistic Missile Development; and A Survey of China’s Space
S&T Industry, 1994, Beijing: CASC.
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APPENDIX II
THE LEGEND OF QIAN XUESEN

The father of China’s space and missile industry is Qian
Xuesen. Sent to the United States on scholarship in 1935,
Qian was educated at Massachusetts Institute of Technology
and CalTec and became one of the initial cadre of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. As one of the world’s foremost experts
in propulsion and aerodynamics, Qian worked on a number of
advanced aircraft and missile projects. In 1944, General
Henry Arnold recruited Qian to work as a scientific consultant
to the Army Air Corps’ Scientific Advisory Group. Their task
was to search nationwide and abroad for developments that
would make American air power the very best in the world.
Given an Air Force officer commission, Qian traveled
throughout the country and drafted a report, Future Trends of
Development of Military Aircraft, one of the U.S. Air Force’s
first long-range studies. At the conclusion of World War II,
Qian and the Scientific Advisory Group traveled to Germany
to interview German rocket scientists, including Werner von
Braun.
Upon his return, Qian played a major role in the Scientific
Advisory Group’s production of Toward New Horizons, the
blueprint for the long-range development of the U.S. Air
Force. Qian led writing of aspects of the report which dealt
with aerodynamics, pulsed engines, ramjet engines, solid and
liquid rockets, and jet-propelled supersonic wing missiles.
Between 1945 and 1950, as a member of the Scientific
Advisory Board, he authored futuristic concepts including
nuclear powered aircraft propulsion, manned space flight,
and rocket powered transcontinental aerospace vehicles that
travel at speeds in excess of 10,000 mph.
Qian Xuesen’s promising career as a leading U.S. scientist
and visionary was cut short, however, in the mania of the
McCarthy era. Accused of being a communist, he was stripped
of his security clearances. Under a cloud of suspicion, Qian
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was deported to China in 1955. In Beijing, Qian joined a group
of other scientists and engineers who had returned to China
after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) in 1949. Bent on extracting revenge on the United
States, Qian quickly gained the confidence of Mao Zedong and
Zhou Enlai and passionately accepted the responsibility of
leading the development of China’s aerospace capability. Qian
was obsessed with the belief that China could do anything
that the United States and the West could do, and he instilled
this view in the cadre of engineers around him.
Qian’s first task was to assemble a team of foreign-trained
engineers and establish an aerospace research and
development organization. In 1956 Qian shaped a plan that
bears a striking resemblance to the U.S. Air Force’s Toward
New Horizons, which prompted China to adopt a long-range
perspective in its weapons development. The plan placed
emphasis on atomic energy, missiles, computer science,
semiconductors, electronics, and automation technology.
Qian also emphasized the exploitation of foreign—especially
U.S.—technical materials to use as guides for indigenous
development. Most importantly, Qian convinced the Chinese
government that missile development should take precedence
over aircraft development.
Based on a February 1956 proposal of Qian’s, Zhou Enlai
approved the establishment of the Fifth Academy of the
Ministry of National Defense. Qian and the Fifth Academy
lacked even the most fundamental resources, such as rubber,
and tools to accomplish their objectives. In 1957, Qian led a
military delegation to Moscow to lay the foundation for a
Sino-Russian technical relationship. The relationship
involved hundreds of Soviet engineers working in Chinese
research institutes, Chinese students studying in the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and the transfer of
technical designs to China. In all, the Soviets and the Chinese
were engaged in 343 contracts and 257 technical projects. In
August 1960, however, the relationship was abruptly ended.
During the next two decades, Qian guided the
development of a family of ballistic and cruise missiles,
aerodynamic testing facilities, satellites, and a TTC network,
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and was a strong advocate of nuclear power. Qian was
harassed during the Cultural Revolution but was a crucial
factor in the Central Committee’s declaration of the space and
missile industry as a top priority and therefore immune from
the ravages of the Cultural Revolution.
In the years that followed, Qian became identified with the
conservative factions of the government. In 1977 Qian spoke
out against Deng Xiaoping and his supporters, including
Commission of Science and Technology for National Defense
Director Zhang Aiping. Qian’s opposition to Deng and his
dabbling in the supernatural resulted in a loss in credibility
among China’s scientific and technological elite.
Qian, however, regained status after supporting Deng
Xiaoping’s actions in cracking down on anti-government
protests in 1989. Qian’s protégé, Song Jian, was appointed as
State Science and Technology (S&T) Committee chairman,
and Qian again became active in scientific circles. Qian was
showered with awards and accolades in 1991. Qian’s most
recent influence was felt during the March 1994 COSTIND
S&T Committee Meeting when he pressed the Chinese
leadership and COSTIND to adopt a visionary outlook and
establish technologies and systems such as remote sensing
satellites, hypersonic aerospace planes, adaptive optics, and
communications systems as national priorities. Qian
currently serves as special advisor to COSTIND’s S&T
Committee.
In sum, Qian’s legacy still exists to this day. First of the
Qian legacies is the confidence that China can match the West
in technological development. The desire to develop and field
systems simply for status sake is a driving force behind
China’s research and development strategy. Another legacy is
Qian’s preference of missiles over aircraft. In effect, he
influenced the Chinese leadership to place strategic nuclear
and missile industries first in the defense industrial
hierarchy, including greater funding and prestige. Its
historically lower status plagues the aviation industry to this
day. Qian also instilled a forward looking approach to defense
S&T strategy. He imbued a generation of China’s scientific
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elite with the need to be forward looking and bold in their
engineering ambitions.
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APPENDIX III
SPACE SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC
MODERNIZATION

Development of a viable space force is a vital aspect of
China’s strategic modernization. There appears to be a clear
long-range path to support an emerging doctrine which views
space as an arena for competition. The basic building block of
China’s future capability in space is their launch vehicles. Up
until the last few years, Chinese launch vehicles had one of the
best success rates in the world, opening the door for
international launch services. A recent spate of failures,
however, has reduced foreign confidence. Domestic confidence
has continued, though, and they are proceeding with other
space transportation programs, to include a manned space
capsule, a space shuttle, and preliminary research into single
stage-to-orbit transatmospheric vehicles. China’s premier
space research and development entity, the China Academy of
Space Technology (CAST) under CASC, is also developing a
spectrum of new generation satellites.
China’s Space Leading Group, under the State Council,
oversees and coordinates all space activities in China. The
group is composed of six members: COSTIND director, State
Science and Technology Commission (SSTC) deputy director,
vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), deputy
director of the State Planning Commission, and the director of
CASC. The Space Leading Group coordinates among various
1
industries and agencies.
China has several approaches to developing a space
capability to meet the demands of 21st century warfare. First
is development of smaller boosters able to launch satellites at
a moment’s notice in a contingency. Solid-fueled launch
vehicles would probably be a natural transition after fielding
the next generation of solid-fueled missiles around the turn of
the century. Second is a movement toward various
constellations of small satellites, which are more resistant to
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anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and can be produced cheaply in
large numbers. China is already investing in the U.S. Iridium
program, a constellation of 66 small satellites, and is prepared
to invest in their own indigenous answer to Iridium. China is
also working with others in the region to jointly develop a
smallsat constellation of imaging satellites. The next area is
counterspace. Open source literature strongly suggests
China’s ASAT program is in the model development stage
where the space industry is identifying various design
proposals for seekers and propulsion systems.
CASC has a huge, bloated space infrastructure waiting to
be filled to capacity. CAST’s 529 Factory and SAST’s 509
Factory currently only manufacture a few satellites a year.
China Academy of Launch Technology’s (CALT) 211 Factory
only assembles a few launch vehicles, but, as of 1994, has the
capacity to produce up to 10 vehicles a year. COSTIND’s space
tracking network provides tracking, telemetry and control
2
(TT&C) services to a handful of domestic satellites.

Space Transportation.
Essential to China’s future in space is its launch vehicle
infrastructure and systems. COSTIND has operated a
network of space launch bases since their space program
began in the 1970s. Launch centers include the following:

•

Xichang Space Launch Center (XSLC). Xichang is
China’s primary site for the launch of space vehicles
intended for geosynchronous orbit. The site is
equipped with two launch pads, one for LM-3
launches and the other for LM-2E, LM-3A, and
LM-3B vehicles.

•

Jiuquan Space Launch Center. Jiuquan is used for
the launch of remote sensing and scientific satellites,
and will be center for China’s manned space program.
Primary LVs include LM-2C and LM-1D.
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•

Taiyuan Space Launch Center. Taiyuan is used for
polar orbit satellites and plays a major role in
launching the Iridium satellite constellation.

To augment COSTIND’s three main launch centers,
Chinese engineers are examining alternative launch modes
for the 21st century. Concepts under consideration include a
small solid-fueled launch vehicle which is air-launched; a
sea-based launch platform; and a compressed-air launch
system. These new approaches to space launches are viewed
as simple, mobile, and capable of accommodating heavy loads.
The lead COSTIND organization for exploring future launch
3
modes is Beijing Academy of Special Engineering Design.
There is a large volume of literature which outlines
China’s current family of launch vehicles, which includes
several variants of the Long March (LM)-1, LM-2, LM-3, and
LM-4. Their heaviest lift launch vehicle is the LM-3B which
integrates a cryogenic third stage engine. All launch vehicles
are manufactured by the CASC First Academy (CALT) and
Eighth Academy in Shanghai. Current efforts are aimed at
producing a small launch vehicle which can send small
satellites into low and medium orbits. Critical to the small
effort is microelectronics technology, new materials, and low
4
power loss electronic devices.
CALT is also striving to further increase the carrying
capacity of their heavy launch vehicles. The launch vehicle
which will carry China’s manned space capsule will be a
variant of the LM-2E, likely designated as the LM-2E(A). It
will be launched from Jiuquan Space Launch Center and able
to lift 12 tons to low earth orbit. CALT is looking at developing
a nontoxic propellant launch vehicle with a single engine over
100 tons and a vehicle whose single cryogenic liquid
5
oxygen/liquid hydrogen engine is capable of 50 tons of thrust.
China is working to develop a new Ariane V class heavy-lift
booster which utilizes cryogenic oxygen/hydrogen engine in
the first stage. CALT currently utilizes a cryogenic third stage
on the LM-3A and LM-3B launch vehicles. CALT is also
researching large kerosene/oxygen engines, building upon
engines purchased from Russia in 1993. China hopes to field a
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new generation launch vehicle which has the capacity to hurl
20 tons into low earth orbit. This vehicle will serve as the basis
6
for China’s lunar and planetary exploration.
The Shanghai Academy of Space Technology’s LM-4 will
have the ability to launch dual payloads and is slated to boost
the new FY-1C and an 880-pound magnetosphere research
satellite in late 1998. Other modifications include a new third
stage which will give the vehicle the capability to loft medium
sized (2,200-3,300 pounds) payloads into highly elliptical
7
orbits. The new stage will also have a restart capability.

Launch Business.
China has made the launching of satellites a money
making venture. Since the first commercial launch of
ASIASAT 1, COSTIND and CASC have launched several
more, each bringing in an average of $40-70 million.
COSTIND and CASC are expected to increase the cost of
launch services to bring them on a par with western launch
providers. Recent launches include a Philippine satellite,
Mabuhay, which was launched by a LM-3B, during summer
8
1997.
Revenues from the commercial launch arena are
significant. Since 1991, COSTIND and CASC have grossed
approximately $500 million in U.S. dollars (10 launches,
average 50 million each). With the cost of a launch vehicle
estimated at five to ten million U.S. dollars, the commercial
launch business is extremely profitable. In fact, one
commercial launch matches the entire annual CASC
investment into dual-use space technology. Revenues are
shared between COSTIND and CASC, with the proportion
varying based on the specific contract. Within CASC, profits
are shared between CALT entities involved in manufacturing
the launch vehicle; China Great Wall Industry Corporation,
the marketing and contracting agent; and CASC head9
quarters.
Despite a recent spate of failures, China’s launch business
will increase in the future. COSTIND and CASC have
contracted to launch 12 U.S. manufactured Globalstar
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satellites on a single LM-2E rocket and 22 Iridium satellites
on 11 LM-2C vehicles. CGWIC and Hughes Space and
Communications Company have struck a long-term deal
under which China will launch 10 satellites through the end of
10
2006. Assuming no serious rash of failures, the number of
planned Chinese commercial launches total 27 in the next 7
11
years, approximately $1.35 billion in revenue.

Other Space Transportation Programs.
COSTIND and CASC will need this cash flow to augment
budgets for a wide variety of planned space programs. The
decision to proceed in R&D into manned space platforms and
reusable space vehicles was made in formulating the SSTC’s
12
Mid- to Long-Term S&T Development Program.

•

Space Capsule (Feichuan ). China has been
conducting research into manned space flight since
1970s. Under Project 921, China is planning to launch
two astronauts into space in 1999 for 5 days to
celebrate the 50th anniversary of the founding of the
communist state. The initial test of the KM-6 space
capsule, roughly comparable to the two-man U.S.
Gemini spacecraft, will be launched in 1998, probably
from Jiuquan Space Launch Center in Gansu
province. The launch vehicle will most likely be a
variant of the LM-2E. Under a 1995 contract with
CAST, Russia’s Yuri Gagarin Center near Moscow is
providing training for 70-80 Chinese astronauts,
engineers, and managers in 1997-98. Russia’s
Krunichev Space Center and Energia Company and
the Ukrainian space agency are assisting in the
development of the capsule and booster capable of
lifting 20 tons.13 China’s domestic astronaut training
has been underway at COSTIND’s Beijing Institute of
Space Medical Engineering (507th Research
Institute) since 1968. A new astronaut training
facility, the Beijing Space Technology Experiment
Center, was opened in 1995 in northwestern Beijing.
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All astronauts in training are experienced pilots with
at least 1000 hours of flying time.14

•

Space Shuttle (Hangtian Feiji). Since 1989, China has
embarked upon a serious effort to deploy a space
shuttle. With COSTIND and CASC in the lead,
Chinese aerospace engineers are absorbing
technologies and lessons learned from the Soviet and
U.S. experiences with space shuttles. In fact, Russia is
granting significant assistance to China’s space
shuttle. 15 Space shuttle designs are somewhat
alarming. According to one U.S. analysis, a 1991
design was meant to optimize transfer between
coplanar orbits, essential for military related space
activities to include ASAT operations. Other Chinese
studies confirm interest in coplanar transfers.16 Some
observers note that the first experimental launch
could occur as early as 2005. The project is valued at
RMB 11 billion (approximately $1.35 billion in U.S.
dollars), weighs 22 tons, carries a payload of up to 3.5
tons, and is operated by a crew of three. The shuttle
will have a service life of 30 missions, with a typical
mission length being 3-5 days. 17

•

Aerospace Plane (Kongtian Feiji). Taking space
shuttle concepts a step further, COSTIND is directing
an effort to master technologies associated with a
hypersonic single stage-to-orbit (SSTO, or danji
rugui) aerospace plane. COSTIND’s Beijing Institute
of Systems Engineering (BISE), with technical
assistance from the launch vehicle/ballistic missile
and cruise missile industries (CASC’s First and Third
Academies), is responsible for the aerospace plane’s
systems design, which will incorporate scramjet
engine (chaoran chongya fadongji) technology.18 First
Academy President Li Jianzhong indicated one
design concept weighs 2,000 tons and will have
manned and unmanned versions. 19 Possibly in
preparation for testing, COSTIND’s China
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Aerodynamic Research and Development Center has
upgraded its hypersonic wind tunnel complex in
Mianyang, outside of Chengdu, Sichuan province.
The wind tunnel will be able to test various systems
traveling at Mach 5-10.20 The First Academy (11th
Research Institute), Shanghai Academy of Space
Technology (Institute of Power Machinery), and the
Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
have also proposed other aerospace launch vehicle
concepts.21

•

Tethered Satellites (Xisheng weixing). China has
initiated R&D into space tether technology for
generating power and in the repositioning of
satellites. A tether system reels out what is in effect a
small satellite which can generate a large amount of
electricity. Tethers have generally been used on U.S.
space shuttle systems.22

•

Space Station. China is laying the groundwork for a
space station around the year 2020.23

•

Moon Missions, Mars Probes, and Deep Space
Exploration. China’s space community is also
planning to launch a scientific satellite to orbit the
moon around the year 2000. This scientific satellite
will serve as the initial step in a long-range program
in lunar exploration. Specific approaches to
exploration of the moon includes an unmanned lunar
surveyer as well as landing a man on the moon.
China’s space community is evaluating feasibility of a
Mars probe, and also intends to field a initial pair of
satellites for scientific exploration of deep space.24

Satellite Development.
Since the 1970s China has fielded seven COMSATs, two
METSATs, 17 retrievable photoreconnaissance satellites, and
12 other scientific systems. One of China’s objectives is to
eliminate reliance on foreign communications, weather,
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navigation, and photo-reconnaissance satellites. For
example, as of June 1996, China depended on foreign
satellites for up to 80 percent of its satellite communications.
Besides reducing vulnerabilities related to foreign
dependence, COSTIND, CASC, and MPT view marketing of
communications and other satellites as an extraordinary
source of revenue. Besides renting transponder space, CAST
25
is formulating plans to sell satellites by 2000.
The general direction of China’s satellite development is to
reduce the number of components and reduce the weight of
their satellite systems. Power supplies make up to 40 percent
of the weight, satellite structure around 30 percent, and
26
attitude control system around 20 percent. CAST is striving
to develop larger antennas, multiple beams, onboard
processing, and more capable power sources. For better
satellite control, the Fifth Academy (CAST) has integrated
GPS onto their satellite platforms. After initiating
preliminary research in 1991 and model R&D in 1994, the
503rd Research Institute tested its first GPS system on board
China’s 17th remote sensing satellite launched in October
27
1996.
To expand the lifespan of their space systems, the PLA and
the space and nuclear industry have advocated using a
nuclear generator to power satellites and other platforms in
space. Some preliminary research had been done already
between 1970-78 when the Institute of Atomic Energy and
COSTIND jointly carried out research on space reactors. In
May 1994, 50 military and civilian experts from various
entities participated in a space nuclear power technology
seminar. At the conclusion, participants petitioned the State
Council to allocate increased funding for nuclear powered
satellites in order to place a trial nuclear powered satellite
into orbit within 10 years. The group strongly argued for
28
cooperating with foreign space industries. Since 1988,
China has been carrying out research into arcjet satellite
engines which provide an efficient manner of utilizing
29
propellant.
In their satellite development, China is working toward
launching their second generation communication satellites
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which will be a vital component to their national information
infrastructure. With General Staff Department (GSD) and
COSTIND guidance, the space industry is working toward
fielding a full constellation of reconnaissance systems,
including high resolution EO, radar, and infrared systems,
which, in the outyears, could give them a near real time
imaging and missile early warning capability. The space
industry is also working to field their second generation
weather satellite and first generation navigational satellites.
CAST has had significant problems, however, in its
satellite development. The satellite R&D cycle is usually 7-8
years long, and operating lives of less than 4 years are too
short; resolution of remote sensing platforms is low; and
capacity of communications satellites are low. Only about
one-third of the space industry is devoted to advanced
research, design selection studies; and engineering
management.
China’s communications and remote sensing satellites are
discussed in detail in the main body of this report. Besides
communications, scientific, and remote sensing platforms,
CASC is also working on fielding a sophisticated weather
satellite. The new generation weather satellite, the
Fengyun-2 (FY-2), exploded at the Xichang Space Launch
Center. After completion and launch of a replacement, China
expects to complete the FY-3 follow-on. FY-2 will be positioned
30
in a geosynchronous orbit over Singapore (105 degrees east).
Weather satellites are essential for the conduct of a variety of
military operations.
CASC is also carrying out R&D on navigation satellites.
Chinese exploitation of GLONASS and NAVSTAR GPS is
well-documented. China, however, loathe to be dependent on
any foreign system, is busy developing its own navigation
satellite constellations. The initial design, the Twinstar
(shuangxing) Rapid Positioning System, is an RDSS design
with two satellites in geosynchronous orbit, due for launch
around the year 2000. The follow-on system under design
31
consists of four satellites also in a geosynchronous orbit.
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Unlike GLONASS and NAVSTAR GPS, these
geosynchronous systems will only provide regional navigation
services, and will probably not provide enough precision for
use on missile systems. CASC, however, has been instructed
to proceed with design of a more complex global navigation
system. CAST’s systems engineering design institute has
forwarded two conceptual designs which would provide global
coverage. One design employs a constellation of five satellites
in five orbital planes at an inclination of 43.7 degrees. An
alternative calls for seven satellites in seven orbital planes at
32
a 61.8 degree inclination.
CAST is also engaged in preliminary R&D into even more
advanced satellite systems. For example, CAST has an active
R&D program for a data relay satellite, crucial for a global
near real-time imaging capability. They are also conducting
conceptual studies on a space-based satellite tracking system
which would serve as a potentially important component of
33
any ASAT system.

Satellite Miniaturization.
China has embarked on a program to develop a family of
small satellites as a measure to reduce costs, increase revisit
rates, and increase survivability. General classifications of
these satellites include small satellites (100-500 kilograms);
microsatellites (10-100 kilograms); and nanosatellites (less
than 10 kilograms). Critical steps in developing small
satellites include smaller, more efficient power sources,
smaller on-board computers and attitude control systems, and
34
reduced structure size.
The Chinese clearly recognize the military implications of
small satellites. Chinese defense officials advocate small
satellite development in order to reduce vulnerability of fixed
launch sites. Chinese engineers are examining the utility of
using mobile, solid-fueled launch vehicles, such as a modified
DF-21, or future variants of the DF-31 and DF-41. They are
35
also interested in satellite launches from transport aircraft.
Reduced size and complexity allows for faster R&D and
manufacturing time, and production in significant numbers.
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In a contingency situation, tactical communications and
imagery satellites can be launched on demand. Mobile launch
platforms allow for increased survivability. As seen by China’s
Globalstar contract, multiple small satellites can be launched
on a single launch vehicle. Furthermore, ASAT attacks on
small satellite constellations will encounter greater targeting
difficulties and be costly. Destruction of one satellite will have
minimal effect on the overall functioning of the constella36
tion.
Preliminary research has been conducted on small
satellite photo-reconnaissance and electronic reconnaissance
constellations. CAST is also examining future generation
small satellite communications, satellite constellations which
are put into low earth, sun synchronous orbit, transmit via a
digital storage and forward system, incorporate spread
37
spectrum, and other secure methodologies.
One of the first family of small satellites is the Shijian (SJ)
series. The SJ-4 was a small satellite experiment which
included a package of various scientific experiments. With 863
Program funding and COSTIND oversight, the SJ-4 weighed
400 kilograms and, after launch by a LM-3A, was placed in a
200-36000 kilometer geosynchronous transfer orbit. CAST
provided the bus while CAS’s Space Science and Application
Research Center provided the payload. The follow-on SJ-5
system is expected to be the common bus for China’s first
generation of small satellite constellations. SJ-4 was the
fourth in a series of scientific platforms. SJ-1 was launched in
March 1971, while SJ-2, SJ-2A, and SJ-2B were three space
physics satellites launched on a single launch vehicle in
38
September 1981. SJ-3 was designed but aborted.

Foreign Assistance.
Beijing clearly understands China cannot develop a viable
space capability without significant foreign technical
assistance. After establishing a relationship with Germany
and France in the 1980s, CASC has expanded its contacts with
a number of countries, including the former Soviet Union,
Brazil, and the United States.
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The greatest source of foreign assistance for its space
program is from countries of the former Soviet Union. Space
cooperation between China and Russia has been formalized
into a series of agreements between CASC and the Russian
space agencies. Representatives from Chinese and Soviet
space industries signed an initial agreement in Moscow in
May 1990 on 10 cooperative projects, the first of which
addressed joint efforts to develop a GLONASS/GPS
compatible receiver. A formal contract was signed 2 years
later. The relationship was solidified when, on December 18,
1992, CASC and the Russian Space Agency signed an official
protocol for the sharing of space technology. This agreement
was formalized during President Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing
where he also signed a no-first-use pledge with the Chinese.
A follow-on agreement, signed by CASC Vice-director
Wang Liheng and the head of the Russian Space Agency,
outlined at least ten areas of space cooperation including
exchanges in satellite navigation, space surveillance,
propulsion, satellite communications, joint design efforts,
materials, intelligence sharing, scientific personnel
40
exchanges, and space systems testing. For program
management, the two sides agreed to annual meetings to
review the various cooperative programs. In addition, China,
Russia, and Ukraine’s space community have held annual
exchange conferences attended by as many as 250 engineers.
The fourth annual trilateral conference was held in
41
September 1996 in Kiev, Ukraine. Space cooperation
agreements have also been concluded with Ukraine (March
1994), Belarus (June 1994), and Kazakhstan (May 1998).
Areas of cooperation with Ukraine include remote sensing,
satellite communications, and aerospace material research
42
and development.
Much of the Sino-Russian and Sino-Ukrainian cooperation
is centered on China’s manned space program and supporting
launch vehicles. Russia and Ukraine have provided
assistance to China in developing cryogenic upper stages for
launch vehicles. Russia sold three RD-120 cryogenic upper
stage engines, the same as that used on the Zenit space launch
43
vehicle, to China. A formal agreement for Russian
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assistance in the manned space program was slated to be
signed during Li Peng’s visit to Moscow in May 1995 or during
Yeltsin’s late 1995 visit to Beijing. China is allegedly paying
“billions of dollars” for Russian assistance in its manned space
program, although a small proportion can be paid in bartered
goods. Items of special interest include emergency rescue,
44
thermal control, and space docking.
China has not limited its international cooperation to the
former Soviet Union. Building upon a foundation established
in the 1980s, recent contacts between French and Chinese
space communities were initiated during June 1994 space
industry negotiations between France’s National Center for
Space Studies (CNES) and COSTIND and CASC. Specific
areas of discussion included small launch vehicle technology
and R&D of small satellites. Two follow-up meetings were
held in September 1994 and November 1995. Since 1994, at
least 10 Chinese space delegations have visited French space
industry facilities. Besides small launch vehicle and satellite
technology, cooperation focuses on GPS/GLONASS
exploitation, satellite attitude control systems, commu45
nication satellites, and meteorological satellite technology.
China will work with France in developing the Proteus small
46
satellite bus.
The space relationship between China and Germany
started in the early 1980s, culminating in a contract between
the CASC and DASA in 1987 on the DFH-3. A follow-up
agreement between CASC and Deutsche Aerospace AG was
signed in November 1993 which directed the establishment of
a joint venture between EuraSpace and CASC called Sinosat.
Sinosat’s first satellite is Nahuel, a communications satellite
47
scheduled for launch in 1997. Other areas of cooperation
include SATCOM transponder technology, solar panels, and
48
orbital control systems. China is also working with
Germany on a two ton solar telescope which will orbit around
49
the moon about 2002.
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Space Warfare.
Chinese strategists have grasped the concept of space
dominance. Writings and speeches by the PLA leadership
acknowledge space as an essential dimension of regional
warfare. Space systems, under the responsibility of CASC’s
CAST, are emphasized in China’s 863 program and the 5- and
15-year plans. These systems include a new generation of
COMSATs, data relay satellites, remote sensing platforms, a
navigation satellite constellation, weather satellites, space
shuttle, and space station. Chinese space advocates place
special emphasis on small satellite technology.
Chinese writings indicate a significant interest in
anti-satellite warfare, an issue usually shrouded in extensive
50
secrecy. When discussing ASAT principles, internal
writings omit sections which address China’s domestic
programs. However, a number of systems now under
development could be used in an ASAT role. First, China has
an extensive satellite tracking network which may be
upgraded to provide precision tracking for space intercepts.
Sites are located throughout the country, and COSTIND has
approached a number of foreign countries, including Chile
and Brazil, to jointly build and use space tracking facilities.
Besides tracking and controlling satellites, these sites could
receive downlinked imagery for transmittal to Beijing.
With some modification, China’s solid fueled missile
systems, the DF-21 or DF-31, could be used in a direct ascent
ASAT role. One Chinese article referred to the potential use of
an older launch vehicle, the Long March-1, in an ASAT mode.
Warheads would most likely rely on kinetic or RF energy. The
successful development of a ballistic missile defense system
will give the Chinese an inherent ASAT capability as well.
Other ASAT concepts which have appeared in Chinese
writings include a satellite which can spread steel balls along
an enemy satellite’s path or spread dust on satellite reflectors.
Finally, COSTIND has acknowledged research into the use of
enhanced radiation weapons, which could be most useful in a
nuclear pumped laser system. China probably has the
technological capability to jam satellite uplinks or downlinks
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with some effectiveness, and could use ground-based lasers
for opto-electronic countermeasures.
Chinese strategists are thinking about satellite defense as
well. Satellite hardening measures, such as thermal shielding
or armor, are likely being examined by COSTIND and CAST.
Deception or hiding measures could be employed as well. The
use of small satellites, as CASC analysts have acknowledged,
will reduce satellite vulnerability. The use of gallium arsenide
(GAAS) integrated circuits will provide additional resistance
against space EMP weapons. China’s most recent
photoreconnaissance satellite, the FSW-2, displayed some
in-orbit maneuvering ability. As a side note, one cannot
dismiss the possibility that Russian institutes have provided
51
some results from previous Soviet ASAT tests.
Finally, China’s increasing reliance on internationally
shared space platforms could complicate attempts to deny
access to or destroy space systems used by the Chinese. China
and Brazil have a joint project to deploy two remote sensing
satellites. Beijing utilizes transponder space on the Hong
Kong controlled Asia-Pacific Telecommunications satellite.
Besides complicating ASAT efforts, the joint development and
use of satellites reduces the cost of the wide range of satellite
development programs.
Who should oversee China’s fledgling space force is a
52
subject of internal debate. The most likely candidate for
running a space organization is COSTIND’s China Launch
and Tracking Control (CLTC). CLTC oversees China’s three
main launch centers and its satellite tracking and control
network. There have been discussions within the PLA
leadership on splitting off CLTC into a independent space
command, or under control of the PLAAF, but there has been
53
no concrete action to date.
In summary, China has a wide variety of programs which
indicate it intends to become a major player in space in the
21st century. China’s emphasis is on dual use systems which
could provide significant value added benefits to future PLA
operations. PLA strategists understand that without a
presence in space, national security cannot be assured.
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Foreign assistance is crucial in their efforts. Launch vehicles,
besides providing an important source of revenue, serve as the
foundation of their future in space. A broad family of satellite
4
systems will provide critical C I services for their emerging
reconnaissance/strike complex. For greater space
survivability, greater production capacity, and lower costs,
China is emphasizing small satellite development. Finally,
extensive R&D is being carried out on a counterspace
capability in order to potentially deny future adversaries
access to their own space systems.
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APPENDIX IV
CHINA’S DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS

China is examining and testing the critical engineering
technologies needed to develop a host of directed energy
weapons (DEW). The world, including China, has long been
fascinated with the notion of projecting energy at the speed of
light in the pursuit of warfare. American and former Soviet
Union DEW programs are well-known. Very little, however, is
publicly known about research and development (R&D) of
DEW in China. However, the number of papers on directed
energy weapon-related technology is in itself an indication of
the amount of work done in this field. DEW are part of a larger
class of weapons known to the Chinese as “new concept
weapons” (xin gainian wuqi), which include high power
lasers, high power microwaves, railguns, coil guns, particle
beam weapons, etc.

Organization of China’s DEW Program.
The two most important organizations involved in R&D of
DEW are the China Academy of Sciences and the Commission
of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND).
China Academy of Sciences (CAS). CAS is China’s leading
institute for basic research into the basic sciences. Institutes
involved in DEW affiliated research include the following:

•

Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics
(solid state lasers; adaptive optics)

•

Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics
(adaptive optics)

•

Institute of Optoelectronics (adaptive optics)

•

Dalian Institute of Chemistry and Physics (COIL).
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China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP). CAEP is
an outgrowth of the nuclear industry’s 9th Academy
(Northwest Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy)
which has developed and tested China’s nuclear warheads.
The 9th Academy, subordinate to COSTIND, was previously
located in Haiyan, Qinghai Province, but moved to Mianyang,
Sichuan province in the late 1960s. With its headquarters in
Sichuan, CAEP has offices and research entities in Shanghai
1
and Beijing. CAEP’s traditional purview has been the
development of nuclear weaponry, and R&D efforts into DEW
systems reflect a significant diversification of its mission.
Subordinate research institutes include the following:

•

Southwest Institute of Applied Electronics (HPM)

•

Southwest Institute of Fluid Physics (accelerators
and HPM drivers)

•

Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics and
Chemistry (X-ray lasers)

•

Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics

•

Institute of Computer Applications

Chinese Lasers and Other Directed Energy
Weapons Under Development.
One area receiving a substantial amount of emphasis is
lasers. Work on lasers has been going on since the 1960s, when
Mao Zedong approved the 640 Plan, an advanced weapons
development project focused on missile defense. The high
powered laser portion was designated as Project 640-3 and
was intended to counter high altitude bombers and
reconnaissance platforms, such as the SR-71 which was then
under development. Primary responsibility was awarded to
the China Academy of Sciences’ Shanghai Institute of Optics
and Fine Mechanics. Research was focused in two directions:
laser nuclear fusion under the leadership of Deng Ximing, and
2
laser weapons under the leadership of Wang Zhijiang.
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In 1979, under threat of scaling back high powered laser
R&D, COSTIND’s Sun Wanlin successfully convinced the
Central Military Commission to maintain the pace and even
raise the priority of laser development, and then represented
3
the laser community in the formulation of the 863 Program.
Today, lasers, together with space, are key COSTIND4
managed programs. The Chinese recognize the role lasers
will play in 21st century warfare and are laying the
foundation for eventual weaponization of wide range of
systems. The Chinese defense industrial complex, under
management of COSTIND, are carrying out R&D on a variety
of lasers. China’s research into lasers began in the 1960s. An
estimated 10,000 people, including approximately 3,000
engineers, in 300 organizations are involved in China’s laser
program. Almost 40 percent of China’s laser R&D is for
5
military purposes.
Solid-State Lasers. Solid state lasers make use of artificial
crystals. China is a world leader in crystal growth and is
expected to further improve its capabilities through the use of
parallel processing computers which allow for complex
6
calculations for analysis of crystalline materials. China
developed one of its first high powered solid laser devices, the
Shenguang-1 (Magic Light) in 1986. This high energy
Nd:glass laser system, also known as LF-12, was developed by
CAS’s Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics
7
(SIOFM) reportedly has an output power of one terawatt. The
Shenguang-II Nd:Glass laser has an output power of two
terawatts, and will be a major facility for China’s inertial
8
confined fusion program. China Academy of Science’s
Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics (SIOFM)
has developed an Nd:YAG laser with an output power of 62.5
9
MW. An Nd:Glass laser, the Xingguang-II, has also been
developed and tested. SIOFM, together with China’s
University of Science and Technology, developed a tunable
10
titanium-sapphire laser with an output power of 650MW.
Free Electron Laser (FEL). Chinese defense S&T
community views free electron lasers (ziyou dianzi jiguang) as
having a number of advantages, including their adjustable
wavelength and bandwidth and their potential range of 5000
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kilometers. CAEP began holding meetings on FEL
development in 1985. China’s first FEL, the Shuguang-1, was
activated in May 1993 and achieved a power of 140 MW in
July 1994, with a theoretical maximum output of 10GW. The
Shuguang-1 was developed by CAEP’s Southwest Institute of
11
Fluid Physics (SWIFP). The size of FEL systems currently
limit deployment options. However, MEI’s Southwest
Institute of Electronic Engineering is working to reduce the
size of FEL systems through the miniaturization of electronic
12
devices. A second FEL facility located in Beijing was
developed by the China Academy of Sciences Institute of High
13
Energy Physics. Chinese FEL systems, including Raman,
Compton, electromagnetic wave pumped, and Cherenkov
lasers, have been modeled and simulated by an organziation
with close links to CAEP, the Institute of Applied Physics and
14
Computational Mathematics (IAPCM).
X-ray Laser. X-ray lasers, in principle, can destroy
electrical circuitry, possibly trigger some types of munitions,
set off nuclear weapons, and make humans sick or worse. The
preferred energy source is a small nuclear explosion.
However, China, which claims certain aspects of its X-ray
laser program to be the most advanced in the world, appears
to be focusing on using high powered lasers to produce X-ray
15
lasing. China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP) is
China’s leading institute on the development of X-ray laser
systems. At least one prototype X-ray driver, the Shenguang-1
16
device, was tested as early as 1988. CAEP’s Institute of
Nuclear Physics and Chemistry is also working on the
Xingguang-II laser to support its ICF and X-ray laser
17
programs.
Gas Lasers. China’s Tianguang-1 excimer laser will
probably drive CAEP’s inertial confinement fusion (ICF)
18
program. CAEP’s Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics
and Chemistry has developed and tested a fast breed
19
reactor-pumped xenon laser. China Institute of Atomic
20
Energy has experimented a krypton-flouride excimer laser.
CAEP’s Southwest Institute of Nuclear Physics and
Chemistry and SIOFM have tested a nuclear pumped
helium-argon-xenon laser, using their China Fast Breed
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Reactor (CBFR-II). The power output reached 7.5MW with a
21
peak power of 926MW.
Chemical Oxygen-Iodine Laser (COIL). CAS’ Dalian
Institute of Chemistry and Physics (DICP) is responsible for
China’s COIL development program, which they acknowledge
has the potential to be an effective DEW. COIL research in
Dalian began in the early 1980s and was formally accepted as
an 863 project in April 1991. Progress has been made into both
pulsed and CW modes. DICP scientists claim they are among
22
the world’s leaders in COIL research. In May 1995, DICP
conducted one of its first tests of a COIL against a target at
140 meters, achieving a power of 10 kilowatts with an output
23
energy of 40-50 kilojoules for 3-4 seconds.
KrF Laser. China National Nuclear Corporation’s
Institute of Atomic Energy (IAE) has developed a krypton
flouride (KrF) excimer laser. IAE began its laser development
program in 1982 and on the KrF laser, named Heaven, in
1986. The laser, a potential candidate for an ICF driver, was
24
tested in 1991 and achieved an output power of 20GW.
2

Carbon Dioxide (CO ) Laser. China’s CO2 laser
development program has been led by SIOFM which has
25
developed a 3.2 GW system. Researchers have tested the
2
effects a CO laser can have on certain composite materials,
26
such as fiberglass epoxy.
Semiconductor Laser. R&D into semiconductor lasers is a
major program supported by the Ninth Five Year Plan and
2010 Long Range Plan. Semiconductor lasers have a number
of advantages over conventional laser systems that make
them ideal for many military applications. They are highly
efficient (i.e., greater than 60 percent, as compared to 10
percent or less for conventional lasers); are scalable to higher
powers; are microelectronics-based which means they can be
mass produced, resulting in low cost; require low voltages,
therefore, can be battery operated; are compact; and because
they are solid state, they are reliable. Semiconducter lasers
are also wavelength agile. A new CAS subordinated facility
dedicated to the development of semiconductor lasers is being
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constructed in Shandong province. The Shandong
27
Semiconductor General Plant will lead the project.
Optics. China’s ability to generate high powered lasers is
well-established. However, a high powered laser is not enough
to make a weapon system. First, optics must focus the laser
energy onto a target. Generally, the larger the mirror is
relative to the wavelength, the smaller the focal spot and
higher the energy density. Optics must compensate for
atmospheric turbulence through the use of adaptive mirrors
which use numerous electronic devices to shape and achieve
the optimal beam pattern. These mirrors must also be able to
28
withstand tremendous heat generated by the laser.
China has placed high priority on development of adaptive
optics and deformable mirrors to support its DEW program.
During an annual COSTIND science and technology (S&T)
meeting, one of China’s most prominent scientists and
COSTIND advisor, Qian Xuesen, recognized the criticality of
this technology and asserted that adaptive optics, or “magic
mirrors,” are one of China’s most critical technologies in need
29
of further development.
Some progress in the development of adaptive optics has
already been made. Concentrated efforts into adaptive optics
began in 1980 when CAS formed an adaptive optics research
group and laboratory within its Institute of Optoelectronic
30
Technology. CAS certified an adaptive optics system,
developed by its Institute of Optoelectronics, which they
believe has made China a world leader—third behind the
31
United States and Germany—in adaptive optics. CAS’
SIOFM and Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics are
leading organizations responsible for development of
32
deformable mirrors and adaptive optics. Beijing’s Institute
of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics (IAPCM)
has conducted modeling work on atmospheric effects on
33
ground based high power laser weapons. To further boost its
capabilities in optics, China is seeking assistance in
34
laser-related optics technology from former Soviet states.
High Powered Microwave (HPM) Weapons. HPM weapons
are one of the world’s most sought after tools of information
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warfare. Intended to exploit the growing reliance on dense
microelectronics packed into modern military platforms,
HPM weapons can degrade computer systems used in data
processing systems, displays, signal processors, electronic
flight controls, receivers, radars, electronic warfare
equipment, satellite ground stations, and a wide range of
communication systems. China—like the United States,
Russia, and France—has a national program aimed at
exploring the feasibility of HPM weapons. Protective
measures against nuclear related EMP effects generally do
35
not perform well against HPM weapons.
China’s technology base which could be applied to design of
an HPM device is diverse and, in many areas, seemingly quite
mature. HPM weapons are generally envisioned as part of an
air defense system or, if successfully miniaturized, as a
air-delivered munition, or a cruise or ballistic missile
warhead. As an air defense system, HPM weapons have a
number of advantages. First, there are virtually no target
acquisition, pointing, or tracking requirements in any HPM
employment scenario. The radiation, traveling at the speed of
light, can envelop a large volume and engage multiple targets
at once. It may be possible to design a system that acts as both
a radar and weapon, which first tracks the target and then
increases the power and engages the target.
CAEP’s Institute of Applied Electronics and the
Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology in Xian are two
organizations engaged in research, design, and testing of
36
HPM devices. COSTIND’s National University of Defense
Technology has also conducted theoretical analysis of HPM
generators, as has the Southwest Institute of Electronic
37
Equipment.
Chinese military strategists, COSTIND analysts, and
electronic warfare specialists believe HPM weapons will serve
a useful purpose in the 21st century and strongly advocate
their weaponization. HPM systems, called the “superstar” of
directed energy weapons, can be used as “superjammers”
which focus microwave energy onto a wide range of potential
targets. HPM weapons are praised as being able to counter
stealthy air targets and antiradiation missiles, and can be
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used against wide area targets at long distances. Other DEWs
praised include plasma guns, high energy ultrasonic weapons,
and subsonic wave weapons which affect the cognitive
processes of a enemy pilots or soldiers. Besides HPM weapons,
these include particle beam “death ray” weapons with “the
power of a thunderbolt” which can carry out both hard and soft
kills against ground and air targets. Space-based neutral
particle beam weapons can engage missiles during all phases
38
of flight.
China’s HPM program is the outgrowth of research into
the effects nuclear EMP would have on its electronic
equipment in a general war. Since 1964, Chinese engineers
have developed a series of EMP devices to simulate ground,
low altitude, and high altitude nuclear bursts. These
simulators have been used to test EMP resistance of radars,
2
C centers, missile sites, underground command bunkers, and
39
other large fixed facilities.
Several power sources could drive such a weapon. For
example, energy from China’s FEL could be converted to a
40
powerful electromagnetic beam. Other potential generators
include gyrotrons, explosively-driven magneto-cumulative
generators (MCGs), magneto-hydrodynamic (MHD)
generators, flux compression generators (FCG), vircators,
klystons, magnetrons, or beam plasma devices, as well as
backward wave oscillators. An HPM weapon could also be
generated through a high explosive charge used to create a
short pulse of RF energy. The explosive charge could be
carried by an artillery shell, or as a warhead on a
41
surface-to-surface or cruise missile.
Numerous entities within China’s defense industrial
complex are conducting R&D into the most critical segment of
an HPM weapon system, its power source. For example,
University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
(UESTC), supported by CAEP’s Southwest Institute of
Applied Electronics, has been conducting developmental work
on a backward wave oscillator (BWO) as an HPM source since
at least 1989 and acknowledges the BWO as a leading
42
candidate for a mobile HPM system. UESTC has also
developed a high-powered microwave source in support of
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CAEP’s FEL program. They have also experimented with an
electron beam-plasma interaction with an HPM system which
44
increases the operating efficiency and power. UESTC,
directed by Liu Shenggang, has also developed gyrotrons as
an HPM source, while CAS’ Institute of Electronics has been
conducting R&D into broadband megawatt-class klystrons as
45
an HPM source since 1992. CAEP’s SWIFP and IAPCM are
carrying out R&D into a magnetic flux compression
46
generator.
Also under development at UESTC is an HPM variant
known as an electromagnetic missile (dianci daodan),
characterized by burst of RF energy which attenuates very
slowly (manshuaijian). As a jammer, the electromagnetic
missile (EMM) covers a broad frequency range from 1-40 GHZ
and has a longer range than more conventional jammers. As a
radar, an EMM has strong ECCM properties due to its wide
bandwidth, and can effectively counter antiradiation missiles.
Chinese engineers also tout its counterstealth capabilities,
and ability to detect low flying targets. EMM systems can
function as a most desirable means of communication due to
their high capacity, long-range, ECCM properties. When
boosted by a small nuclear explosion, Chinese engineers point
out, an EMM can also conduct hard kills against a range of
47
targets.
One of China’s first experiments in HPM weapon research
was the Flash-I system which utilized a vircator as a power
source. CAEP began development of the Flash-I in 1975. After
completion in 1983, the Flash-I operated at approximately 1
48
GhZ and had a microwave power of 1GW. The Northwest
Institute of Nuclear Technology (NWINT) has developed the
Flash-II (Shanguang) electron beam accelerator with a
maximum power of 1 terawatt. After a feasibility study in
1982, the Flash-II project, designed to aid China’s
electromagnetic simulation and HPM weapons research,
49
began in 1983 and was first tested in 1990. NWINT has also
conducted developmental work on vircators as an HPM power
50
source and is a strong proponent for their use. Finally, the
2nd Academy has also done technical assessments of
51
directional transmissions of EMP bursts.
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If successful, HPM and other RF weapons could cause a
military technical revolution by sharply limiting the
battlespace use of advanced electronics and severely
interrupting enemy communications without the use of
nuclear weapons. Russia’s Institute of Applied Physics and
Lebedev Physics Institute are currently believed to be the
world leaders in some of the basic technology involved in HPM
52
and RF weapons. In light of the large number of Russian
scientists assisting China’s conventional and strategic
military modernization, one cannot ignore the possibility that
Russian engineers are providing assistance to China’s DEW
program.
There is no proof or strong indication that development of
HPM or RF weapons is in a more advanced stage in China
than in the United States. Chinese engineers are probably
working hard along the same lines as U.S. engineers on
strategic and tactical applications of laser technology.
CAEP has done significant work on particle accelerator
technology. Besides serving as a key component of an FEL
system, accelerator technology can be used as a particle beam
source, a driver for an ICF program, or to simulate a nuclear
explosion. SWIFP’s 3.3 MeV linear induction accelerator
53
drives the SG-1 FEL.

Potential Applications.
The PLA is placing greater emphasis on lasers and their
potential military applications. The Academy of Military
Science, the PLA’s leading think-tank on future warfare,
believes lasers will be an integral aspect of 21st century war.
Strategists note a wide range of military applications of
lasers, including ranging, laser radars, communications,
reconnaissance, high power directed energy weapons, nuclear
fusion and neutron bombs, laser gyroscopes, and laser
computing. At the same time, strategists highlight the
54
importance of countering an enemy’s use of lasers.
Air and Missile Defense. China’s defense industrial
complex is researching potential applications of a tactical
laser system to counter aircraft; ballistic, cruise, and
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anti-radiation missiles; and a wide range of precision
guidance munitions. As an air defense weapon, lasers can be
highly effective against pilots and vulnerable parts of the
2
aircraft itself, including the wing root, radar, and engine. CO ,
chemical, FEL, and X-ray laser systems have been examined
as potential candidates. Research has, in large part, been
55
budgeted under the 863 program.
Satellite Tracking. For more than a decade, China has
used lasers to track satellites in space. Laser range finders are
located at space observatories in Wuhan, Nanjing, Beijing,
Kunming, Lintong, and Shanghai. Anhui Institute of Optics
and Fine Mechanics plays a large role in the development of
these systems, as well as excimer lasers and the atmospheric
effects on laser transmission. China’s satellite laser range
finders, which have an accuracy of 3-4 centimeters, assist in
satellite orbit calculations and real-time tracking and
adjustment in support of COSTIND’s China Launch and
Tracking Control (CLTC). The lasers can track satellites at
56
both low earth and geosynchronous orbit. While apparently
not operationally subordinated to CLTC, the laser range
finders are most likely tied into their space tracking network.
The laser ranging systems can support China’s domestic
satellite tracking requirements and, if upgraded, any future
ASAT campaign.
Anti-Satellite (ASAT). Chinese engineers have conducted
at least theoretical research into the use of high powered
lasers and other directed energy weapons against satellites
and have closely studied U.S. and former Soviet ASAT
systems, including the U.S. MIRACL, COIL, EMRLD
57
projects, and former Soviet DEW systems at Sary Sagan.
Satellites as currently constructed are particularly
susceptible to laser attack. Typical antisatellite concepts have
a 100 second engagement time, which is the exposure time of a
low earth orbit satellite to a ground station.
Laser Radar. Chinese engineers strongly advocate the
2
development of CO laser radars (lidar), especially for
countering a potential adversary’s cruise missiles. Supported
by the 863 Program, Anhui Institute of Optics and Fine
Mechanics has developed one of China’s first lidars, which has
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a maximum detection range of 50 kilometers. Other
applications include GEO satellite tracking, target tracking,
fire control, and terrain following for helicopters and cruise
58
2
missiles. One study noted the utility of CO laser radars,
combined with other sensors, in countering stealthy cruise
59
missiles and aircraft.
In summary, directed energy weapons are an integral
component of China’s strategic modernization program. Key
programs include a variety of high powered lasers and high
powered microwave weapons. Chinese analysts see directed
energy technology as important for China’s air defense and
counterspace efforts. DEW efforts also reflect a diversification
of China’s nuclear weapons industry.
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APPENDIX V
COMMISSION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND INDUSTRY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE

The focal point for coordinating People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) requirements with the SSTC is the Commission of
Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense
(COSTIND). COSTIND is directed by Lieutenant General
Cao Gangchuan, who transfered from his previous position as
director of the GSD Equipment Department. Cao has at least
1
four deputy directors who each hold different portfolios.
COSTIND senior advisors include Qian Xuesen, the father of
China’s space and missile development (see Appendix II) and
Chen Fangyun, an electronics expert who in the 1960s and
1970s organized the effort to develop a space tracking
network. Important departments, committees, and institutes
include the following:

•

S&T Committee. COSTIND’s S&T Committee,
directed by Zhu Guangya, is made up of some of
China’s most talented engineers, who provide
consultative guidance for the COSTIND leadership.

•

Comprehensive Planning Department.
COSTIND’s Comprehensive Planning Department
(zonghe jihua bu) is a key organization responsible for
long-range planning for developing of critical
enabling technologies and weapons systems.2

•

S&T Department. Directed by Major General Jiang
Laigen, the S&T Department likely oversees
preliminary and model R&D efforts of the various
COSTIND and defense industry research institutes.3

COSTIND also oversees the development and operation of
China’s space facilities and a series of engineering and test
bases. 4
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•

Base 20. Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (JSLC),
located in Gobi desert, is China’s earliest and largest
satellite launch center. From here, CLTC conducts
medium and low earth orbit satellite launches at high
inclinations. More than 20 satellites, mostly
photoreconnaissance platforms, have launched from
Jiuquan. Beijing has TT&C station under XSCC.

•

Base 21. Nuclear weapons testing in Xinjiang, near
the town of Lop Nur.

•

Base 22. SAM testing near Jiuquan, Gansu province.

•

Base 23. Naval Test area SLBM testing; antiship
missiles at Huludao, Liaoning province. Established
in 1957 for joint Sino-Soviet anti-ship missile testing.

•

Base 25. Taiyuan Space Launch Center, in northern
Shanxi province in the area of Kelan, Wuzhai, and
Xingxian counties, one of China’s primary satellite
launch and missile testing sites. Commanded by
Major General Jiang Xuefu.

•

Base 26. Xian Satellite Control Center is directed by
Major General Li Hengxing, who recently replaced
Major General Shangguan Shipan.

•

Base 27. Xichang Space Launch Center, directed by
Major General Hu Shixiang.

•

Base 29. China Aerodynamic Research and
Development Center (CARDC) in Mianyang, Sichuan
province.

•

Base 31. Baicheng Conventional Weapons Testing
Center.

China Launch and Tracking Control General
(CLTC). CLTC (Weixing Fashe Cekong Xitong Zongbu) is a
departmental level entity which functions as an operational
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arm of COSTIND. CLTC, commanded by Major General Li
Yuanzheng, is roughly analagous to U.S. Space Command.
With over 5000 engineers and technicians, CLTC oversees
three satellite launch centers and China’s vast tracking,
telemetry, and control (TT&C) network. CLTC headquarters,
which occupies a large facility on Beijing’s North Third Ring
Road, is made up of a planning department, development
department, tracking and control department, logistics
department and liaison department. Two research institutes
under CLTC include the Luoyang Institute of Tracking,
Telecommunications, Technology (LITTT) and the Beijing
5
Special Engineering and Design Research Institute (BSEDI).
The COSTIND entity responsible for constructing launch and
tracking sites and testing facilities is the Beijing Special
6
Engineering and Design Research Institute (BSEDI).

ENDNOTES - APPENDIX V
1. Deputy Directors include Lieutenant General Zhang Xuedong,
Lieutenant General Shen Rongjun, Lieutenant General Huai Guomo,
Lieutenant General Shen Chunnian, Major General Chen Dazhi, and
Major General Wang Tongye. Portfolios include conventional systems
R&D and testing; space and missile systems R&D (Shen Rongjun);
telecommunications (Wang Tongye); nuclear issues; and defense
conversion (Huai Guomo). At the time of this writing, much of
COSTIND was being placed under a new general department, the
General Armaments Department, co-equal to the GSD, GPD, and GLD.
2. At least since 1991, the Comprehensive Planning Department
has been directed by Major General Chen Dazhi. Chen, however, has
been recently promoted to become a deputy director of COSTIND. See
Xinhua press release, March 31, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-091.
3. Organizational information drawn from “Directory of PRC
Military Personalities,” Defense Liaison Office, U.S. Consulate
General, Hong Kong, October 1996, pp. 25-27. For an excellent overview
of COSTIND, see Shirley A. Kan, China: Commission of Science
Technology, and Industry for National Defense, Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, November 7, 1996.
4. Lewis and Xue, pp. 85, 189, 191, and 279 endnote 64; and
“Directory of PRC Military Personalities,” pp. 25-27. Bases within
China’s military industrial complex can be divided into series. For
example, the 20 and 30 series are COSTIND bases for space launch and
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weapons testing. The 50 series are Second Artillery strategic missile
bases. The 60 series are subordinate to China Aerospace Corporation,
China’s space and missile industry.
5. Undated CLTC brochure; “Directory of PRC Military
Personalties,” Defense Liaison Office, U.S. Consulate General, Hong
Kong, October 1996, pp. 25-27.
6. Undated BSEDI brochure. Founded in 1958, BSEDI has over 450
personnel.
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APPENDIX VI
CHINA’S MINISTRY OF ELECTRONICS
INDUSTRY (MEI)

Minister:

Hu Qili

Vice-ministers:

Liu Jianfeng (dual-hatted as Chairman of
Liantong. Next in line to replace Hu Qili)
Zhang Jinqiang
Lu Xinkui

Chief Engineer:

Yu Zhongyu

China Academy of Electronics and Information
Technology (CAEIT). General systems design department. Heavily involved in formation of national information
infrastructure. Works closely with COSTIND’s Beijing
Institute of Systems Engineering (BISE) in developing
China’s national C4I infrastructure.
Research Institutes.
2nd Research Institute

Taiyuan

5th Research Institute

Associated with environmental
testing.

6th Research Institute

Computer systems engineering.
Also known as Huasun
Computer Company.

7th Research Institute

Guangzhou Communications
Research Institute. Has
conducted R&D on field mobile
communications systems, such as
digital mobile communications
system.

8th Research Institute

Anhui Fiber Optical Fiber
Research Institute.
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10th Research Institute

Southwest Institute of
Electronics Technology (SWIET).
Located in Chengdu. Involved in
a range of defense-related
programs including UHF,
microwave, and millimeter
communications and radar
equipment.

11th Research Institute

R&D into solid state laser
systems, to include laser range
finders.

12th Research Institute

TACAN systems.

13th Research Institute

Located in Shijiazhuang.
Involved in development of
integrated circuits and
solid state lasers. Best known for
work in gallium arsenide
integrated circuits. Importing
advanced French technology.

14th Research Institute

Leading radar institute, located
in Nanjing. Involved in
development of early warning,
phased array, HF, and
space tracking radars.

15th Research Institute

North China Computer Institute.
Located in Beijing and known as
Taiji.

18th Research Institute

Tianjin Institute of Power
Sources.

20th Research Institute

China’s primary navigation
research institute located in
Xian.

21st Research Institute

Located in Shanghai.

22nd Research Institute

China Institute of Radiowave
Propagation. Involved in timing
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sources, such as those associated
with Shaanxi Astronautical
Observatory Timing Station.
25th Research Institute

R&D on signal processing
systems. Working on long wave
infrared (LWIR) imaging seeker.

26th Research Institute

Located in Chongqing. R&D into
surface acoustic wave (SAW)
devices, piezoelectronic
acousto-optics, electronic
ceramics, and crystals.

28th Research Institute

Nanjing Research Institute of
Electrical Engineering.
4
Responsible for C I systems
integration for air defense
and air traffic control systems.

29th Research Institute

Southwest Institute of Electronic
Engineering (SWIEE). Located in
Chengdu. Responsible for radar
reconnaissance and electronic
countermeasures.

30th Research Institute

R&D on switching systems,
to include advanced common
channel signalling seven (SS7)
software.

33rd Research Institute

Located in Taiyuan.

34th Research Institute

Guilin Institute of Optical
Communications. One of China’s
principle entities engaged in
R&D on fiber optics. JV with
Nokia.

36th Research Institute

Responsible for communications
electronic countermeasures.

38th Research Institute

East China Institute of
Electronic Engineering
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(ECRIEE). Specializes in
early warning and artillery
radars. Located in Hefei.
39th Research Institute

Northwest Institute of Electronic
Equipment (NWIEE). Develops
SATCOM ground stations,
microwave relays, and missile
range equipment.

40th Research Institute

Responsible for connectors and
relays. Located in Bengbu.

41st Research Institute

R&D into signal generators and
test equipment for infrared focal
plane arrays.

43rd Research Institute

Hengli Electronics Development
Corporation. Located in Hefei.

44th Research Institute

Chongqing Institute of
Optoelectronics. R&D into
charged couple devices (CCDs),
infrared focal plane arrays, and
fiber optics.

45th Research Institute

R&D into integrated circuit
production technology, i.e.,
steppers. Located in Pingliang,
Gansu province.

46th Research Institute

Located in Tianjin. R&D and
testing of silicon and gallium
arsenide materials.

47th Research Institute

R&D into reduced instruction set
computing (RISC) integrating
circuits.

49th Research Institute

Northeast Institute of Sensor
Technology. Located in Harbin.
Develops vibration and other
sensors.
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50th Research Institute

Shanghai Institute of Microwave
Technology. Has worked on
automated command systems for
SAM units.

51st Research Institute

Conducts R&D on radar reconnaissance and jamming.

53rd Research Institute

Institute of Applied Infrared
Technology. Located in Liaoning.
Engaged in passive jamming and
optoelectronics.

54th Research Institute

Communications Technology
Institute. Located in
Shijiazhuang. Major player in
wide range of military systems.

55th Research Institute

R&D on semiconductors.

Factories.
605th Factory

Fiber optic cable.

701 Factory

Radios

707 Factory

Chenxing Radio Factory

710 Factory

Zhongyuan Radio Factory.
Located in Wuhan. Engaged in
production of civilian and
military telecommunications
equipment.

711 Factory

Shipborne UHF systems.

712 Factory

Airborne UHF systems. Located
in Tianjin.

713 Factory

unknown

714 Factory

Panda Electronics Factory. HF
and airborne UHF systems.

716 Factory

Digital communications
equipment
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719 Factory

Airborne navigation equipment

720 Factory

One China’s primary radar
factories. Works closely with
14th Research Institute in
Nanjing.

722 Factory

ECM plant. Works closely with
29th Research Institute.

730 Factory

Submarine cable

734 Factory

Fiber optic cable and wireless
equipment

738 Factory

Computers. Works closely with
15th Research Institute.

741 Factory

Optoelectronics and infrared
systems.

750 Factory

Guangdong Radio Group
Telecommuications Company.
HF SSB.

754 Factory

Located in Tianjin.

756 Factory

Aviation navigation equipment

760 Fatory

Troposcatter systems

761 Factory

Beijing Broadcast Factory. High
powered VLF systems.

764 Factory

Tianjin Broadcasting Equipment
Company. Aviation navigation
equipment

765 Factory

Aviation navigation equipment.
Located in Baoji.

769 Factory

Airborne UHF systems

780 Factory

Airborne radar countermeasures

781 Factory

ECM plant and bombing control
radars
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782 Factory

Airborne radars and transponders. Located in Baoji.

783 Factory

Fujiang Machinery Factory.
Also known as Sichuan Jiuzhou
Electronic Factory. Produces
secondary radars and IFF
transponders. Located in
Mianyang.

784 Factory

Jinjiang Electronic Machinery
Factory. Located in Chengdu.
Produces surveillance radars.

785 Factory

Produces optoelectronics
equipment and SAM guidance
radars, and AAA computers.

786 Factory

SAM guidance radars. Located in
Xian.

789 Factory

AAA computers

834 Factory

Tactical communications
equipment

913 Factory

ECM plant. Works closely with
36th Research Institute.

914 Factory

Lanxin Radio Factory. Located in
Lanzhou.

924 Factory

Radar reconnaissance and jamming equipment. Works closely
with 29th Research Institute.

4500 Factory

Computer systems

4508 Factory

Located in Tianjin.

6909 Factory

ECM plant
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Other Entities
Nanjing Radio Factory

Tactical communications
systems.

Nanhai Machinery
Factory

Airborne navigation radars

Huajing Electronics
Group

Working on submicron
integrated circuits under 908
project. Located in Wuxi. Joint
venture with AT&T.

Huadong Computer
Technology Institute

Developed China’s first
minisupercomputer.

Great Wall Computer
Group

Largest computer firm in China.

Beijing Institute of
Electronic Technology
Applications

Developed Internet firewall
system.

North China Research
Institute of OptoElectronics

Works on sub-systems for lidar
system. Develops infrared
materials and devices.

Zhongchen Electronics
Industry Development
Corporation

Engaged in systems
engineering. JV with US Lotus
Corporation.

Zhongruan Corporation

Computer software.

China’s Top Integrated Circuit Producers:
Shougang-NEC
Tianjin-Motorola
Huajing Microelectronics Group
Shanghai Beijing Microelectronics Company
Shanghai Advanced Semiconductor Corporation
Shaoxing Huayue Microelectronics
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Sources: Various Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
reports, 1995-present; China Today: Defense Science and Technology,
Vol. II, pp. 719-764; author’s unpublished study, Ministry of Electronics
Research Institutes and Factories: Organizations Engaged in Research
and Development of Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence (C3I), U.S. Defense Attache Office, Beijing, May 1995; and
Lynn Crisanti, Report on Ministry of Electronics Industry Research
Institutes and Factories, Kamsky Associates, 1998.
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